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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Sherman Act was passed, the federal antitrust laws have cycled
through extreme positions on the relationship between competition policy and
the patent system. Initially came a period of extreme deference, in which the
Supreme Court rejected every antitrust challenge to a patent practice. The
Court approved product price fixing in patent licenses,1 patent ties,2 and
refusals to license externally acquired and unused patents.3 A single mention
of patents in the 1914 Clayton Antitrust Act abruptly changed that.4 The
Supreme Court began an aggressive campaign against patent “misuse” that
placed severe limitations on patent practices.5 Under Thurman Arnold’s
1 See, e.g., Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) (“[T]he general rule
is absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United States.
The very object of these laws is monopoly . . . .”).
2 See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 49 (1912).
3 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908); see also
CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 295–98 (2012).
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012) (prohibiting anticompetitive tying or exclusive dealing in
goods, “whether patented or unpatented”). For a historical perspective, see HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870‒
1970, at 185–205 (2015).
5 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917)
(overruling Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912)). On the rise and fall of the patent
“misuse” doctrine, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 258–89.
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leadership of the Antitrust Division in the late 1930s and 1940s, these
concerns migrated into antitrust law.6 At the same time, the Court invalidated
an ever-increasing number of patents under a restrictive “inventive genius”
test, prompting Justice Jackson to complain that “the only patent that is valid is
one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”7
The Supreme Court also developed the “leverage” theory, initially in
patent misuse doctrine8 and later in antitrust law.9 Under that doctrine, a patent
owner behaved anticompetitively when it adopted a practice that was thought
to extend its power “beyond the scope” of the patent itself.10 For example,
International Salt, Co. v. United States condemned a firm’s tying of salt to its
patented salt-injecting machine.11 The Court did not go so far as to say that
such ties were condemned per se, without any showing of market power. It did
what amounted to the same thing, however, by declaring that ownership of a
patent created a presumption of sufficient power to make a patent tie
unlawful.12 That presumption stood for nearly sixty years until it was
overruled in 2006.13 During its life, this presumption became the basis for
many attacks on restrictions in patent licensees.14
The Supreme Court was hardly the sole instigator of hostility toward
patents. It also came from the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
The Antitrust Division was largely responsible for spreading competition
doctrine from patent “misuse,” a set of judge-made rules that arose exclusively
in private patent litigation, into government enforced antitrust policy. The high
point of patent aggressiveness was around 1970, when the Antitrust Division
articulated its “nine no nos” of patenting, virtually guaranteed to produce an
antitrust challenge. This list included:

6 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 200–03.
7 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 566, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J.,

dissenting) (applying the “inventive genius” standard and finding a lack of invention in
combination of a well-known mold process and a well-known process of using centrifugal
force to press melted wax into the mold; the process had been widely used with metals in
the jewelry industry).
8 See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680,
684 (1944) (refusing to enforce tie accomplished via a combination patent); Carbice Corp.
of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 34–35 (1931) (refusing to enforce patent
tie).
9 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 254 (1942) (condemning RPM of
lens blanks for bifocal glasses); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 457–
59 (1940) (condemning resale price maintenance of gasoline containing the appellant’s
“antiknock” compound). The extensive case law is discussed in 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1621a (3d ed. 2010).
10 See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1621a.
11 Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
12 Id. at 395–96, 403–04 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
13 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006).
14 See 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1781–1782.
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1. Tying the purchase of unpatented materials as a condition of the
license;
2. Requiring a licensee to assign back subsequent patents;
3. Restricting the resale right of a product’s purchasers;
4. Restricting a licensee’s ability to deal in products outside the
scope of the patent;
5. Prohibiting a licensor from granting further licenses;
6. Requiring mandatory package licensing;
7. Requiring, as a condition of the license, royalties not reasonably
related to the licensee’s sales of products covered by the patent;
8. Restricting a licensee’s use of a product made by a patented
process; and
9. Setting minimum resale price provisions for licensed products.15
Most of the “nine no nos” described vertical practices, although “no no”
number nine encompassed both horizontal price fixing and resale price
maintenance. In a perverse turn, the decision in Bement v. National Harrow
Co. and United States v. General Electric, Co. (GE) twice rejected challenges
to horizontal price fixing of patented products if the price fix clause was part
of a patent license.16 Congress attempted repeatedly to overturn this “GE
rule,” but without success17—a point that three dissenting Justices emphasized
in the 1947 United States v. Line Materials Co. decision.18 There, a majority
condemned a market wide price fixing agreement contained in patent crosslicenses.19 The antitrust enforcement agencies today largely ignore Bement and
GE,20 even though they have never been overruled. In the 2013 FTC v.
Actavis, Inc. decision, however, dicta in the majority opinion restricted their
application to agreements between a “single patentee” and a “single

15 Bruce B. Wilson, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use,
Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions, in ANTITRUST PRIMER: PATENTS,
FRANCHISING, TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS 11, 11–21 (Sara-Ann Sanders ed., 1970).
16 See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926); Bement v. Nat’l
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 93–95 (1902); see also infra text accompanying note 249.
17 See TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM. (TNEC), INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF
ECONOMIC POWER, S. DOC. NO. 76-95, at 16–18 (1939); see also Grant W. Kelleher, PriceFixing Under Patent License Agreements, 3 MONT. L. REV. 5, 19–25 (1942). For harsh
criticism of the Temporary National Economic Committee proposals on patents, see
generally GEORGE E. FOLK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS (1942).
18 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 362–63 & n.30 (1948) (Burton,
J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 314 (majority opinion).
20 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR THE LICENSING AND ACQUISITION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.2 (1995)
[hereinafter IP ANTITRUST GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public
/guidelines/0558.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/QMX2-M4DA (citing GE only as a
qualifier to its then-existing position that resale price maintenance is unlawful but never
citing Bement).
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licensee.”21 In 1913 and 1917, however, the Court twice applied antitrust law’s
per se rule to purely vertical price maintenance provisions in license
agreements with dealers in patented products.22 The result was that for nearly
a century purely vertical agreements on the pricing of patented goods were
treated with greater hostility than agreements among competitors.
By the time the “nine no nos” were articulated, patent and antitrust
doctrine had already come under blistering attack—particularly antitrust law’s
hostility toward patent ties,23 as well as its presumption that antitrust-imposed
restrictions on patents would advance either competition or innovation.24
Today we are inclined to see patent tying arrangements as competitively
benign in most cases.25 None of the “nine no nos” remains unlawful per se as a
general matter. That includes number nine when applied to resale price
maintenance, which was placed under the rule of reason in 2007 by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin Creative Products, Inc. v. PSKS Inc.26
Market wide product price fixing among competitors is or should be an
exception.27 Further, the presumption of market power is gone, and today
patents are regarded in most cases as no more indicative of monopoly power
than are land titles or other tangible property interests.
Both antitrust policy and patent policy are properly concerned with
economic welfare, although the concerns are articulated more clearly in
antitrust than in patent law. At the atmospheric level, antitrust focuses on the
short run, including such things as immediate pricing and output, while patent
law is concerned with long run issues relating to innovation. But upon
inspection this dichotomy quickly breaks down. In fact, antitrust policy has
always been concerned with performance over both the short and long runs
and often considers effects on innovation.

21 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013). The limitation is suggested in
12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2041b (3d ed. 2012) (discussing Newburgh
Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283, 291–94 (3d Cir. 1956)).
22 See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 501 (1917); Bauer & Cie v.
O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913).
23 See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
YALE L.J. 19, 20 (1957).
24 See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 239–56 (1973); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on
Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 312–13
(1966); see also John L. Murchison, Jr., Patent Acquisitions and the Antitrust Laws, 45
TEX. L. REV. 663, 663 (1967).
25 See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1711–1717; Erik Hovenkamp &
Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION POLICY (Daniel Sokol & Roger D. Blair eds., 2015); Erik Hovenkamp &
Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 926
(2010).
26 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007).
27 See infra notes 273‒77 and accompanying text.
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Previous studies of antitrust law and the patent system have generally
assumed that issued patents are valid, discrete, and generally of high quality in
the sense that they further innovation. As a result, increasing the returns to
patenting increases the incentive to do socially valuable innovation, whose
gains must be traded off against the losses from patent exclusion. Ward
Bowman addressed this tradeoff problem by presenting the patent as a kind of
walled garden, protecting everything inside from antitrust scrutiny—provided
that the activity remained inside the patent’s lawful scope. He concluded:
[E]valuating whether certain patent licensing practices should be sanctioned
will involve the proper scope of the legal monopoly. Is more being
monopolized than what the patent grants, or is the practice merely
maximizing the reward attributable to the competitive advantage afforded by
a patent?28

In the mid-1980s, Louis Kaplow proposed a “ratio test” that assessed
antitrust practices by balancing “patentee reward” against “monopoly loss.”29
Kaplow himself recognized that the challenges in applying such a test are both
“formidable” and “controversial.”30 Indeed, the relevant measurements
required information about the optimal term of a patent.31 Not only is this term
impossible to compute in litigation, it also varies considerably from industry to
industry.32
28 BOWMAN, JR., supra note 24, at 8–9 (emphasis added). In the process, Bowman
dismissed Chicago economist Frank Knight’s suggestion that the patent process
undervalued those who did pure creative research and gave the reward to the one “who
adds a detail or finishing touch that makes an idea practicable where the real work of
pioneering and exploration has been done by others.” FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 372 (1921); see also THORSTEN KÄSEBERG, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, ANTITRUST AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION IN THE EU AND THE US 31‒32
(2012); Amedeo Arena et al., Two Bodies of Law Separated by a Common Mission:
Unilateral Conduct by Dominant Firms at the IP/Antitrust Intersection in the EU and the
US, 9 EUR. COMPETITION J. 623, 623–24 (2013); Baxter, supra note 24, at 312; Michael A.
Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 762–65 (2002);
Thomas K. Cheng, A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface, 33 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 3–5 (2012); Thomas Cheng, Putting Innovation Incentives Back in the
Patent-Antitrust Interface, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 385, 386–93 (2013); Gerald R.
Gibbons, Price Fixing in Patent Licenses and the Antitrust Laws, 51 VA. L. REV. 273, 273–
78 (1965). See generally Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of
Meaning, VA. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2008, at 3 (arguing that much of the problem is
semantic because the two systems use the same words to mean different things).
29 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1831 (1984). Professor Kaplow explained: “In this ratio, ‘patentee reward’ and
‘monopoly loss’ refer, respectively, to the incremental reward and loss resulting from the
practice in question. In general, the higher the ratio, the more desirable the practice.” Id.
30 Id. at 1833.
31 Id. at 1831.
32 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294–300 (2003). On the question of different optimal
periods in different industries, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in
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If a patent or patent practice does nothing to further innovation, however,
then any amount of social loss from increased monopoly is harmful. In that
case, there is no additional benefit from innovation down the road. Because
only a subset of patents are worthless, this naturally invites the question
whether considerations of patent social value are a reasonable element of
competition policy.
Two premises drive the approach taken here. First, any resolution of
patent/antitrust conflicts must be capable of judicial administration, although
legislation can provide the relevant framework. This places the “patent social
value” question out of bounds in most cases because it simply cannot be
answered. Second, both antitrust and patent law are “regulatory” institutions,
which respond to political as well as economic pressures. An approach to
harmonization that assumes that patent law always “gets it right” will lead to
significant errors, just as much as an approach that makes the same assumption
about antitrust. Courts need to play the hands they are dealt, which are
complex statutes that at least at the verbal level have surprisingly few
inconsistencies. Further, judicial statutory construction is always subject to
further congressional revision, as the history of both statutory regimes amply
indicates. For example, in 1914, Congress responded with § 3 of the Clayton
Act to what it viewed as an irrational lack of judicial concern about patent
ties.33 It also responded to Supreme Court merger decisions in 1950 with
expansions of the merger law.34 For its part, patent law was amended in 1952
in order to counter what Congress perceived as overly restrictive rules on
patent issuance and excessively quick findings of misuse. It further limited
misuse claims in 1988.35
In the current state of the law, antitrust is doing a better job of addressing
the concerns within its domain than patent law is at addressing its concerns.
Indeed, antitrust law is often a more effective promoter of innovation than our
current patent system is. To be sure, at various points in their history both
antitrust law and patent law have engaged in considerable overreaching.
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, antitrust law went through a lengthy and
still ongoing process of court-imposed discipline that has brought its rules
more closely into alignment with its stated concern, which is increasing
consumer welfare by promoting competition. Today, antitrust cases are far
more difficult to win, the per se rule is less frequently used, and we have
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576–78 (2003); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro,
Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106, 106–07 (1990); Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839, 840 (1990). Important earlier literature includes WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE (1969); F. M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric
Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972).
33 See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012).
34 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
35 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (2012).
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considerably heightened the requirements of allegation and economic proof.36
By contrast, patent law has continued on an expansion course that is only now
showing some signs of abating. Patent law still awaits the consumer welfare
revolution that to a large extent has already occurred in antitrust doctrine.
Writing in the mid-sixties, Ward S. Bowman and Robert H. Bork warned of a
“crisis in antitrust,” presaging the significant reform that was to follow.37
Today we are facing a similar crisis in patent law.
This Article first examines antitrust and patent law as regulatory
institutions with legislative authority to manage their given areas, but subject
to limitations that all regulatory institutions face—namely, high cost,
imperfect information, and special interest capture. One failed approach to this
regulatory enterprise was the view that the patentee acts improperly when it
engages in activity “beyond the scope” of the patent. The flip side is that
activity that is not “beyond the scope” is permissible.38 A more sensible way
to view the interaction between the patent and antitrust regulatory systems is to
divide patent activity into two parts: pre-issuance and post-issuance conduct.
Secondly, one must look for explicit statutory authorization of the conduct in
question. Post-issuance conduct that is not statutorily authorized is generally
amenable to antitrust scrutiny.39 Next, we examine the antitrust and patent
systems as regulatory institutions, finding that today the presence of special
interest capture is far stronger in the patent system than the antitrust system,
although that may not always have been the case.40
After that, we turn to the very different ways that antitrust and the patent
system approach economic policy and innovation. The antitrust system is
empirical, market based, and acutely sensitive to the differences that exist
among markets. In sharp contrast, the patent system is dominated by a much
more myopic set of queries concerned with the boundaries of individual
property rights and largely indifferent to market performance and diversity. If
one thinks of the antitrust system and the patent system as tools for promoting
economic growth and consumer welfare, antitrust has distinct institutional
advantages.41

36 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 33–59; infra notes 291–94 and

accompanying text. The specific antitrust doctrines that gave effect to these changes are
discussed in 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 306–309 (discussing jury trial,
complaint and summary judgment, and expert testimony); 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 9, ¶¶ 335–338 (discussing plaintiff standing, causation, and antitrust injury).
37 Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec.
1963, at 138, reprinted in 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 363–66 (1965).
38 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1); see also infra notes 45–66 and
accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 67–82 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 83–116 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 135–63 and accompanying text.
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Finally, we develop a set of rules for evaluating specific disputes that
implicate both antitrust and the patent system, focusing mainly on the
difference between pre-issuance patent conduct, which is intensely regulated,
and post-issuance conduct, as well as the differences between practices that are
expressly authorized by the Patent Act and those that are not. Given the level
of producer capture exhibited by the Patent Act, the search for express
authorization is particularly important. A regulatory statute must be followed,
even when it bargains away the public interest, but silence and ambiguity
should be construed against the interests in control of the legislative process.
These principles are applied to a number of practices, including price fixing in
patent licenses, vertical practices, pay-for-delay settlements and other naked
market division agreements, and improper patent enforcement actions.42

II. ANTITRUST AND PATENT LAW AS REGULATORS
Both the antitrust and patent systems are regulatory institutions, calling for
government intervention in market trading. Antitrust law’s principal purpose is
to correct market failures brought about by lack of competition or to discipline
activities that seek to limit it. The patent system is intended to correct market
failures that result when inventors cannot effectively appropriate the returns to
their inventions.
Stating the concerns in this way exaggerates their separateness, however.
The market failures that result from harm to competition frequently include
loss of inventiveness or technical progress, and the patent system ideally
accomplishes its goals by metering a tradeoff between exclusion and access.
The latter requires competitiveness and the free mobility of assets. The result
is a complex set of rules that reflect the relationship between these two
systems, with one frequently required to accommodate the other.43
Nonetheless, a “tradeoff” is necessary only if there is something to trade
off. For much of our history the courts have applied aggressive antitrust rules
to patent practices when the antitrust rules themselves did nothing to further
competition. For example, we do not need to “trade off” the competitive harm
from patent tying arrangements with patent law in the vast majority of cases.
The tie does no competitive harm to begin with. By the same token, however,
there is nothing to trade off when the patent rule in question causes
competitive harm but does nothing to further innovation. In this sense, the
“crisis” of patent law overreaching today resembles the antitrust crisis of the
1960s and 1970s.44 For example, in the Trebro Manufacturing, Inc. v. Firefly
42 See infra notes 164–97 and accompanying text.
43 These rules are expressed in multi-volume treatises such as 1 HERBERT

HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED
TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2014).
44 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978); Bork & Bowman, Jr., supra note 37, at 363–64; see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
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Equipment, LLC decision, discussed below, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit traded off a considerable loss of market competitiveness for a
remedy that did absolutely nothing to further innovation.45
The most important development in patent/antitrust law in the last three
decades is that antitrust has become narrower and much more rigorous about
its mission to protect competition.46 At the same time, however, patent
granting and interpretation have increasingly reflected producer capture and
overbreadth. In addition, antitrust policy has become increasingly empirical,
assessing practices by modeling impact on price, output, or other indicia of
consumer welfare. In sharp contrast, patent law as applied in the courts has
very little empirical economic content.

A. “Beyond the Scope”
One of the more unhelpful patent/competition rules is that a patent practice
should be evaluated by querying whether it reaches “beyond the scope” of the
patent grant. The formulation perpetuates the idea of the patent as a walled
garden whose insides are largely free of scrutiny, while everything outside is
challengeable. As noted above, Ward Bowman advocated “beyond the scope”
as a way of demarcating the line between patents and antitrust.47
The “beyond the scope” formulation actually originated before the
antitrust laws were passed, in nineteenth century cases involving patent term
extensions applied retroactively to goods that had already been purchased.48 It
was later used to justify the judge-made first sale doctrine against patentees
who attempted to enforce patents rights in goods that they had already sold.49
For example, in Adams v. Burke, Justice Bradley described such post-sale
restraints as attempts to assert rights that are “no longer within the limits of the
monopoly.”50 After that, the formulation was used to refer to unreasonably
broad construction of patent claims.51 In the twentieth century it was extended
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 31 (1976) (analyzing the “crisis” in a less
rhetorical but equally critical way).
45 Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see
infra note 140 and accompanying text.
46 See generally BORK, supra note 44; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST
ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION (2005).
47 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
48 The first use of the concept was in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539,
549 (1852). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution 57 (Univ.
Iowa Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 14-20, 2015), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486612, archived at http://perma.cc/S83V-QN27.
49 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 487 (2011).
50 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 460 (1873).
51 See, e.g., Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 576 (1895) (noting that overly broad
interpretation served to “enlarge a patent beyond the scope of its claim, as allowed by the
Patent Office”).
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to cover patent practices such as cross-licenses and ties. For example in
condemning a product price fix in a licensing agreement in 1948, Justice
Burton noted that if the terms of the license “reach beyond the scope of the
statutory patent rights, then they must be tested by the terms of the Sherman
Act.”52
The “beyond the scope” idea was essentially that a patent is a type of
monopoly defined by boundaries, identified by its written description and
claims. Certain actions were thought to enlarge this monopoly by extending its
power outside, or “beyond the scope,” of the patent grant. As Justice Douglas
stated in the 1944 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. decision,
the law:
denies to the patentee after issuance the power to use it in such a way as to
acquire a monopoly which is not plainly within the terms of the grant. The
necessities or convenience of the patentee do not justify any use of the
monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly. The fact that the patentee
has the power to refuse a license does not enable him to enlarge the
monopoly of the patent by the expedient of attaching conditions to its use.53

The “beyond the scope” formulation has led courts to two different ideas,
both of which lack either conceptual or empirical support. One is that any
patent practice that reaches “beyond the scope” of the patent is competitively
harmful. The other is that a patent practice that does not reach “beyond the
scope” of the patent is benign or untouchable.
As a matter of competition policy, the “beyond the scope” formulation
makes little sense. Antitrust is concerned with practices that are not authorized
by other statutory provisions and realistically reduce output and raise price.
Some contractual restrictions do this, while most do not, but the “beyond the
scope” analysis adds nothing to that determination. This is why the dissenters
in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. were wrong to conclude that a naked market division
agreement should be regarded as lawful because it did not stretch “beyond the
scope” of the patent.54 Naked market division, the practice at issue in Actavis,
is not authorized by the Patent Act, whether or not the agreement goes beyond
the scope of the patent.
The Actavis decision suggests that the Supreme Court may be finished
with the walled garden approach reflected in the “scope of the patent” test.55
To be sure, that approach made some sense in the early 1970s when Bowman
52 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 353 (1948) (Burton, J.,

dissenting); see also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 662 (1944)
(involving patent tie affected through combination patent); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
80 F. Supp. 989, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
53 Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 665–66.
54 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2241 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Both
Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court and the Chief Justice’s dissent also used the phrase
“beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.” Id. at 2231 (majority opinion); id. at 2240
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
55 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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was writing. At that time, antitrust policy was unreasonably hostile toward a
wide variety of conduct, particularly vertical practices that we regard today as
economically harmless. The walled garden protected the patent from
significant antitrust overreaching. But today the tables have turned, and the
overreaching is going in the other direction.
To be sure, as a matter of patent policy, “beyond the scope” inquiries are
meaningful to the extent that patents grant what they grant and no more. As a
result, nineteenth century courts rightly complained that overly broad claim
constructions were judicial attempts to extend the patent beyond its granted
scope.56 More recently, broad use of the doctrine of equivalents produced
similar complaints.57 The same thing is true of attempts to enforce patents
beyond their expiration date,58 or to enforce them against defendants who are
clearly not infringers.59 These are all fundamentally questions of patent law,
and the “scope” question concerns the location of a patent’s boundaries. The
antitrust question necessarily reaches more broadly to concerns about impact
on markets and the resulting effects on price, output, or innovation. As in the
law of real property, the owner’s “scope” defines what he or she may do as a
matter of property law, such as evicting trespassers, but it says virtually
nothing about anticompetitive uses that are reachable under antitrust law.
The “beyond the scope” formulation is a relic of a bygone approach to
antitrust and regulation, in force at Bowman’s time, which regarded regulation
as “ousting” antitrust from the regulated market altogether.60 Once an area was
deemed to be pervasively regulated, antitrust law had no place. As a result, the
scope of antitrust immunity was a set of boundaries largely defined by the
scope of a regulator’s jurisdiction. Practices within that jurisdiction required
oversight by the particular regulatory agency in charge, not by antitrust law.
As Chief Justice Roberts put it in his Actavis dissent, “the scope of the
patent—i.e., the rights conferred by the patent—forms the zone within which
the patent holder may operate without facing antitrust liability.”61
This approach also grew out of an era that was much more optimistic
about regulation than we are today, regarding it as a complete substitute for
competition law with respect to matters within its domain.62 After decades of
56 See Coupe, 155 U.S. at 576.
57 See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)

(stating that patent law doctrine of equivalents should not be construed as “regularly
available to extend protection beyond the scope of the [patent] claims”); see also Johnson
& Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
58 See Int’l Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Pilkington PLC, 137 F.3d 1382, 1393 (9th Cir.
1998).
59 Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
60 See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 389 (1973); Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1963); see also 1A
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 244b‒244c.
61 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
62 See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963) (discussing the
holding of Pan Am., stating “that because the Civil Aeronautics Board had been given
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exposure to ideas about regulatory capture, incompleteness, conflicts, and
other imperfections in regulatory regimes, attitudes have changed. Today we
look at competition issues in regulated markets much more critically and focus
more narrowly on the issue at hand. Antitrust policy yields if the regulatory
provision or the courts interpreting it have jurisdiction over a particular
practice and have controlled it as “effective steward[s] of the antitrust
function.”63 Private conduct that is not expressly authorized by the statute
enjoys no such status, particularly if the agency itself has not asserted
control.64 In particular, regulatory defenses to antitrust claims should not be
taken seriously when activity that is not authorized by statute is also “neither
compelled nor approved by any governmental, regulatory body.”65 As the
Supreme Court observed:
To be sure, where Congress did intend to repeal the antitrust laws, that intent
governs, . . . but this intent must be clear. Even when an industry is regulated
substantially, this does not necessarily evidence an intent to repeal the
antitrust laws with respect to every action taken within the industry. . . . Intent
to repeal the antitrust laws is much clearer when a regulatory agency has been
empowered to authorize or require the type of conduct under antitrust
challenge.66

B. Regulation and Three Areas of Patentee Conduct
As an alternative to “beyond the scope,” it is more useful to divide
patentee conduct raising competition issues into three areas. The first is preissuance conduct involving the patent application and prosecution process, all
of which is under the intensive supervision of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) and its examiners, as well as the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, and occasionally the Supreme Court. The second area
concerns post-issuance conduct that is expressly authorized by the Patent Act,
or occasionally, some other federal statutory provision. The third concerns
post-issuance conduct that is not authorized by the statute.

1. Pre- vs. Post-Issuance Practices
The regulatory approach just described suggests powerful differences
between patentee activity that occurs prior to patent issuance and that which
broad powers to enforce the competitive standard clearly delineated by the Civil
Aeronautics Act, and to immunize a variety of transactions from the operation of the
antitrust laws, the Sherman Act could not be applied to facts composing the precise
ingredients of a case subject to the Board’s broad regulatory and remedial powers”).
63 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
413 (2004).
64 See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 241, 243.
65 Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 389 (1981).
66 Id.
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occurs after. Prior to issuance, the patent process is subject to intensive public
agency scrutiny—far more, in fact, than is the conduct of many private firms
under regulatory oversight. Patent applications must be filed with the USPTO.
During the patent prosecution process, the applicant may rewrite some
portions of the proposed patent, add or subtract claims, or even divide complex
patents into two or more. At every stage, however, the decision whether or not
a patent will issue—and its final text—is given to a government official. To be
sure, the USPTO might issue too many patents or permit overly broad or
vague claims, but these are not matters of antitrust concern. It is not antitrust
law’s purpose to police shortcomings in other regulatory agencies.
One possible exception is the Walker Process doctrine, discussed below,
which can make it unlawful under the antitrust laws to enforce a patent
obtained by fraud or inequitable conduct during the patent prosecution
process, provided that the enforcement action threatens to create or maintain a
monopoly.67 The doctrine is applied very sparingly, however, and with good
reason. Patent law contains its own provisions that discipline improper
conduct in the patent prosecution process, ranging from invalidation to the
award of attorney’s fees against patent infringement plaintiffs who abuse the
process.68 Once again, the Federal Circuit may be too generous to patentees in
this area.69 But that is not an antitrust problem.
In any event, Walker Process is not about pre-issuance conduct as such. It
is concerned with infringement actions, which occur post-issuance. The
relevant question is whether the infringement plaintiff sued with an objectively
reasonable expectation of success, measured from the time that the
infringement lawsuit was filed.70
Once a patent goes “out the door,” so to speak, the amount of USPTO
supervision changes dramatically, from very high to almost non-existent. The
USPTO does have jurisdiction for re-examination, payment of maintenance
fees, and a few housekeeping matters. By and large, however, an issued patent
is completely in the control of its owner, subject to express limitations in the
Patent Act. It is treated for antitrust purposes much as any business asset. No
one supervises licensing and transfer practices, although there is a passive
recordation requirement for assignments, protecting bona fide purchasers
without notice.71 Licensing decisions, patent ties, exclusive dealing
67 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1073 (Fed. Cir.
1998); see also 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 706.
68 See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 705a. But see infra text
accompanying notes 411–13 (suggesting that these tools are inadequate).
69 See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758
(2014) (rejecting very strict Federal Circuit standard for assessing allegedly improper
enforcement conduct by a patent infringement plaintiff).
70 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 706a, 706b.
71 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (making assignments void against subsequent bona fide
purchasers (BFPs) without notice unless recorded within three months of transfer).
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agreements, mergers, pricing of both licenses and products, and exclusionary
practices are all within the patent owner’s control with no regulatory oversight.

2. Authorized vs. Unauthorized Post-Issuance Practices
Explicit statutory authorizations are immune from antitrust scrutiny even if
there is not regulatory supervision. Many provisions of this kind do not require
much supervision in any event. For example, once federal law requires new
cars to be equipped with seat belts, it cannot be an unlawful antitrust tying
arrangement for a car manufacturer to refuse to sell an automobile without
them.72 In such cases the specific authorization in a federal statute controls the
more general terms of the antitrust laws.
Just as any regulatory provision, the Patent Act removes certain activities
from antitrust scrutiny. For example, once the Patent Act authorizes a patent
for a given term, exclusion by patent enforcement during that term cannot be
unlawful under the antitrust laws.73 The same thing is true of other practices
that the statute authorizes, including exclusive and nonexclusive production
licenses,74 ties in the absence of market power,75 simple refusals to license,76
and patent assignments.77
On the other hand, the Patent Act does not authorize product price fixing,
market divisions unrelated to production licenses, predatory pricing in
patented goods, anticompetitive acquisitions,78 resale price maintenance of
patented goods, ties in the presence of market power, exclusive dealing, or
infringement suits based on patents that the owner knows or should know are
invalid or unenforceable under the circumstances. The Patent Act expressly
permits unilateral refusals to license, but does not say anything about
concerted refusals to licenses—although the Federal Circuit suggested to the
contrary in its Princo Corp. v. International Trade Commission decision.79
Nor does it have anything to say about practices that have been compared to
tying, including package licensing, royalties attached to unpatented goods
produced with a patented process, or agreements requiring the making of
royalty-like payments that extend past the patent’s term.80 It nowhere

72 49 U.S.C. § 30127 (2012); see also 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9,

¶¶ 242a, 243b(2).
73 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (2012).
74 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 271(d)(2) (2012).
75 Id. § 271(d)(5).
76 Id. § 271(d)(4).
77 Id. § 261.
78 See 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1202f .
79 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc); see also Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, Concerted Refusals to License
Intellectual Property Rights, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 21, 21–23 (2011).
80 See infra notes 393–400 and accompanying text.
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authorizes payments to others to cease production in ways that would infringe
the patent, assuming that it is valid.81
Importantly, most of the practices in this list are not antitrust violations
either. Indeed, far fewer practices are regarded as antitrust violations today
than were so regarded in 1970, when the Justice Department’s list of “nine no
nos” was issued.82 The significance of the list is that these are practices that
can be made subject to antitrust scrutiny and condemned if a suitable threat to
competition is established under ordinary antitrust rules.

C. Consumer Welfare and Intellectual Property Law
The change in attitudes about the relationship between antitrust and
regulation was heavily driven by concerns about regulatory capture,
particularly by producer interests. As noted previously, the idea that regulation
should “oust” antitrust was driven by an optimistic public interest attitude
toward regulation that subsequently came under intense scrutiny.83 An age that
is more skeptical about regulation naturally looks with beadier eyes. Rather
than seeing regulatory legislation as serving the public interest, we are more
likely to view it as a response to the political pressures of organized interest
groups, or as a set of “deals” made with the legislature. Interest groups that are
better organized, more homogenous, and have larger individual stakes invest
much more than large, diffuse groups whose individual stakes are small. In
this process, consumers often come out as losers because their interests are
diverse and individually quite small, even though there are millions of them.84
The most effective ways to limit the effects of capture are, first, to confine
regulatory intervention to situations where it is absolutely necessary. This
principle applies to both antitrust law and patent issuance and enforcement.
Second, government decision makers need to be more transparent when they
81 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013); see also infra notes 393–

400 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
83 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 307–14.
84 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003);
RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING (2008). The economic arguments for capture theory were
developed in Mancur Olson’s classic work. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); see also Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213 (1976);
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335,
335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding
Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010). For a historical
perspective, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 308–14; Richard A. Posner, The Concept of
Regulatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 49, 49‒56 (Daniel Carpenter & David
A. Moss eds., 2013).
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remove practices from competitive constraints. Explicit legislation that is
otherwise valid cannot be overturned simply because it is a product of capture,
but the courts need not go beyond the statutory text and give private firms
greater anticompetitive power than they were able to bargain for in the
legislative process.85
The intellectual property laws, but particularly copyright and patent, are
among the most captured regimes in the American legal system today.86 By
and large, Congress has listened to producers while paying little attention to
the voices of consumers. One consequence of this is that patent law has not
developed any equivalent to the “consumer welfare” prescription that has
become so central to antitrust analysis. Even the dissenting Justices in the
Actavis decision recognized the centrality of consumer welfare as an antitrust
goal.87
The structural problems of capture in the patent system go much further,
however. Patent prosecution remains a largely ex parte process in which patent
examiners and other USPTO officials listen to patent applicants first and
foremost. While there is some limited room for opposition, most of it occurs
from other affected producers.88 One consequence of ineffectual opposition is
that fields become very crowded with patents whose technological
contributions are minimal or nonexistent. Nevertheless, the cost of challenging
or avoiding them is very high. As a result, they can deter competitive entry and
innovation even if they do little to promote long run technical progress.89 Just
85 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court

and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1984); see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 534 (1983).
86 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 1‒28 (2008); BOHANNAN &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 60–160; DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT
CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 3‒6 (2009); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin &
Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1,
17–26 (2008) (discussing special interest capture of the Federal Circuit); Christina
Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567, 590–603 (2006);
Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–
2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2236 (2000); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights
and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1875 (2000); Andrew P.
Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups in the Development of
American Patent Law: 1790–1865, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143, 144‒49 (2011); Liza
Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. REV.
501, 526 (2010).
87 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The
point of antitrust law is to encourage competitive markets to promote consumer welfare.”).
88 See Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to
the America Invents Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 105–06 (2011); see also Bronwyn H.
Hall et al., Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Postgrant Opposition, in 4
INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 4, 115–17 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2004).
89 See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463,
463–66 (1995).
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as the availability of patenting may affect the course of invention,90 so too the
existence of heavily patented environments may serve to direct innovation
away from these environments, at least on the part of new firms. In
environments heavy in patent infringement suits filed by patent aggregators,
incumbent firms often slow down or even stop innovating activity.91 In such
cases there is no innovation–competition “tradeoff” because there is no
innovation to trade off.
The history of interest group theory and intellectual property policy has
been somewhat under researched. Public choice writers attacked government
regulatory policy concerning the railroads, food and drugs, the environment,
corporate securities and banking, or other areas with great enthusiasm. By
contrast, intellectual property regulation traditionally enjoyed a privileged
position—as if it were somehow exempt from the same processes of special
interest capture that are at work in other regulatory areas. That is starting to
change.92

90 See infra notes 191–94 and accompanying text.
91 See, e.g., Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms 6–7

(Harvard Bus. Sch. Fin., Working Paper No. 15-002, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2464303, archived at http://perma.cc
/2U9R-7ZC5; Catherine Tucker, Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion (TILEC,
Discussion Paper No. 2012-030, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2136955, archived at http://perma.cc/8JC2-LXCY; see also James Bessen et
al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 11-45, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1930272, archived at http://perma.cc/87BL-YUS5.
92 See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747,
1747–48 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 127, 127–33 (2000); Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence
in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1966 (2009); Craig Allen Nard, Deference,
Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1417 (1995); Arti K. Rai, Engaging
Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1035, 1036–41 (2003); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law:
Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2013–18 (2013); Melissa
F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent
Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 380–86 (2011).
Good historical work has been done on the political interest groups involved in
making patent policy in the nineteenth and early twentieth century railroad industry. See
STEVEN W. USSELMAN, REGULATING RAILROAD INNOVATION: BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY,
AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1840–1920, at 1‒14 (2002); Steven W. Usselman & Richard R.
John, Patent Politics: Intellectual Property, the Railroad Industry, and the Problem of
Monopoly, 18 J. POL’Y HIST. 96, 97–99 (2006); see also MARGARET SUSAN THOMPSON,
THE “SPIDER WEB”: CONGRESS AND LOBBYING IN THE AGE OF GRANT 33‒69 (1985). There
is also a growing body of scholarship on capture in the development of international IP law
and TRIPS. See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1‒29 (2003); Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of
International Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 977, 977–78 (2014).
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Part of the explanation for this is historical. The PTO is not one of the
great regulatory edifices of progressivism and the New Deal, such as the Food
& Drug Administration, the Securities Exchange Commission, or the GlassSteagal Act. Rather, it has been around since the early national period. Further,
it has historically been blessed with an aura of specialization and expertise that
tended to emphasize the role of producers while minimizing the role of the
courts. When the patent prosecution process did get into the courts it was
mainly through infringement lawsuits filed after patents were issued and
invalidity was raised as a defense.
The absence of a consumer welfare prescription in patent law is
troublesome. Consumer interests should be just as central to intellectual
property law as they are to antitrust. Just as in antitrust, consumers have the
correct set of incentives. They tend to profit from a well-functioning patent
system, furthering innovation that expands output and increases quality and
variety, while reducing costs. More generally, consumers profit from
economic growth, and innovation is growth’s largest driver.93 Further,
consumers tend to be injured by restrictive rules that facilitate exclusion or
collusion without producing offsetting benefits in the form of increased
incentives to innovate.94
Over history, Congress has more-or-less consistently ratcheted up patent
protection at the behest of producer groups. For example, in 1952 it responded
to a series of Supreme Court rulings limiting patent coverage to acts of
“genius” by redefining patentability in terms of merely “nonobvious” subject
matter.95 That same year it limited the judge-made doctrine of patent misuse.96
Then, in 1988, Congress amended the Act to provide further protection against
patent misuse claims.97 These limitations on misuse served to limit the scope
of antitrust liability while expanding the power of patents.98
Even today, debates about patent reform and the proper response to the
recent explosion of infringement lawsuits tend to be waged among producers,
with consumer interests on the sidelines. In areas such as pharmaceutical
patents on primary ingredients the patent system works relatively well and
most participants oppose significant change. By contrast, firms operating in
information technologies want reform. This has little to do with consumer
93 See infra notes 158–63 and accompanying text.
94 See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare in Competition and Intellectual

Property Law, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2013, at 53, 53‒55 (developing this
point).
95 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012)). On the 1952 Patent Act, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at
184–205; John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 33–43 (2007).
96 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012).
97 See id. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (expanding the list of practices not to be regarded as
misuse).
98 See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 40–43 (2006)
(applying the misuse rule on patent ties to antitrust law).
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interests as such, however. Rather, the patent system as we currently have it
has become a deadweight loss on firms operating in markets for information
technologies, often yielding private costs that far exceed benefits.99 When
consumer interests are recognized in the judicial process, it is in antitrust
cases, not patent cases.100
This history of producer capture makes statutory silence all the more
important in areas where competition policy is concerned. A prime example is
pay-for-delay settlements in the pharmaceutical industry, which were the
subject of the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision.101 While the Patent Act
authorizes production licenses, it says nothing about naked payments to keep a
rival out of the market. As a matter of competition policy, the case against
large pay-for-delay settlements is overwhelming. Indeed, any equilibrium payfor-delay settlement is highly likely to harm consumer welfare.102 What many
of these settlements do is create small duopoly cartels between a pioneer drug
manufacture and an agreeing generic that effectively shields the patent from
outside challenge, no matter how weak it is.103 This is why the Supreme Court
acted correctly when it held that such agreements could be condemned without
necessarily inquiring into questions about patent validity or infringement.
Significantly, however, Actavis is entirely a matter of statutory interpretation.
As a consistent history of Patent Act capture shows, if Congress wishes, it can
always amend the Patent Act to permit such settlements.
An important regulatory principal about statutory construction is at work
here. Courts are obliged to apply explicit statutory mandates even if they are a
consequence of capture. But when capture is a realistic threat and harm is
99 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 86, at 14–16, 95–119. On the divergent interests
of producer groups, see PhRMA Commends House of Representatives, PHRMA (Dec. 5,
2013), http://www.phrma.org/phrma-statement-house-passage-of-innovation-act, archived
at http://perma.cc/DW9N-K7H5 (discussing pharmaceutical industry trade group opposing
passage of the Innovation Act); CEA Welcomes Passage of the Innovation Act, CEA (Dec.
5, 2013), http://www.ce.org/News/News-Releases/Press-Releases/2013-Press-Releases
/CEA-Welcomes-Passage-of-the-Innovation-Act.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/J4GBB4QP (discussing electronics industry trade group supporting passage of the Innovation
Act). But see David Orozco & James G. Conley, Friends of the Court: Using Amicus Briefs
to Identify Corporate Advocacy Positions in Supreme Court Patent Litigation, 2011 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 107, 125–26 (noting that most large firms support weaker patent
rights).
100 See, e.g., In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 695 (2d
Cir. 2009) (granting antitrust standing to consumers to challenge pay-for-delay settlement);
see also Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(resembling Walker Process).
101 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227, 2238 (2013). See infra notes 117–
34 and accompanying text.
102 See infra notes 243–45 and accompanying text; see also Aaron Edlin et al., Actavis
and Error Costs: A Reply to Critics, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2014, at 1, 7‒8, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448530, archived at http://perma.cc
/H28X-ZNYB.
103 See infra notes 121–23.
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apparent, statutes that are silent on the issue or ambiguous should be construed
against the special interest group that controls the process. Bad rules that run
contrary to this group’s interests are likely to be changed. On the other hand, a
bad decision that favors the interest group in charge is unlikely ever to be
changed because those on the other side lack the political organization.104

D. Antitrust Capture: The Government as Buyer
Antitrust is hardly immune from capture, but there are important
differences that serve to limit the role of capture in antitrust adjudication. One
is the spare and highly general language of most of the statutory provisions.
The Sherman Act speaks very simply of practices that “restrain trade” or
“monopolize.”105 The Clayton Act is a little more specific, condemning tying,
exclusive dealing, and mergers “where the effect . . . maybe substantially to
lessen competition,” but saying very little more.106 The Robinson-Patman Act,
passed during the Great Depression as a lengthy amendment to Section 2 of
the Clayton Act, is an important exception, intended to protect mainly small
family run grocery stores at the expense of larger more efficient sellers and the
public.107 But widespread recognition of its special interest nature has led to
suppression of its use, by both the Antitrust Division108 and the Supreme
Court.109 The balance of the antitrust laws states a very general concern with
competition and places the onus for interpretation on judges. Federal judges
certainly have ideologies or preconceptions, but they are not actively lobbied,
their ex parte contacts in a particular case are severely limited, and they have
lifetime tenure, which shields them from the most overt political processes.
The federal enforcement agencies are certainly more political, but one
thing that distinguishes them from most other government agencies is their
highly general, multi-sector mandate. Antitrust applies to all commercial
activity affecting interstate commerce that has not been exempted. Further, the
legal principles, such as market definition or assessment of power, apply

104 For particular application to copyright law, see Bohannan, supra note 86, at 571–

72. More generally, see EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET
UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 1‒22 (2008).
105 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
106 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (2012).
107 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012). On the legislative history and statutory intent, see 14
HOVENKAMP supra note 21, ¶¶ 2302, 2331, 2333.
108 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 251‒59 (1977)
(announcing Antitrust Division’s intent to no longer enforce the statute); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 91-1617, at 34–35 (1970).
109 See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 83 n.16 (1979) (noting the
need to interpret the Robinson-Patman Act so as to minimize inconsistency with the
Sherman Act).
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across the full range. As a result, the idea that any particular industry can
capture an antitrust agency is doubtful.110
To be sure, there may be offsetting considerations. For example, the
government is a market participant as well as an enforcer. It is a very large
purchaser of military equipment and supplies, office equipment, vehicles and
fuel, and pharmaceutical drugs, particularly through federally administered
health care programs. One interesting question is whether a somewhat
different type of capture occurs. Perhaps the government’s role as a market
participant biases its decision making when acting as an enforcer.
Historically, the empirical case for such distortion seems weak. For
example, the government has always been a very large purchaser of leather
shoes, principally for the military, but that did not stop it from using antitrust
law in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States to protect higher-cost, smaller firms by
restricting the efficiencies that a larger but by no means monopolistic firm
could obtain from a merger.111 The government also frequently opposed
vertical integration in industries in which it purchased products, even though
the consequence was almost certainly higher prices in the markets in
question,112 and it challenged monopolization in the aluminum industry on the
theory that Alcoa continuously expanded its capacity in anticipation of greater
market demand, a price and cost reducing strategy.113 Indeed, the government
110 See Jonathan B. Baker, Sector-Specific Competition Enforcement at the FCC, 66
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 415 & n.13 (2011); Simon J. Evenett, Competition
Advocacy: Time for a Rethink?, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 495, 498 (2006); Michel Kerf &
Damien Geradin, Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications: Antitrust vs. SectorSpecific Regulation—An Assessment of the United States, New Zealand and Australian
Experiences, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 919, 931 (1999); see also STUART M. CHEMTOB,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ROLE OF COMPETITION AGENCIES IN REGULATED SECTORS 3‒7
(2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/225219.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/SC3M-BVGB.
111 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). For further
information, see the district court’s opinion at 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959)
(citing the post-merger firm’s lower costs as a reason for condemning the merger); see also
Brief for the United States at 48, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1961)
(No. 4) (arguing that the merger would permit the post-merger firm to “sell its own product
at a significantly lower price than the nonintegrated independent retailer can obtain for a
comparable product . . . . The conclusion was inevitable that the advantages the merged
company would have over its smaller retailing competitors would be so great as to threaten
to become decisive.”).
112 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 442–43 (1920); United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 608–11, 640–41 (1957)
(challenging DuPont’s partial stock acquisition of GM on the theory that GM would be
able to obtain preferred treatment in du Pont provided automobile finishes and fabrics); see
also United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 27–28 (1920) (condemning exclusive
dealing under Sherman Act); United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 373 (1912)
(condemning an acquisition).
113 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 437–38 (2d Cir.
1945).
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obtained a decree that forbade Alcoa from bidding on aluminum plants that the
United States government sold after the war, certainly reducing the amount of
revenue that the government obtained.114 For a half-century, the antitrust
enforcement agencies, particularly the Federal Trade Commission, engaged in
relentless attempts to condemn efficient price discrimination practices under
the Robinson-Patman Act. The result was clearly to increase the price of
several products for which the government was a very large purchaser—
including petroleum, foodstuffs, vehicles, gasoline, tires, automobile parts, and
the like. In other cases they sought rules whose higher costs would apply to
government purchasers, whether or not the specific items in that case were
subject to government purchase.115 This record contrasts with the record of a
sector-specific agency such as the United States Food & Drug Administration,
where there is some evidence that the agency has responded to high purchase
114 See Herbert Roback, Monopoly or Competition Through Surplus Plant Disposal?
The Aluminum Case, 31 CORNELL L. Q. 302, 314–18 (1946).
115 See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 83 (1979) (seeking to condemn
large chain store for bargaining for lower prices from suppliers); FTC v. Borden Co., 383
U.S. 637, 641 n.4, 643 (1966) (seeking to require Borden to charge the same higher price
to chain stores as to individually owned stores); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 47
(1948) (attacking Morton Salt’s system of quantity discounts); Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC,
359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966) (pursuing promotional allowances in grocery retailing), rev’d
on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968); United Biscuit Co. of Am. v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615
(7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 926 (1966) (similar); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939); Ark. Wholesale
Grocers’ Ass’n v. FTC, 18 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1927) (condemning grocers’ association
boycott of suppliers who sold to chain store retailers at the same price as they sold to the
defendant wholesalers); United States v. S. Cal. Wholesale Grocers’ Ass’n, 7 F.2d 944
(S.D. Cal. 1925) (similar, Justice Department lawsuit); Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc., 63
F.T.C. 1308, 1347 (1963) (seeking condemnation of a promotional allowance); Tri-Valley
Packing Ass’n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 703 (9th Cir. 1964) (condemning discounting in
market acknowledged to be “highly competitive”); Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945),
modified and aff’d, 173 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1949) (stating that there should be liability
if defendant “sells to a wholesaler it knows or ought to have known . . . is using or intends
to use [the wholesaler’s] price advantage to undersell [the] prices made to . . . retailers”),
rev’d on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, CHAIN
STORES: FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN-STORE INVESTIGATION, S. DOC. NO. 74-4, at 78
(1935) (documenting extent to which chain stores undersold family owned grocers). On
automobile parts, see Mid-South Distribs. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961); Am.
Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960); Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v.
FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959); see also Purolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874
(7th Cir. 1965) (automobile air filters); Alhambra Motor Parts, 68 F.T.C. 1039 (1965)
(automobile parts buyers’ cooperative). For other studies, see Advisory Opinion No. 147,
72 F.T.C. 1050, 1050‒51 (1967) (stating that in delivered pricing system trucks should
return empty rather than receiving a price allowance for agreeing to carry cargo and
opining that “it is highly doubtful that the defense of cost justification . . . would be
available”); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 394 (1948) (rejecting
the use of cost studies to justify discriminatory prices as cost justified), rev’d on other
grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951).
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prices for pharmaceutical drugs by reducing standards for both pioneer drugs
and generics.116
In sum, while the government is in fact a very large market participant,
there is no good empirical case to be made that this has affected antitrust
policy in the non-sector-specific antitrust enforcement agencies. For much of
the history of antitrust law, the government promoted antitrust rules that were
either indifferent to cost savings or imposed higher costs on the very products
that it purchased.
When the government participates in markets subject to the antitrust laws
it is typically as a consumer rather than producer. Given that “consumer
welfare” is the articulated goal of the antitrust laws, the interests of the
government as a consumer are presumably aligned with the interests of the
government as an enforcer; it wants what makes consumers best off.
Perhaps this is too simplistic. When the government purchases drugs its
vision may in fact be myopic, overwhelmed by short run costs that come out
of the current budget. This may lead it to discount the impact of long-term
innovation, which might benefit consumers more, but over a longer period of
time. For example, perhaps the federal government operates as a buyer in
pharmaceutical markets to encourage generic drug use, and this pro-generic
bias spills into its antitrust enforcement policy as well. As a result, the tradeoff
between immediate low prices and long run investment is negative.
In any event, in order to make this determination we would first have to
conclude that there is something to trade off. For example, if there were any
actual evidence that condemning pay-for-delay pharmaceutical settlements
reduces consumer welfare by suppressing innovation, then the government
might be obliged to balance. Based on present information, however, the
evidence is quite overwhelming that condemning pay-for-delay settlements
increases consumer welfare greatly in the short run by leading to lower drug
prices and more widespread use. The idea that condemning such settlements
impairs the ex ante incentive to innovate and that the social costs of this
impairment exceed the benefits of increased access has no empirical support.

116 See James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial

Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 956–
960 (2008); see also Donald W. Light et al., Institutional Corruption of Pharmaceuticals
and the Myth of Safe and Effective Drugs, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 590, 592 (2013). Other
evidence, mainly from an earlier period, suggests just the contrary—namely that FDA
officials were overly cautious in approving new drugs because they were so concerned
about highly publicized drug failures. See HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE
REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 7 (1983).
O’Reilly believes the change occurred during the administration of George W. Bush. See
O’Reilly, supra, at 940.
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III. PATENT REGULATION AND THE ACTAVIS DECISION
The Hatch-Waxman Act and Supreme Court’s Actavis decision, discussed
in more detail later, illustrate these regulatory principles.117 “Pay-for-delay”
settlements, in which a patentee pays an infringement defendant a large sum to
stay out of the patentee’s market, appear to be a unique feature of the HatchWaxman grant of secondary exclusivity to the first generic firm to challenge a
pioneer’s patent.118 A congressional overruling of Actavis, should that occur,
need not even take the form of a general Patent Act amendment. It could be an
amendment to Hatch-Waxman itself, applying only to situations that the
provision covers. In the case of pharmaceuticals, there is a strong history of
producer control over the drug creation and approval system. Patentees in
other markets need not worry.
Briefly, the Hatch-Waxman Act provisions at issue in Actavis were
designed to facilitate the entry of generic drug manufacturers into a market
when a pioneer branded drug entered the public domain because its patents
had either expired or been invalidated. Generic entry is more likely to occur if
someone is rewarded for taking the first entry risk. One problem with generic
entry is that often if everyone can enter, no one will. Bioequivalent generics
are chemically identical, making them largely fungible with one another. As a
result competition among generics drives prices to the competitive level,
making immediate entry by multiple firms unpromising. The compromise
position envisioned by the statute is to permit a single generic to enter first,
with its own 180-day period of “shared” exclusivity with the original branded
manufacturer.119 Such entry typically produces lower prices quickly. After the
first generic is produced for six months, other generics can enter the market,
driving prices down to as little as 20% of pre-generic-entry prices.120
Congress did not foresee the possibilities of abuse that have emerged. The
right of generic exclusivity vis-a-vis everyone except the pioneer creates a
117 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227‒29 (2013).
118 The majority and dissenters in Actavis debated this proposition, but the majority

was clearly correct on the facts. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent
Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 15–
16 (2014).
119 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). The Supreme Court described the process
briefly in Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228–29. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 2046c; C.
Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 952 (2011); Hovenkamp, supra note 118, at
8–10.
120 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND
ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS: GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS 4 (2014), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-other-international-comp
etition-fora/generics_us_oecd.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/92PV-GJYQ (updating
statistics on pharmaceutical pricing in the wake of generic entry); see also Steven Tenn &
Brett W. Wendling, Entry Threats and Pricing in the Generic Drug Industry, 96 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 214, 219‒27 (2014) (comparing based on market size).
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duopoly with absolute legal protection from challenge or new entry until 180
days after the generic begins producing, no matter how weak the pioneer’s
patent. If there is any doubt about a question of patent validity or infringement,
the joint maximizing solution for the pioneer and the first entrant is to divide
the maximum profits available under this duopoly. The price and output
determined by a well-functioning cartel is identical to the price and output that
a monopolist would determine.121 Under the pay-for-delay settlement, the 180day clock does not run because the generic is not producing anything. The
more likely that the patent will not withstand judicial scrutiny, the greater
amount the pioneer will be willing to pay for this agreement. By contrast, if no
payment for delay is permitted, as the Hatch-Waxman legislation
contemplated, then the parties will bargain for an earlier entry date, thus
benefitting consumers more.122

121 See

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 4.1‒.2 (4th ed. 2011).
122 The amount that the pioneer is willing to pay is typically many times more than the
amount that the generic is willing to accept as an inducement to stay out of the market.
This makes settlements highly likely to occur, whether or not payments for delay are
permitted. See Ruben Jacobo-Rubio et al., Generic Entry, Pay-for-Delay Settlements, and
the Distribution of Surplus in the US Pharmaceutical Industry 3 (Oct. 7, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2481908, archived at http://perma.cc/L2KV-87TP (measuring high value of pay-for-delay
settlements). One important finding is that pioneer drug makers value entry deterrence by
roughly $4.6 billion, while generics value the right to enter at about $236.8 million. Id.
This provides enormous bargaining room for an exclusion payment once the parties have
come fairly close to an understanding about patent value. See id. at 4; see also Bruce H.
Kobayashi et al., Actavis and Multiple ANDA Entrants: Beyond the Temporary Duopoly 3
(George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 14-62, 2014),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508094, archived at
http://perma.cc/65PX-PVGD. The authors note that if a patent is found invalid a duopoly
exists only for the 180 days of generic exclusivity; after that other generics can enter. Id. at
3‒4. This makes a pre-judgment settlement even more valuable for the pioneer, because
anticipated losses from generic competition will be higher than the settlement cost. Id. at 4.
The authors conclude, oddly, that this indicates a fuller inquiry into patent validity. Id. at
14‒15. But their model indicates precisely the opposite. It suggests that the likelihood of a
settlement without the need of a reverse payment is even higher. Further, generic entry will
occur earlier if no payment is made. All things being equal, a settlement without a
payment-for-delay is always better from consumers’ perspective than a settlement with
one. At the same time, the model also indicates that even when no payment is made, a
settlement can harm consumers. For example, a risk-averse generic will bargain for
delayed but permitted entry rather than face the likelihood that the patent will be declared
valid and infringed and they will not be able to enter at all prior to patent expiration; or that
it will be declared invalid, and they will have only 180 days of exclusive production in
competition with the pioneer alone. The Kobayashi model thus suggests that the Supreme
Court, if anything, was not sufficiently harsh. The welfare effects of a settlement with a
large reverse payment are generally worse than a settlement without a reverse payment, but
even some of those without a reverse payment harm consumers.
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One important thing about pay-for-delay settlements is that they are
favored by both the pioneer and the first generic. Dividing the monopoly
proceeds is virtually always more profitable than competing, even within a
duopoly. The only way that the two firms could hope to duplicate this return
would be if they fixed prices after the generic started producing. But this
would be unlawful collusion under the antitrust laws and even a criminal
offense.
In defense, settlement participants point out that if the patent is valid and
infringed, the generic would lose its lawsuit anyway and the result would be
the patentee’s continued sole production under the patent, or the monopoly
result. The Actavis dissenters emphasized this point.123 As a result, a pay-fordelay settlement on an absolutely valid patent would generate a result no
worse than litigation would achieve, provided that the duration of the pay-fordelay settlement is no longer than the remaining duration of the patent in
question. This is where the “scope of the patent” issue arises, because the
settlement agreements typically terminate prior to the expiration of the patent.
If the “scope of the patent” rule that the Actavis dissenters favored were to
become law—with scope measured by the remaining duration of the patent—
then the equilibrium pay-for-delay agreement would postpone generic entry
right up to the patent’s expiration.124 The patent provides a monopoly stream
that lasts for its duration, and the joint-maximizing position for the litigating
parties would be to take full advantage of this stream. The only indeterminacy
is the size of the payment, which would vary with the parties’ predictions of
the outcome of the patent litigation.
Pharmaceutical drug patents on pioneer molecules are very robust, and for
these we would not ordinarily expect large pay-for-delay agreements. It is no
coincidence that most pay-for-delay settlements involve secondary or
“evergreened” patents on new dosages, new treatments, or new combinations
of well-established drugs.125 Some may also involve what has come to be
known as “product hopping,” which occurs when a pioneer switches support
away from an older version of a drug in favor of a newer version.126 Product
hopping has produced antitrust complaints of anticompetitive design

123 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238–39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
124 See Hovenkamp, supra note 94, at 60.
125 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION:

AN FTC STUDY 16 (2002), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/HN4X-TSXR (summarizing cases); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The
Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 354
(2007).
126 See Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1030–36 (2010); Jessie
Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1472, 1787–88 (2008); M. Sean Royall et al., Antitrust Scrutiny of
Pharmaceutical “Product Hopping,” 28 ANTITRUST 71, 71‒72 (2013).

494

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 76:3

changes.127 When generic entrants actually pursue patent infringement
litigation to completion these patents end up being declared invalid or
infringed more than 70% of the time.128 Prohibiting large pay-for-delay
settlements will force patentees to litigate against generics or perhaps give
them a production license.
The debate between the Actavis majority and dissenters illustrates two
different approaches to the competitive analysis of post-issuance patent
practices. As a matter of antitrust law, a pay-for-delay settlement is a naked
market division agreement. There is no joint production or distribution, or
sharing of technology or information. The pioneer is simply paying the generic
to stay out of the market for the term specified in the agreement. This
distinguishes pay-for-delay settlements from most others. Further, while
production licenses are expressly authorized by the Patent Act, and are a
common way of settling patent infringement cases, naked exclusion payments
are not authorized by either the Patent Act or the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The Actavis dissenters believed such agreements were impervious to
antitrust challenge so long as they fell within the patent’s scope. Of course, the
agreement would not be within the patent’s scope if the patent were invalid or
uninfringed, but historically the courts have not considered these issues when
analyzing settlement agreements unless there were clear abuses. If the term of
the agreement extended beyond the life of the patent, then it would exceed the
patent’s scope whether or not the patent was valid or infringed.
Over a long history the federal courts have followed a policy of
encouraging settlements of patent infringement suits. They have been reluctant
to dive into questions of validity or infringement simply when determining
whether a settlement should be approved. The general assumption in these
cases, however, is that there was true adversity between the parties, the
patentee seeking to enforce its patent and the defendant seeking to avoid it or
limit its costs. For example, the Supreme Court has concluded that an
important test for a settlement was whether there were “legitimately
conflicting” litigation claims.129 That is not the case in Hatch-Waxman pay127 See, e.g., In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust
Litig., No. 13-MD-2445, 2014 WL 6792663, at *42 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2014) (sustaining
antitrust complaint); see also New York v. Actavis, PLC, No. 14 Civ. 7473, 2014 WL
7015198, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014) (granting preliminary injunction).
128 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 125, at vi (demonstrating that generic applicants
prevailed in seventy-three percent of the litigated infringement cases); see also C. Scott
Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, 339 SCIENCE 1386, 1387
(2013). For litigated patents generally, see John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194, 205–06 (1998)
(finding general invalidity rates of litigated patents in the forty to fifty percent range).
129 Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931); see also Asahi
Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991–92 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner,
J.) (“Only if a patent settlement is a device for circumventing antitrust law is it vulnerable
to an antitrust suit. Suppose a seller obtains a patent that it knows is almost certainly
invalid (that is, almost certain not to survive a judicial challenge), sues its competitors, and
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for-delay settlements where both the patentee and the generic are made better
off by the settlement than by generic production.
The Court’s strong preference for settlement has resulted in some clearly
anticompetitive arrangements, such as the infringement settlement in Bement
that included a provision fixing product prices.130 Actavis restates a point that
the Supreme Court had previously embraced but inconsistently applied: patent
settlements containing anticompetitive provisions that are not authorized by
the Patent Act should receive closer scrutiny than provisions that are
authorized.131
By contrast, the majority took an approach that was more realistic about
the regulatory process that governs the patent systems. First of all, while the
Patent Act expressly authorizes production licenses it nowhere permits naked
market division agreements that are not attached to simultaneous production,
and neither does the Hatch-Waxman Act. In most patent infringement cases
outside the Hatch-Waxman context the infringement defendant pays a license
fee to the patentee for a license to produce under the patent. Significantly, such
license agreements are expressly authorized by the Patent Act and are lawful
whether or not they are the outcome of infringement litigation.
While the Court required rule of reason treatment for Actavis-style payfor-delay settlements, this meant mainly that the burden of proving power and
anticompetitive effects were on the plaintiff; however, both could be proven
by truncated evidence. The Court observed that a large payment for delay
could provide good evidence of market power,132 as well as anticompetitive
effects.133 The Court did not alter the standard rule of reason approach that
once the plaintiff has shown power and anticompetitive effects, then the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove a defense.134

settles the suit by licensing them to use its patent in exchange for their agreeing not to sell
the patented product for less than the price specified in the license. In such a case, the
patent, the suit, and the settlement would be devices—masks—for fixing prices, in
violation of antitrust law.”).
130 See Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 94–95 (1902); see also infra notes
260–62 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 (1963) (disapproved
settlement agreement involving pooling plus the exclusion of third parties); HartfordEmpire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 435 (1945) (horizontal customer restrictions);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942) (similar); see also Palmer v.
BRG, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48–50 (1990) (per curiam) (holding that territorial division
agreement established under trademark and copyright license agreement was per se
unlawful).
132 See FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235–36 (2013).
133 See id.
134 See infra notes 223–26 and accompanying text.
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IV. PATENT AND ANTITRUST APPROACHES TO COMPETITION AND
INNOVATION: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
The patent and antitrust systems have different structures and different
histories. Both affect how competition and innovation issues are handled.
First, while antitrust law’s broad focus on competition has compelled antitrust
courts to consider innovation issues, the reverse is rarely true. Second, the
open-ended nature of the antitrust laws and their mandate to protect
competition has directed litigants, their experts, and the academy to develop a
large empirical literature on the competitive effects of various practices. By
contrast, the patent code is much more specific and never invites such
empirical query. As a result the empirical literature on how the patent system
functions in relation to innovation goals is not well developed and, in any
event, seldom employed in litigation. A critical aspect of that difference is the
Patent Act’s general insensitivity to market diversity, even though such
diversity affects the rate and dissemination of innovation at least as much as it
affects the robustness of competition. Finally, the creation of the Federal
Circuit as an exclusive appellate tribunal for patent cases has exacerbated
myopic analysis of innovation issues.

A. Nonreciprocal Accommodation
At least since the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, courts deciding
antitrust cases have attempted to accommodate patent policy to competition
policy. To be sure, courts are imperfect and they have sometimes wandered to
extreme positions, but at least they have taken seriously the idea that
competition and innovation policy are related to one another and must be
metered together.
To illustrate, consider the antitrust rule that a product innovation cannot be
unlawful, no matter how much it harms competitors through its success.135
The rule has nothing to do with patent law and is not based on any specific
patent law doctrine. Nor does it require anything like the assertion of a patent
law counterclaim or even invocation of the Patent Act. Rather the antitrust rule
is rooted in antitrust law’s own appreciation that innovation is part of
competition, requiring courts to consider them together, often protecting
innovation even when it tends to create or prolong monopoly. Even this rule
must be metered to the specific market, however, in order account for
situations where the cost of design changes is very low in relation to the harm
that a network monopolist might cause.136 Other examples include the explicit
135 See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592

F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 776 (4th ed. 2015).
136 See John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 693–94 (2012).
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recognition in merger policy that mergers may reduce innovation by
eliminating highly innovative competitors, or that explicit restraints on
innovation are an important concern of competition policy.137
Patent law simply does not have this tradition except in a few areas that
fall into patent law’s outer boundaries. For example, patent “misuse” doctrine
identified competitive concerns in patent licensing and enforcement, often
exaggerating them considerably. But recent case law has virtually written the
patent misuse doctrine out of existence.138 The Supreme Court has
occasionally suggested that concerns about competition play a role in defining
the scope of IP rights—for example, denying trade dress protection to
functional uses.139
Patent law has operated in a much more myopic universe in which
competition policy is rarely addressed except in the small subset of cases that
expressly include an antitrust counterclaim or misuse defense. Indeed, in some
cases an increase in competition is considered to be the “harm” that justifies
patent law relief—precisely the opposite of the “antitrust injury” rule that
refuses to condemn a practice unless harm to competition is shown. One
example is the Federal Circuit’s 2014 decision in Trebro v. Firefly. The court
counted competition itself as patent harm justifying an injunction on an
unpracticed patent that the plaintiff had acquired from an outside inventor.140
Injunctions are generally denied to non-practicing entities, but in this case the
court held that the fact that the parties were competing served to justify an
injunction. No antitrust issues were raised, but that is not surprising given that
patent law decision making has never developed a culture of taking
competition issues seriously.
Another situation where courts fail to consider impact on competition
involves the use of “authorized generic” restrictions in settlements of patent
infringement suits in the pharmaceutical industry. An “authorized generic” is
one that is made by the patentee itself. No patent infringement is involved,
because the patentee already owns the patent. An authorized generic typically
is identical to the branded version in both active and inactive ingredients. They
differ mainly in trademark and packaging. The courts have held repeatedly that
a branded drug manufacturer is entitled to introduce its own authorized generic
137 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER

GUIDELINES ¶ 1 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg2010.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VN4H-JVF3; PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 900.1a, 900.1c (Supp. 2015); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 252 (2007).
138 See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 79, at 21–23.
139 See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34–35 (2001);
see also Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 506–20 (2006) (citing misuse doctrine and functionality limits
on trade dress law as examples of competition concerns raised within IP policy).
140 Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1170–71 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
see infra notes 460–64 and accompanying text.
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into the market.141 The authorized generic can be a socially valuable price
discrimination device, enabling the patentee to reach higher elasticity
customers who are price sensitive, while retaining the brand for less price
sensitive customers.
Even following Actavis, several decisions have upheld patent settlements
in which a generic firm has agreed to delayed entry in exchange for the
patentee’s promise not to enter the market with an authorized generic.142 The
“no authorized generic” clause increases prospective profits to the generic, and
thus can serve to reduce the size or in some cases perhaps even eliminate a
cash payment to the generic. The literature suggests that the entry of an
authorized generic can reduce the first generic’s output by half, and this is
what one would ordinarily expect. The two generics are nearly identical, and if
the firms have the same costs each would end up with roughly half of the
market. The literature also suggests that post-entry generic prices are about
16% lower if an authorized generic comes into the market.143 For these
reasons the patentee’s promise not to enter with an authorized generic is very
valuable to a prospective independent generic entrant.
Such a promise is valuable, however, for the same reason that any cartel
agreement can be valuable to participants: one cartel member promises to
restrain its own output in order to get market prices up. A “no authorized
generic” provision is actually more anticompetitive and harmful to consumers
than a payment for delay. The payment for delay is merely a wealth transfer
between the patentee and generic. By contrast, the “no authorized generic”
141 See Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., 659 F.3d 1171, 1174–75 (Fed. Cir. 2011);

Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 271 (4th Cir. 2006); Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v.
Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
142 See, e.g., In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *26
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 3:12-CV-02389 PGS, 2014 WL
4543502, at *25 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014) (involving a provision in agreement under which
patentee promised not to enter with authorized generic during 180-day exclusivity period
was not a “payment” for delay and thus did not invoke Actavis doctrine); In re Loestrin 24
Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 194 (D.R.I. 2014) (ruling that Actavis applied only
to cash payments, which means that promises not to enter the market with an authorized
generic could not be counted); In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp.
3d 560, 570 (D.N.J. 2014) (similar). Compare In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp.
3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (settlement agreement provision preventing pioneer from
entering with authorized generic could be counted together with other promises in
determining existence of large reverse payment), with In re Nexium (Esomeprazole)
Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 410‒11 (D. Mass. 2013) (similar). See also Aaron S.
Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 66 RUTGERS L. REV.
(forthcoming
2015)
(manuscript
at
1‒12),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2560107, archived at http://perma.cc/2RRK-QZLK (critiquing these and other postActavis decisions).
143 See In re Effexor, 2014 WL 4988410, at *4; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N,
AUTHORIZED GENERICS: AN INTERIM REPORT 1–2 (2009), available at www.ftc.gov
/os/2009/06/P062105authorizedgenericsreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5LDF-9J4S.
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agreement is not merely a wealth transfer, it is also a cartel agreement that
serves to reduce market output and keep prices higher than they would
otherwise be.144 As a result, agreements restraining authorized generic entry
should be treated more harshly than pay-for-delay settlements. After all, a payfor-delay settlement is not a license but, at most, an agreement to license in the
future. By contrast, the no-authorized-generic agreement takes effect
immediately. Because neither an IP license nor any kind of joint production is
contemplated, these are simply naked market division agreements.
To be sure, sometimes increased competition should count as “injury” for
patent infringement purposes. That would be true, for example, when a
competitor is a direct infringer of a technology that a dominant firm is
practicing. In any event, the Patent Act’s expressly created right to bring an
infringement action contains no exception for actions against competitors. But
entitlement to an injunction is a matter of equitable principles and not an
absolute right. To permit a dominant firm to acquire competing technology
from an outside inventor and then use it to shut down a rival can cause
considerable harm to competition without protecting any element of
innovation, because the patent in question had already been invented by
someone else.

B. Uneven Empirical Research
The unevenness of the economic literature on the antitrust and patent
systems reflects fundamental differences in how the two systems approach
economic policy. The theoretical and empirical literature on price theory,
industrial organization, and competition is large and stretches across more than
a century. The courts have generally paid attention, making antitrust the first
area of significant judicial reliance on economic literature.145 The record
reveals diverse impulses resulting from different economic theories, as well as
differing ideas about the goals of antitrust law. For example, the post-New
Deal era was dominated by an economic theory that strongly distrusted
markets and had heightened fears about the competitive threats imposed by
vertical integration, product differentiation, and intellectual property.146 The
Warren Era in the 1960s was overly preoccupied with protecting smaller
businesses from conduct that was presumed to be anticompetitive but was
often efficient.147 The courts and enforcement agencies were generally
following the mainstream economics of the day.148 Beginning in the 1980s the
144 See Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 25.
145 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial

Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 167 (1989).
146 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 206–19.
147 The most important contemporary critique was BORK, supra note 44, at 210–16. For
a more compact critique, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 33–59.
148 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 206–19.
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courts became much more explicit about their use of economic research in
antitrust analysis.
Patent law is a remarkably different enterprise, in which the courts receive
little guidance from the economic literature. A principle reason for this is that
we have historically treated patents as “property” rights rather than as an
element of economic policy. A distinctive feature of property rights in our
legal system is that their absoluteness provides a certain degree of immunity
from policies about economic development. Taken too far, the idea of patents
as property can place patents on a collision course with policies about
economic growth. This is why it is so critical that suitable restraints be placed
on the process of patent issuance. The property right guaranteed by a patent
does not kick in until the patent has been granted. But pre-issuance practice is
also the place that the patent system is woefully inadequate, because precious
little economic analysis goes into the development of the rules for deciding
when a patent should be issued. In any event, a patent grants whatever
property right the Patent Act says it grants, and need not grant anything more.
In addition, while people have a “property” right in their patents, that need not
include rights to do things that the Patent Act does not authorize, such as fix
product prices, tie in the presence of market power, enter into exclusive
contracts in the product market, or obtain injunctions outside the limits of
ordinary equitable principles.

C. Economics and Statutory Language
Another reason for the differences between patent and antitrust
approaches to economic development is statutory. In the antitrust laws the
highly general “restraint of trade” and “monopolize” language of the Sherman
Act, as well as the “may substantially lessen competition” language of the
Clayton Act, explicitly invites courts to consider the market impact of various
practices. Over time the courts have developed a wide array of tools for doing
this. Nothing in the Patent Act invites either patent examiners or the courts to
do anything similar. The statute itself says virtually nothing about market
impact or “innovation policy.” As a result, the only place market analysis
plays much of a role in litigation about patents is in competition policy
analysis of post-issuance practices, such as tying, pooling, price fixing and
cross-licensing, mergers, exclusion, and the like. To say this more bluntly, the
only time patent law pays much attention to markets is when the law
incorporates antitrust principles.
Consider patent law’s requirement of nonobvious subject matter.149 Its
purpose is relatively uncontroversial and completely driven by our ideas about
the relationship between innovation, exclusion, and economic growth: we do
not want to give exclusive rights over things that someone of ordinary skill
149 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
(2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14‒17 (1966).
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could be expected to come up with independently. We should not permit
people to commandeer technologies that in the ordinary course would be
produced competitively rather than not at all. Having a strict nonobviousness
requirement is particularly important in a regime of absolute liability for patent
infringement such as we have—that is, where people can be held liable even if
they did not know the technology they developed was patented by someone
else.150 One of the reasons copyright and trade secret law have much lower
standards of inventiveness is someone can infringe only by copying.
Empirically, there are useful ways to think about this problem. For
example, if a large number of people who end up being infringers actually
discovered or developed the technology entirely on their own, then the patent
doctrine of nonobvious subject matter is not doing its job. In fact, the number
of infringement suits that either allege willful infringement (fewer than 11%)
or prove it (fewer than 2%) is extremely low.151 These numbers are quite
telling, given that infringement plaintiffs can obtain up to treble damages by
showing that patent infringement was willful.152 There could be important
qualifiers, however. For example, perhaps determining how infringers came
upon the infringing technology is difficult.153 That makes this particular query
interesting, but hardly superfluous.
The courts have not indicated that an empirical inquiry into the extent of
independent discovery is even relevant to the issue of nonobvious subject
matter, either as a general matter or in specific infringement cases. In sum, we
do not possess a “political economy” of nonobvious technology in the way
that, say, merger law today requires economic modeling and evidence to
predict the likely output or price effects of a merger. In this area the empirical
science of the patent system is far behind the empirical science of industrial
organization.154
By and large legal queries into nonobviousness proceed by examining
existing boundaries, asking questions such as how the technology under
consideration differs from earlier technology, whether something in the prior
art anticipated the solution that the patent proposes, whether the prior art
teaches away from the proposed solution, whether ex post conclusions of
obviousness reflect hindsight bias, and the like. Most of this analysis has little
150 See infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
151 See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C.

L. REV. 1421, 1453–54 (2009).
152 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
153 On this point, see Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement
Liability in Patent Law 5 (July 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2464756, archived at http://perma.cc
/2P3V-VQZU.
154 On the antitrust experience with economics since early in the twentieth century, see
ERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836‒1937, at 241–330 (1991);
H
Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890‒1955, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 311, 367 (2009).
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to do with human cognitive ability and invites the complaint that far too many
obvious patents are granted.155 It also completely ignores the question of how
patents perform as innovation facilitators in specific markets.
Given the large number of patents that are issued, we cannot afford to do
much individual market impact analysis at the time of application, such as the
antitrust enforcement agencies perform for reported mergers. Of course, if
such analyses were performed it is very likely many fewer patents would
issue. More importantly, however, we do not even do such analysis in
infringement litigation, where validity is often contested on grounds of
nonobviousness. Only 1.5% of patents are ever litigated, and only .1% make it
to trial.156 Further, litigating a patent infringement case commits far greater
resources in most cases than obtaining one. Because the vast majority of these
cases are brought against apparently unknowing infringers, the case for
absolute liability depends crucially on a high degree of certainty that patents
are not being granted for things that in the ordinary course would have been
developed competitively. Finally, more empirically driven approaches to
litigation would invite development of a research database that would affect
patent issuance practices as well.
Both private and public antitrust enforcement has drawn significant
resources into the economic analysis of challenged practices. Antitrust
litigation and counseling create a market for economic experts, and this in turn
creates a significant market for the economic study of competition-affecting
practices.157 As a result, litigating an antitrust case under the rule of reason
today invariably requires expert economic analysis of the effects of a
challenged practice on competition, including market definition, ease of entry,
probability of collusion, and the like. Patent law has very little equivalent to
this forensic economic evaluation outside of damages measurement, which
does use market-based tools. The typical patent infringement case reveals very
little awareness that the participants are engaged in making economic policy,
particularly when they make decisions about the proper scope of patents and
their significance over the prior art.

155 See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1452 (2006);
Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of
Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 (2013); Colleen M. Seifert,
Now Why Didn’t I Think of That? The Cognitive Processes That Create the Obvious, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 489, 490 (2008).
156 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 75
(2005).
157 For example, the Antitrust Law treatise includes a large portion of a volume on the
use of economic experts in antitrust litigation. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL.,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 390–399 (4th ed. 2014).
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D. Innovation, Competition, and Market Diversity
Another critical area of difference between the antitrust and patent systems
is in their recognition of variation among markets. Antitrust is acutely
sensitive to issues of market structure and diversity. In many markets
monopolization is regarded as structurally impossible because the number of
rivals is large and entry is easy.158 Both monopolization and merger law regard
market structure and diversity as critical.159 This is also true of the law of
horizontal restraints under the rule of reason. We distinguish networked
industries or industries with economies of scale or informational needs that
justify competitor collaboration from those that do not. We also distinguish
product-differentiated markets from markets for fungible products, as well as
industries with high fixed costs and a heavy upfront investment component.160
Further, these differences clearly impact not only traditional price and output
competition but also innovation.
Imagine an antitrust system for assessing mergers or a monopolistic
practice such as exclusionary pricing that did not differentiate based on the
number of firms in a market, ratios of fixed to variable costs, barriers to entry,
flow of information, and the like.161 But that is very largely the legal patent
system we have today, and it is increasingly clear that the operation and
innovation value of patents is just as dependent on individual market
characteristics as antitrust rules are.162 Patent policy is played out in a onesize-fits-all system that is largely indifferent to industry structure, nature of
information dissemination, or other factors that explain when patents are
socially valuable and when they are not. Its broad protections are most
justified in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries for patents on primary
molecules, but they are very likely not justified in high turnover technologies
such as electronics, computers, communications devices, software, and
business methods. Nevertheless, the law of patents has virtually no marketspecific metering.
For example, the literature on the extent of copying by claimed patent
infringement defendants shows significant differences among industries. A
relatively high percentage of patent infringement cases in chemical and
pharmaceutical markets allege and show copying, while very few do in the
information technologies.163 The data suggest alternative explanations, all of
158 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, ¶¶ 420–423, 501–507.
159 See 3B id. ¶¶ 801–803 (discussing monopolization); 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,

supra note 9, ¶¶ 911–915 (discussing mergers).
160 13 id. chs. 21–22.
161 On how the courts have required this analysis in predatory pricing cases, see 3A
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, ¶¶ 725–730.
162 See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2510004, archived at http://perma.cc/N5AU-38BB.
163 See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 151, at 1445.
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which are under researched. Perhaps the nonobviousness requirement as
currently articulated works better for chemicals than for, say, communications
technology. That is particularly likely to be true of patents on molecules,
which could be unknowingly duplicated only by extraordinary coincidence. Or
relatedly, evaluating prior art is easier for chemicals then it is for, say,
electronics. Alternatively, perhaps information about patents is disseminated
more effectively in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries than in other
industries. Dissemination consists of two things: being able to locate a patent
and being able to interpret it. The data also suggest an important question: is it
merely a coincidence that the patent system seems to be functioning much
better in industries such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals where the
percentage of infringement claims based on copying is high? An antitrust
economist looking at these data would see obvious needs for differential
treatment. The current law of nonobvious subject matter seems to work better
in some industries than in others.

E. Asymmetric Appellate Process
Under our current system all cases that arise under the Patent Act are
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Antitrust cases, like most others, go to the relevant regional circuit. Both, of
course, are subject to Supreme Court review, which is rare and selective. This
structure tends to insulate patent law from competition policy except in the
relatively few cases that arise under the Patent Act and which also include an
antitrust claim, such as a counterclaim. If the controls to economic growth
have two switches, competition and innovation, the Federal Circuit very
largely has control over one switch—a phenomenon that the Trebro decision,
discussed above, illustrates. By contrast, the Supreme Court and (historically)
the regional circuit courts had control over both. I believe this is at least a
partial explanation for the divergence that has emerged between the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court. A well-designed system should have the same
courts monitoring competition policy and innovation policy, bolstered by
inter-circuit competition.

V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PATENT LAW PERFORMANCE
The idea that too many patents lack significant value is hardly new.
Supreme Court Justice David Brewer suggested it already in the late
nineteenth century, concluding that the system had far too many patents, many
of which were worthless.164 Further, patent litigation had become
unreasonably expensive and uncertain.165

164 David J. Brewer, The Patent System, 3 YALE L.J. 149, 151 (1894). Brewer was a
justice on the Supreme Court from 1889 to 1910. His opinion of patents was all the more
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In general, the problem of patent value is beclouded by poor information.
In fact, lack of market specific information about the performance of the patent
system produces an unacceptably wide range of opinions about the system’s
value and how it can be improved. In addition, we lack good empirical
information about the welfare effects of individual patent rules. Neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has insisted on the development of tools that
enable decision makers to determine empirically how specific patent doctrines
serve as inducements or in some cases impediments toward innovation. To a
very significant extent patent drafters, lawyers, and judges interpret questions
of patent validity and scope in the same way that real property lawyers have
traditionally determined boundary lines in real property cases—mainly by
reference to a set of rules of long standing, but rarely confronting fundamental
issues of economic policy directly.
To be sure, economic assessments of industry performance are difficult to
make. Views change over time, and generalist judges and lawyers may make
erroneous decisions. These are good reasons for trying to do better, but not for
jettisoning economic analysis from the law. Patent law will never be able to
optimize innovation until it begins to internalize a “political economy” of the
patent system, including the development of empirically supported
conclusions about how patent law affects innovation.
Economic research on innovation and the patent system can be divided
into several parts, with overlapping boundaries. These include:
1. The relative contributions to economic growth of innovation as
opposed to competition under constant technology;
2. The relationship between market structure and the rate of
innovation;
3. The competitive impact of post-issuance patent practices;
4. The influence of patent issuance or strength on the rate of
innovation, its direction, or its quality;
5. The way that specific patent doctrines perform in the market;
6. Private patent value under the existing system; and
7. The social cost of restraints on innovation.
The following discussion examines these very briefly.

A. Innovation and Economic Growth
The literature on the relationship between innovation and economic
growth is significant and has been developing since the 1940s. Joseph
Schumpeter argued in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy that innovation
important because he was a conservative, one of the early architects of economic
substantive due process.
165 See, e.g., Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from a decision upholding price regulation of grain elevators).
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contributed much more to economic growth than competition did.166 The
concern of this literature is with the relationship between innovation and
growth, not with the patent system. In the 1950s Robert M. Solow’s empirical
work modeling economic growth with and without innovation concluded that
as much as 85% of nonfarm economic growth in the twentieth century up to
his time came from innovation.167 Since that time the modeling has become
more complex, and has divided into different theories of growth depending on
whether the relevant stimulants are endogenous or exogenous.168 But there is
very little dispute over the basic proposition that innovation is the dominant
contributor to growth.169

B. Innovation and Market Structure
A second body of empirical as well as theoretical literature deals with the
relationship between market structure and innovation. Schumpeter believed
that monopoly was essential to robust innovation because only the monopolist
would have both the appropriation incentives and the economic surplus to
profit from it.170 Writing roughly a decade later and after Schumpeter’s death,
Kenneth Arrow disagreed, pointing out that competitors have much more to
lose from not innovating: if they do not innovate, someone else will. In
addition, under competition firms would compete on innovation itself. Finally,
one obstacle to invention by the monopolist is that innovation would tend to
displace its own established technology. By contrast, competitors must
continuously worry that if they do not develop new technology someone else
will. As for appropriation incentives, Arrow believed the patent system would
take care of them.171
This Schumpeter–Arrow “debate” spawned an enormous body of literature
in industrial organization economics, both theoretical and empirical. The
emergent consensus is that neither Schumpeter nor Arrow had it exactly right,
although Arrow was somewhat closer. The innovation/market structure curve

166 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81–86 (1942).
167 Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39

REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 316 (1957); see also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at
295–98; ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 7, 34–35 (2004).
168 See generally PHILIPPE AGHION & PETER HOWITT, ENDOGENOUS GROWTH THEORY
(1998); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of
Growth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 23 (1994).
169 See the strong assumptions about the relationship made in THOMAS PIKETTY,
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 72‒109 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Belknap
Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (2013).
170 SCHUMPETER, supra note 166, at 81–86.
171 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 156‒60 (Kenneth J. Arrow ed.,
1971).

2015]

ANTITRUST AND THE PATENT SYSTEM

507

is in fact an inverted “U.”172 Monopolized markets tend not to exhibit a great
deal of innovation, but neither do highly competitive markets. Rather,
innovation proceeds most quickly in moderately concentrated, productdifferentiated markets that have relatively large firms but also sufficient
competition that each firm offers an innovation threat to the others.

C. Economic Effects of Patent Practices
A large body of literature, stretching back nearly a century, concerns the
economic impact of various uses of patents that have already been issued.173 A
related and also extensive law review literature looks more specifically at
antitrust rules, but frequently invokes the economics literature.174 The
172 See John T. Scott & Troy J. Scott, Innovation Rivalry: Theory and Empirics, 41 J.

INDUS. & BUS. ECON. 25, 25 (2014); see also Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and
Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 120 Q.J. ECON. 701, 701–28 (2005); Koki Arai,
Patents, Competition Policy, and Growth, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 83, 84 (2013). The
literature is summarized in BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 9–11.
173 In chronological order and emphasizing historical work, see J. MAURICE CLARK,
STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923); FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS
OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM (1925); ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION
11–17 (1936); THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS (1940); WALTON
HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE (1941); LAWRENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND
ANTITRUST LAW (1942); OTTO RAYMOND BARNETT, PATENT PROPERTY AND THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS (1943); GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND
FREE ENTERPRISE (1951); GUSTAV DREWS, THE PATENT RIGHT IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
OF THE UNITED STATES (1952); BOWMAN, JR., supra note 24 at 239; see also, in
chronological order, Floyd L. Vaughan, The Relation of Patents to Industrial Monopolies,
147 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 40 (1930); Alfred E. Kahn, Fundamental
Deficiencies of the American Patent Law, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 475, 483–84 (1940);
Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 61 (1944); Bowman, Jr., supra
note 23, at 19; Statement of Grounds for Action, United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46
F. Supp. 541 (S.D. Ohio 1942) (No. 4426). For more discussion of the literature prior to
passage of the 1952 Patent Act, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 184–91 (discussing
patents and then antitrust).
174 See generally Rome G. Brown, The Right to Refuse to Sell, 25 YALE L.J. 194
(1916); Mortimer Feuer, Patent Abuse Versus National Interest, 2 LAW. GUILD REV. 1
(1942); Walton Hamilton, Property Rights in the Market, 1 J. LEGAL & POL. SOC. 10
(1943); Horace R. Lamb, The Relation of the Patent Laws to the Federal Anti-trust Laws,
12 CORNELL L.Q. 261 (1927); Philip Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Law and Antitrust
Judgments Through Hartford-Empire, 34 GEO. L.J. 1, 36–51 (1945); F. Granville Munson,
Control of Patented and Copyrighted Articles After Sale, 26 YALE L.J. 270 (1917); David
L. Podell & Benjamin S. Kirsh, Patent Pools and the Anti-trust Laws, 13 A.B.A. J. 430
(1927); Irving I. Schachtel, Patent Pools and the Federal Anti-trust Laws, 5 LINCOLN L.
REV. 7 (1932); George H. Schueller, The New Antitrust Illegality Per Se: Forestalling and
Patent Misuse, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 170, 172 (1950); Roscoe Steffen, Invalid Patents and
Price Control, 56 Yale L.J. 1 (1946); H.A. Toulmin, The Patent Law and the Sherman
Law, 1 VA. L. REV. 445 (1914); Comment, The Effect of Nonuse on a Patentee’s Remedy
Against Infringement, 18 YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1908) (discussing the Paper Bag decision);
Note, Patent Abuses and Antitrust: The Per Se Rule, 64 HARV. L. REV. 626 (1951); Note,
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theoretical and empirical literature ranges over such subjects as the economic
effects of tying, pooling, price fixing, price discrimination, the impact of
patents on product differentiation and the resulting competition among firms,
the use of patents by dominant firms, and the like. While this literature
concerns the use of issued patents, nearly all of it properly falls into the
domain of competition policy rather than analysis of the patent system. In
most of it the internal workings of the patent system are not even discussed.175

D. Patents, Economic Growth, and the Direction of Innovation
A fourth issue concerns the relationship between patent issuance or patent
strength and economic growth, and relatedly, the relationship between the
availability of patents and the direction of innovation.176 As patent protection
is greater, measured by either duration or breadth, the incentive to obtain
patents increases but the dissemination of knowledge decreases. Economic
growth depends both on sufficient incentives to innovate plus the effective
dissemination of innovation through the economy. Finding the right balance
presents an empirical question.
The more general literature on patent issuance and economic growth is
inconclusive, with most of it suggesting little correlation between a country’s
patent system and its rate of economic growth.177 More discriminating studies
Patent Dedication as Antitrust Remedy: New Light on Hartford-Empire, 63 YALE L.J. 717
(1954). For a good, brief economic analysis of the competitive effects of post-issuance
patent practices, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 372–402.
175 For a good summary of the literature prior to its publication date, see Jonathan B.
Baker & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and
Critique, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 386, 386‒91 (1999).
176 On this second point, both Arthur Cecil Pigou and Arnold Plant argued that the
availability of patents would channel innovation toward patentable areas because
appropriability would be greater. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 185
(4th ed. 1932); Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1
ECONOMICA 30, 30‒32 (1934). The point is developed further in Baxter, supra note 24.
One can say much the same things about trade secrets or copyrights.
177 David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in
Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323, 328–38 (1996); Walter G. Park & Juan Carlos
Ginarte, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, 15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y
51, 54–56 (1997). A recent study found a correlation between the existence of a patent
system and total factor production (TFP) growth, but also concludes that there is an inverse
correlation between the strength of patent rights and TFP growth. See Xin Chang et al.,
Patents and Productivity Growth: Evidence from Global Patent Awards 26 (Feb. 20, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2371600, archived at http://perma.cc/79MT-ZU3X (While patent rights lead to more
patents, “our findings also suggest that patent rights slow the diffusion of new innovations
throughout the economy, as we find that the effect of patents on TFP growth is weaker in
countries with stronger patent rights. Our results suggest that finding the optimum level of
patent protections requires the consideration of these two offsetting effects.”); see also Rod
Falvey et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, 10 REV. DEV. ECON. 700,
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that break industries into different groupings find positive correlations in
markets where products are durable, investment costs are high, but copying is
cheap, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals.178 By contrast, studies of
information technologies and software often find just the opposite: the patent
system actually tends to hinder economic development.179 Some studies also
find that the effect of patent protection in restricting the dissemination of
knowledge outweighs its effect in inducing innovation, thus producing a
negative correlation between patenting and economic growth.180
None of this literature is absolutely conclusive and it has not come close to
establishing a consensus on these issues. One startling likelihood, however, is
that while innovation contributes a great deal to economic growth, the patent
system may not contribute much to innovation, although the results vary from
one market to another.
This literature must also be qualified by another important factor, which is
the cost of the patent system itself. Obtaining patents is costly and litigating
them is even more costly. Further, the patent system creates risks for
innovators and, as a result, costly duties to search. One very troubling
conclusion for many markets is that there is not any “tradeoff” at all between
the value of appropriation and the hindrance to dissemination. In fact, the
appropriation value is negative because even looking at purely private costs
and returns, the patent system costs innovators more than it is worth.181 Once
again, chemicals and pharmaceuticals are an outlier on the positive side.182

700–01 (2006) (noting that at least in middle income countries, intellectual property rights
cause more harm by restricting the dissemination of technology than they contribute to
economic growth).
178 For a summary of this literature, see Michael Meurer & James Bessen, Do Patents
Promote Economic Growth?, TECH. INNOVATION & INTELL. PROP. (Mar. 17, 2008),
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/WordPress/?p=95, archived at http://perma.cc/TW
C5-38VL (finding pharmaceuticals to be an outlier in a large number of diverse studies);
see also Albert G.Z. Hu & I.P.L. Png, Patent Rights and Economic Growth: Evidence from
Cross-Country Panels of Manufacturing Industries 2, 4 (Aug. 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1339730,
archived at http://perma.cc/MTE5-VWEB; Yi Qian, Do National Patent Laws Stimulate
Domestic Innovation in a Global Patenting Environment? A Cross-Country Analysis of
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 1978–2002, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 436, 450 (2007)
(making dubious conclusions even about chemical and pharmaceutical patents).
179 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 56–57 (2001).
180 See Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Local Innovation?, 7 J.
INT’L. ECON. L. 359, 369–70 (2004); see also Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson,
Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 132–35
(2009) (using simulation to come to similar conclusions).
181 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 86, at 120–46.
182 See id. at 95–120.
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E. The Economic Performance of Specific Patent Doctrines
An economically defensible patent system requires patent rules that can
enable its goals. How do rules concerning such issues as patent duration, the
requirement of nonobvious subject matter, enablement, or the doctrine of
equivalents perform in the market? There is very little empirical study of how
individual patent doctrines perform, although a significant “meta” empirical
literature exists on judicial behavior concerning these doctrines.183 By
contrast, antitrust law often adopts specific doctrines by linking them to
market performance or expectations. One example is antitrust law’s per se
rule, which is applied only after judicial experience indicates that certain
practices as a class are highly likely to reduce market wide output and increase
price.184 Another example is the “recoupment” requirement in predatory
pricing law, which uses economic analysis and empirical study to link the law
of predatory pricing to rational expectations about monopoly outcomes in
specific markets.185
Antitrust rules evaluate practices by asking market performance questions,
often in the context of litigation, although also by relying on industry studies
that are later used in litigation. For example, as a matter of doctrine,
monopolization and merger law require definition of a “relevant market” in
which the threat of monopoly or cartel behavior can be assessed. Relevant
market queries are highly empirical and market specific, looking at such
factors as degree and speed of substitution from inside to outside, the number
of firms in the market and their size, and the history of new entry. For antitrust
purposes, markets differ so much from one another that each new market
requires its own inquiry. Doing that is costly but it is based on recognition that
the thing we are attempting to measure is very specific to the environment in
which it occurs.
183 See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence:

An Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 732–61 (2013); see also Ali Mojibi, An
Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the Federal Circuit’s Patent Validity
Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 581–96 (2010). For pre-KSR literature, see
Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis
of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 912–15 (2007); see also J. Jonas
Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative
Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 63–76 (2014) (discussing
claim construction and scope); Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the
Written Description Requirement in Patent Examination, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1665, 1665–
68 (2010) (discussing written description); Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent
Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 417, 439–51 (2012) (discussing willful infringement).
184 See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1509; 11 id. ¶ 1909b (addressing
horizontal restraints).
185 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224–
26 (1993) (developing the recoupment requirement); see also 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 135, ¶¶ 725–727.
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The work that has been done on various patent doctrines suggests exactly
the same thing—namely, that a one-size-fits-all approach is completely wrong
headed. That is clearly true of patent duration.186 A longer patent term
increases the incentive to patent, although by less than one might think.187 As
William Landes and Richard Posner note, at a discount rate of 10%, which is
probably low for patented goods with high price/cost margins, the ex ante
value of a twenty-year patent is approximately 85% of a patent whose duration
is infinite.188 Once they calculate what they believe to be a realistic
depreciation rate, the number is closer to 95%.189 Just as a lease or any other
property right with a limited term, a patent depreciates in value as it gets closer
to expiration. A patent also depreciates in value to the extent that the demand
for the product it covers declines, perhaps because it has become obsolete, or
perhaps because more and closer substitutes become available as the
technology matures. For example, if others develop alternatives to the patented
technology over the patent’s lifetime the market for that patent will become
increasingly competitive, and its value accordingly less. At the same time, the
harm caused by exclusion extends over the full term. These numbers are
frankly not very revealing about the impact of longer terms on the balance
between incentive and dissemination of information, except to suggest that
shorter terms give us somewhat smaller incentives, significantly reduced
exclusionary effects, and thus more rapid dissemination of technology. Indeed,
in some information technology areas considerable technology may become
obsolete in the market before the patents on them expire. This makes the
Constitution’s “limited times” prescription meaningless and indicates that the
patent system is not facilitating the dissemination of this technology at all.
Overall, the existing literature provides very little insight into the effects
of either specific patent or antitrust rules on economic performance. For
example, there is little to no empirical support for suggestions made by some
that limiting pay-for-delay pharmaceutical settlements reduces welfare in the
pharmaceutical industry.190 To be sure, any practice that tends to increase the
duration of patent protection increases the incentive to patent,191 but ex ante
186 See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 308–09 (2006).
187 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22
AIPLA Q.J. 369, 392–93 (1994) (finding a greater incentive to innovate in most industries
as term went to twenty years from date of application).
188 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 296.
189 Id.
190 Among those making this suggestion are Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch,
Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ
Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 57, 90–91 (2010); James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and
Agreements to Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments
from Branded to Generic Drug Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777, 809–10 (2003).
191 See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent
Duration and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1641–42 (2009).
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the incentive is not all that large, as the Landes and Posner conclusions
indicate.192 Further, that number needs to be offset by dissemination effects.
Even incentive effects are uncertain. A likely impact of restricting pay-fordelay settlements is to increase patentee incentive to develop new drugs that
start the patent clock over, as an alternative to weak extensions of patents on
old drugs.193 Further, one must consider the generally low quality of the
extension patents that are subject to pay-for-delay settlements.194 Given the
exclusive rights they create, the incentive to obtain them may be strong, but if
they provide protection over developments that in the ordinary course would
have been provided competitively, their social value is negative.
Returning to the question of nonobvious subject matter, a court reviewing
a performance based litigation question might consider how many independent
inventors had developed the same technology. For example, in the Alexsam,
Inc. v. IDT Corp litigation the defendant had sued thirteen different “stored
value” gift card manufacturers for infringing its patent.195 That fact alone
should have provoked a query into such questions as how many relevant gift
card manufacturers there are, and whether they had copied this technology or
developed it independently. If the requirement of nonobvious subject matter is
performing as it should, we should not have a large number of independent
developers. The Federal Circuit found that the defendant had not established
obviousness by looking at some prior art, particularly since it failed to provide
expert testimony on the question of whether a skilled artisan would have been
independently motivated to combine the various prior art references.196 In
short, the court asked a backward looking “boundaries” question when it
should have been asking an “economic performance” question.
Without changing the doctrine of absolute liability, a court interested in a
performance-based rule of nonobvious subject matter might develop a
presumption that if, say, 10% of the producers in a market are infringing, then
192 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 422.
193 See Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D

Incentives, 30 RAND J. ECON. 197, 197–98 (1999).
194 See infra notes 247–50 and accompanying text.
195 Sua Sponte Order of Severance 1, Alexsam, Inc. v. Best Buy Co., No. 2:10cv93
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2013) (involving the Alexsam litigation); see also Unified Messaging
Solutions, LLC v. United Online, Inc., No. 13C00343, 2013 WL 1874211, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
May 3, 2013); EIT Holdings LLC v. Yelp!, Inc., No. C10-05623, 2011 WL 2192820, at *2
(N.D. Cal. May 12, 2011). The America Invents Act added a provision that limits the
ability of an infringement plaintiff to join a large number of defendants who are acting
independently into a single cause. 35 U.S.C. § 299(a) (2012); see also In re EMC Corp.,
677 F.3d 1351, 1353, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that joinder provision is not
retroactive and considering pre-passage complaint naming eighteen infringement
defendants in a single suit). Of course, a patentee can still bring separate suits against a
large number of claimed infringers. See Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Capital One Fin.
Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740, 2013 WL 6682981, at *5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013) (alleging
such a scheme).
196 Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp., 715 F.3d 1336, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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the subject of the patent must be obvious. The infringement plaintiff could
defeat the presumption by showing that the infringers are in fact copyists or
that the product, once on the market, is easy to copy and the infringers had
access to it. For example, a showing that the product is easy to copy and was
widely disseminated prior to rivals’ entry creates an inference of copying. By
contrast, the fact that a large number of firms are infringing an electrical or
business method patent held by a non-practicing entity is a strong indicator
that the patent’s subject matter is obvious.197 That question will be difficult to
answer in close cases, but not so difficult in many others. Further, it would
actually measure what the nonobvious requirement should be measuring. Most
importantly, it would lead to a body of empirical work guiding these
determinations in the future.

F. Comparative Advantage
Legal policy makers must make decisions with the tools and information
available to them, even if they are not perfect. At this time our knowledge
about the relationship between antitrust law and traditional competition, while
imperfect, is much more complete than our knowledge about the relationship
between patent law and innovation—and more particularly, about the impact
of particular patent doctrines on innovation. In that setting it is not irrational to
condemn a practice that is highly likely to decrease welfare via collusion or
exclusion in the shorter run based on nothing but an unsupported hunch that it
might also increase innovation.

VI. RESTRAINTS ON INNOVATION
One important corollary to the observation that innovation contributes
much more to economic growth than does competition under constant
technology is that restraints on innovation can do much greater harm than
restraints on simple competition.198 To an extent, the Patent Act itself or the
courts interpreting it restrain innovation when exclusion effects outweigh the
incentive effects. Several of the studies previously mentioned have observed
that possibility. A well-known example is broad use of the patent law doctrine
of equivalents to shut down technologies that are actually inventions in their
own right. For example, in Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co. (Wright v.
Curtiss), the Wright brothers were able to get a very broad interpretation of
their patent that shut down the superior technology contained in the Curtiss
airplane.199 The Wright brothers’ design employed flexible fabric covered
197 See, e.g., Market-Alerts Pty., Ltd. v. Bloomberg Fin., LP, 922 F. Supp. 2d 486,

488–89 (D. Del. 2013) (involving business method patent claim by non-practicing entity
filed against multiple stock trading companies).
198 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 238–57.
199 Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 204 F. 597 (W.D.N.Y. 1913), aff’d, 211 F. 654,
655 (2d Cir. 1914); see Merges & Nelson, supra note 32, at 890–91.
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wings and a series of cables that twisted, or “warped,” them in order to steer
and level the plane.200 By contrast, Curtiss’s alternative used hinged ailerons,
capable of being used with rigid metal wings, and similar to the technology in
current use.201 While the practical result of Wright v. Curtiss is controversial,
it may have delayed the development of a military-worthy United States
aircraft until after World War One was over.202 The government eventually
pressured the parties to cross license.203 Another is the Supreme Court’s 1908
Continental Paper Bag Co v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. decision, which once
again relied on a broad interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents to shut
down a dominant firm’s competitor, who was in fact using a different
technology than the dominant firm was using.204
Only some restraints on innovation come through the patent system itself,
however. Most are the result of conduct for which the Patent Act is largely
irrelevant. Examples include Microsoft’s successful use of its market power to
force Intel to cease development of a microchip capable of efficiently
processing Java’s multi-language instructions. Microsoft feared that efficient
translation and processing of different computer languages would weaken the
hold of its Windows operating system by making it easier for non-Windows
systems to be compatible.205 Another example was a cartel among American
automobile manufacturers to suppress the development of low emissions
automobile technology.206 A further example was the temporarily successful
efforts of Allied Tube to withhold legal approval to plastic electric conduit, a
lower cost and technologically superior alternative to Allied’s steel conduit.207
And yet another example was a market dominant newspaper’s use of
exclusivity threats to deter the advance of radio advertising, a nascent
competing technology.208 To my knowledge no one has ever attempted to
200 Wright, 204 F. at 600–01.
201 Id. at 609.
202 Merges & Nelson, supra note 32, at 890–91.
203 Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481, 485 (1933) (detailing the

government “suggestion” of cross-licensing).
204 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 427‒30 (1908); see
also infra notes 455–56 and accompanying text.
205 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17–18, 28–29 (D.D.C. 1999),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 253 F.3d 34, 73–78 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See generally ANDREW I.
GAVIL & HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST CASES: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014).
206 See In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398, 401–02 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
207 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496–97 (1988).
But see SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., No. 1:14-cv-191, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Va.
July 15, 2014) (dismissing for lack of agreement complaint that defendants manipulated
standard-setting process for electric saws so as to exclude plaintiff’s invention that stopped
a saw blade upon contact with human skin).
208 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152–53 (1951); see Spencer
Weber Waller & Matthew Sag, Promoting Innovation, 100 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
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catalog such events completely, and certainly not to estimate their social
impact, but it is almost certainly large.209
Aside from the anti-innovation aspects of some patent rules, as discussed
above, the problem of innovation restraints is best analyzed through the
antitrust system. First of all, a restraint on innovation is an “output” restraint,
just as much as a restriction on the number of units of a good to be produced.
As a result it can readily be modeled through the ordinary tools of price
theory, which typically regard it as leading to higher prices if the innovation
would have reduced cost; or a shift in the demand curve if the innovation
would have made a product more attractive. Some innovations, such as the
plastic conduit in the Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.
decision, do both of these things at the same time.
The presence and ubiquity of restraints on innovation suggests that legal
policy take them more seriously. Patent law has an important role to play here,
principally in ensuring that overly broad interpretations do not serve to restrain
rather than incentivize innovation. For example, a developing concern about
the activities of non-practicing patent assertion entities is that they may be
restraining innovation by deterring firms from innovating in the areas where
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) have large portfolios.210 To the extent that is
true, the fix will very likely have to come from patent law rather than antitrust.

VII. USING PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW TO ASSESS INNOVATIONAFFECTING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT
This section offers some preliminary considerations for assessing
antitrust/patent conflicts. Then we turn to the most commonly occurring
conduct areas, delineating the proper role of antitrust for each.

A. Principles for Resolving Antitrust/Patent Conflicts
1. Pre-issuance conduct involving patents is generally not
addressable under the antitrust laws, although pre-issuance
conduct may be relevant to certain forms of post-issuance
exclusionary behavior, such as the filing of unreasonable
infringement suits. The patent system is a largely complete and
effective regulator of pre-issuance conduct, and it is not antitrust
law’s purpose to police other federal regulatory regimes.
2. A practice that is expressly authorized by the Patent Act cannot
be the basis of an antitrust claim, provided that the conduct in
2015) (manuscript at 7), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2479569, archived at http://perma.cc/7U3T-VBS9.
209 For more substantiated accounts, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at
238–57; Hovenkamp, supra note 137, at 249–52.
210 See infra notes 465–75 and accompanying text.
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question falls within the authorization. This proposition is nothing
more than a general rule of statutory construction: specific
statutory authorizations in a federal statute should control general
prohibitions, such as those contained in the antitrust laws.
Post-issuance practices that are not authorized by the Patent Act
should be evaluated under ordinary antitrust rules, which take
both static competition effects and innovation effects into
account. Saying that a practice is subject to the antitrust laws,
however, is not to conclude that it violates them.
Active production under a patent license can indicate that a
restraint is “ancillary,” justifying rule of reason treatment,211 but
it is important to distinguish restraints in the licensing market
from restraints in the product market.
Innovation affecting conduct falls within the domain of antitrust
just as much as patent law, with the important limitation that
antitrust applies only to innovation affecting conduct that is also
anticompetitive. While the patent law’s own system sometimes
works to restrain innovation, it is not antitrust law’s place to
second-guess the way that Congress, patent officials, or judges
make or interpret patent law. For example, judicial recognition of
an overly broad doctrine of equivalents,212 a judge-made rule,
may restrain innovation, but policing the behavior of federal
judges is not an antitrust function. By contrast, most post-issuance
restraints on innovation are privately created and completely
within antitrust law’s reach.
The range of “agreements” covered by the antitrust laws is
broader than the range of "licenses" authorized by the Patent Act.
This principle is particularly important for assessing large
industry-wide arrangements that include cross-licenses but may
also be subject to other agreements or agreement facilitators, not
all of which will be in writing.
A court generally need not determine patent validity or
infringement in order to assess the antitrust legality of a
settlement or other license agreement. For antitrust, the relevant
question is the objectively measured effects of the agreement and
the parties expectations about the quality of the patent(s) at the
time the agreement was made. A later finding of patent invalidity
should not create antitrust liability for a settlement that was
reasonably deemed lawful when created; nor should a later
finding of validity serve to ratify an agreement reasonably
regarded as anticompetitive. This is consistent with the general
principle that economics takes an ex ante rather than ex post

211 On the rule of reason, see infra notes 221–22 and accompanying text.
212 See infra notes 456 and accompanying text.
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approach to decision making. Further, requiring judicial inquiries
into patent validity and infringement in order to evaluate a
settlement agreement brings back in the very questions that the
disputing parties were seeking to avoid at the time of their
settlement.213

B. Product Restraints vs. Patent Restraints
A simple patent license covers the use of patents, not the production of
products. The difference is important for two reasons. First, many patents
cover only a component of a product, and the patent may have alternatives or
be amenable to inventing around. Secondly, nothing in the Patent Act
authorizes market division or price fixing of products, but only the licensing of
patents. As the number of patents becomes larger and their individual coverage
smaller, the distinction between patent restraints and product restraints
becomes all the more important. For example, under the Patent Act a maker of
outdoor grills who has patented a unique igniter may license the igniter
technology to a competing grill maker and specify the geographic area in
which that patent can be used, perhaps limiting competition with itself in
certain areas. The Patent Act expressly permits domestic geographic
restrictions on a patent license.214 What the Patent Act does not authorize,
however, is an agreement under which the patentee limits the territories in
which the licensee can sell any outdoor grills whatsoever, whether or not they
practice the patent.215 That would be a product market restraint and it is fully
subject to the antitrust laws.216 The distinction is important because there may
be a robust market remaining for outdoor grills that do not have the igniter in
question. Indeed, the igniter may do little more than create a product
differentiation that some consumers prefer but not others. Second, there may
be alternative technologies that get the same job done, or it may be possible
for the second firm to invent around the patent, a practice that patent law
generally encourages.
Most antitrust condemnations of restrictive licensing agreements have
involved restraints with a significant impact in the product market. At the
same time, however, only a subset of product market restraints violate the
213 See Edlin et al., supra note 141; Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at *10.
214 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
215 As a matter of patent policy, the exhaustion, or “first sale,” doctrine might refuse to

enforce such a restriction imposed in a patent license if the good in question was sold. See
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 664–67 (1895) (refusing to enforce
territorial restriction imposed via patent license on good after sale); Adams v. Burke, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456–57 (1873) (same).
216 See, e.g., Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872, 880–81 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding
that resale price maintenance of patented product constituted both a per se Sherman Act
offense and patent misuse); Solvex Corp. v. Freeman, 459 F. Supp. 440, 442–48 (W.D. Va.
1977) (similar but with vertical territorial restraints).
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antitrust laws. For example, suppose that the patentee of the grill igniter
licenses it and specifies the price at which the grills must be sold. Assuming
that the patentee does not make grills itself, this would be resale price
maintenance (RPM), a vertical practice that is governed by the rule of reason
and most often lawful.217 Alternatively, a grill manufacturer might create a
dealership network to sell the grills, giving dealers an express or implied
license for patented technology, and might also impose dealer location
restrictions on dealer sales of the grills themselves. But these would be vertical
nonprice restraints, which are covered by the rule of reason and are usually
lawful.218
One interesting aspect of pharmaceutical pay-for-delay settlements is that
typically the patent and the product are coterminous, at least as a practical
matter. This is because drugs falling under the Hatch-Waxman Act must be
“bioequivalent” in order to qualify for abbreviated FDA testing. A generic
firm invoking the statute does not typically have the option of inventing
around the patent, for the resulting drug would not be bioequivalent. Pay-fordelay settlements such as the one in the Actavis case effectively create a
market division in the product market, an area where antitrust scrutiny has
historically been justified.219 One might object that the only way one can have
a patent license restriction on a bioequivalent drug is to have product market
restriction as well. The argument might carry some weight but for the fact that
a pay-for-delay settlement is not a license at all for the delay period, because
under it the generic firm is not authorized to produce anything during that
period. As a result it cannot be characterized as a restricted production license
of the kind that has generally received benign treatment under the antitrust
laws.220

C. Modes of Antitrust Inquiry
Courts analyze most antitrust claims under the rule of reason, which
requires the plaintiff to show initially that the defendant has sufficient market
power and that the challenged practice injures competition by facilitating
either collusion or anticompetitive exclusion. At that time, the burden of proof
217 When RPM was unlawful per se, it was frequently used to condemn RPM on the

product contained in license agreements. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S.
241, 247–52 (1942) (bifocal lens blanks ground with a patented process); Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 442–43 (1940) (gasoline containing patented
additive); Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir.
1944) (patentee of basket-making machine could not impose RPM on unpatented baskets
made with the machine). Since 2007, resale price maintenance has been addressed under
antitrust law’s rule of reason. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 907 (2007).
218 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47–59 (1977).
219 See FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237–38 (2013); see also supra notes 120–30
and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 210–18 and accompanying text.
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shifts to the defendant to provide evidence of a justification, or legitimate
objective.221 The plaintiff can counter, however, by showing that the same
objective could have been reached by a less restrictive alternative.222
Within each of these elements of proof there may be additional
presumptions. For example, a high market share of a properly defined relevant
market creates a presumption of market power, but the presumption can be
defeated by proof of easy entry.223 While computation of market share is
historically the most common way of establishing power, there are others.224
The Actavis majority correctly concluded that a high pay-for-delay payment
itself could create a presumption of market power, for only a firm with power
would have the ability to make such a payment.225 The Supreme Court then
went on to apply the rule of reason in the conventional way. Once the plaintiff
had provided sufficient evidence of power and competitive harm, the burden
shifted to the defendant to show a justification.
In the process Actavis rejected a “quick look” approach urged by the
Federal Trade Commission. The Supreme Court, Justice Breyer in particular,
has never supported the view that antitrust analysis should be divided into
three discrete silos, with “quick look” in between the rule of reason and the per
se rule. Rather, he observed, appraising reasonableness in antitrust analysis
requires a “sliding scale” that varies the inquiry with the question—a phrase
taken from the Antitrust Law treatise.226 As the Court observed, a “quick look”
was inappropriate in Actavis because the likelihood that a reverse payment
would bring about anticompetitive effects: “depends upon its size, its scale in
relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from
other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other
convincing justification.”227
The Court did not make patent validity or infringement an issue in the
antitrust analysis. Nor did it assign the burden of proof on any issue. It would
be reasonable, however, to require that once the plaintiff established a large
payment in relation to anticipated future litigation costs, the defendant should
be required to come forward with information about collateral services and
their value, as well as other convincing justifications. This information would
most likely be within the defendant’s control. At that point the plaintiff could
221 See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1502, 1507; cf. Cal. Dental Ass’n v.

FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 786–88 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
222 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1505.
223 See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, ¶ 801; see also Cal. Dental Ass’n,
526 U.S. at 788.
224 See, e.g., 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, ¶ 521 (addressing direct
proof of market power by estimating residual demand).
225 See FTC v. Actavis, 113 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 520 (Supp. 2014).
226 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38, (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 780
(quoting 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1507)).
227 Id. at 2237.
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still show that the same objectives could have been achieved by a less
restrictive alternative.
In contrast to the rule of reason, antitrust law’s per se rule condemns a
subcategory of agreements simply upon proof that they have occurred, not
requiring proof of market power or actual competitive harm. Today the per se
rule is largely reserved for price fixing, naked market divisions, and naked
concerted refusals to deal (boycotts).228 Once we have decided that the
antitrust laws can be applied to a practice involving patents, ordinary antitrust
analysis should determine whether the per se rule or the rule of reason should
be used. That is to say, this is an antitrust question of law,229 not a patent law
question.
The involvement of patents may indicate rule of reason treatment in an
antitrust case, mainly because the development and dissemination of
technology are both “ancillary” practices with potential economic benefits. For
example, while a naked product market division agreement is unlawful per se,
an agreement embodied in a patent license or cross license may reveal that the
firms are sharing a common technology. But this is simply a way of saying
that the rule of reason governs “ancillary” restraints, and legitimate technology
sharing is a form of ancillarity. Identifying the potential for gains and harm is
the purpose of the rule of reason.
Actavis is exceptional in this sense because a pure pay-for-delay settlement
is not a license during the delay period but a naked market exclusion that is
ordinarily unlawful per se under the antitrust laws. Further, nothing in the
Patent Act or Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes pay-for-delay settlements. On top
of that, many pay-for-delay settlements involve such attenuated adversity
between the parties that they are best regarded as “settlements” in name
only.230
To that extent Actavis’s insistence on a rule of reason still embodies an
element of the “beyond the scope of the patent” inquiry. The restraint at issue
would have been harmless if the patent were valid and infringed, and the issue
is what to make of a very large payment that sends a strong signal of patent
invalidity. By contrast, practices such as naked product price fixing are
unjustified whether or not the patents in question are valid and infringed.231
The two most salient facts about Actavis’s antitrust analysis are, first, that the
Court applied the rule of reason, but second, that it recognized and applied the
long-standing practice in antitrust cases that even the rule of reason involves
presumptions designed to focus the relevant inquiries.232
228 See generally 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ch. 15; 11–13 id. chs. 19–

22.

229 The choice of rule is a question of law, although factual determinations concerning

ancillarity may be needed. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1909b.
230 See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
231 See infra notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
232 See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1507.
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D. Settlements
Most patent infringement suits settle prior to trial.233 The settlements often
result in production licenses, which the Patent Act authorizes in any event.
These would ordinarily be lawful even if there were no infringement litigation
to be settled.234 When the settlements include provisions that the Patent Act
does not authorize, then closer judicial scrutiny is appropriate.235 Patents enjoy
a statutory presumption of validity, and at the time of a pre-trial settlement this
presumption has typically not been upset.236 In general, the courts look closely
at settlement agreements that include restrictions on the product price,237
market division of the product,238 or concerted refusals to deal with
outsiders.239 Purely vertical settlements are generally approved, with some
exceptions for exclusive agreements.240
The previously discussed “beyond the scope” formulation241 for patent
practices retains some vitality in judicial opinions involving antitrust
challenges to patent settlements. In practice, the formulation has come to mean
that a settlement is permissible if its terms are no more exclusionary than a
finding of patent validity and infringement would have been. The important
thing about most of these disputes is that there is true adversity between the
parties. By contrast, adversity is severely limited in the unique subset of
settlements in Hatch-Waxman cases involving pharmaceutical drugs, where
the joint maximizing course is typically for the two parties to divide the
market for as long as the law permits, taking advantage of the Hatch-Waxman
provision to exclude everyone else.242
233 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1501 (2001).
234 See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 2046b.
235 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931) (noting policy of
encouraging settlements); see also IP ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 5.5 &
Example 10 (“Settlements involving the cross-licensing of intellectual property rights can
be an efficient means to avoid litigation and, in general, courts favor such settlements.”).
236 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012); see also United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S.
287, 318–19 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating the presumption of validity in
assessing a patent settlement but nevertheless striking down resale price maintenance and
price-fixing provisions).
237 United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 373–76 (1952); United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274–77 (1942); United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F.
Supp. 791, 793–94, 803 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (approving the arrangement), aff’d per curiam,
382 U.S. 197 (1965); United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 197–99 (E.D. Pa. 1956)
(striking down cross-licensing agreement accompanied by product price fixing), aff’d per
curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957).
238 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 570, 574 (1945) (clarifying 323
U.S. 386 (1945)).
239 See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 195 (1963).
240 See infra notes 377–79 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 48–66 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 242–47 and accompanying text.
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Pay-for-delay settlements are sometimes thought to be unique because the
market division does no more than protect what a valid and infringed patent
would have protected in the first place—namely, the patentee’s right to
exclude the generic. Those defending the agreements have suggested that an
agreement whose duration runs short of the time remaining on the patent might
actually benefit consumers by permitting quicker generic entry than a valid
patent would permit.243 The problem with that argument, however, is that
there is no equilibrium agreement that would satisfy those conditions without
harming consumers.244 As noted above, under the dissenter’s “scope of the
patent” approach the equilibrium point would be an agreement that delayed
generic entry just short of the full patent term.245
The availability of a pay-for-delay settlement under the Hatch-Waxman
Act creates one of the more perverse anticompetitive incentives in the patent
system. Such settlements are virtually unknown in patent law outside the
context of Hatch-Waxman.246 The owner of a pioneer drug whose patent is
about to expire is incentivized to create a secondary or extension (evergreened)
patent that is just strong enough to get by a patent examiner.247 Evergreened
patents of this nature have a very high failure rate.248 It does not matter how
weak the patent is, however; it simply has to be issued. At that point the
patentee can enter into a pay-for-delay settlement that ratchets the patent’s
anticipated success probability up to 100% because no one can challenge the
patent for the duration of the settlement. The result creates a largely
impregnable market division because the patent and the product in a pay-fordelay settlement are coterminous: one cannot make the product without the
patent.249
As noted previously, some have argued that rules disfavoring pay-fordelay settlements might reduce the incentive to develop new drugs.250 The
only empirical support for that claim is that a longer protection period provides
a greater incentive to get a particular patent, but says nothing about overall
effects on innovation or the social cost of a longer period of exclusion. On the
243 See Barry C. Harris et al., Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story, 28
ANTITRUST 83, 83 (2014).
244 See Edlin et al., supra note 102, at 7.
245 See supra notes 123–26 and accompany text; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 38
(manuscript at 10).
246 See Hovenkamp, supra note 118, at 15–16.
247 Kate S. Gaudry, Evergreening: A Common Practice to Protect New Drugs, 29
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 876, 876–78 (2011) (noting ubiquity of evergreened
pharmaceutical patents); see also ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 170–78
(2012).
248 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 125, at viii, 42 (concluding that one out of
four of litigated patents in Hatch-Waxman challenges are valid); Eisenberg, supra note
125, at 354; Hovenkamp, supra note 38 (manuscript at 11) (invalidity rate of about two out
of three in fully litigated Hatch-Waxman challenges).
249 See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 189–92 and accompanying text.
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other hand, the short-run cost/benefit analysis is overwhelmingly negative.
The consistent record of drug prices shows sharp declines upon generic
entry.251 In any event, the remedy for a patent period that is too short is
congressional action lengthening the patent term, not tacking of a bad patent
onto a good one.
The Actavis decision creates some unacknowledged tension with the
Patent Act’s statutory presumption of validity, which gives the challenger the
burden to prove invalidity.252 In 2011, the Supreme Court agreed with a long
line of cases that this presumption could be defeated only by clear and
convincing evidence.253 At the time of a pay-for-delay settlement a patent has
typically not yet been declared invalid; although there are a few exceptions.254
Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion is driven by an assumption that a high payfor-delay settlement suggests patent weakness. The fact is that the Patent Act’s
statutory presumption of validity is in conflict with a reality in which nearly
half of patents are declared invalid even under the clear and convincing
standard.255 In any event, the Court’s holding that it is not necessary to litigate
the patent’s validity256 is consistent with other decisions holding that
settlement agreements can be unlawful whether or not the patents in question
are valid and infringed. For example, patent validity is not a defense to market
wide price fixing in the product market.257 This is most likely to be the case
when the restraint affects the product market, and when the agreement is not
one that the Patent Act authorizes. Both of these things are true of pay-fordelay pharmaceutical settlements. The underlying rationale is that settlements
as well as other licensing agreement must be analyzed ex ante, based on the
parties’ reasonable expectations, rather than ex post by determining after the
agreement was entered whether the patent was in fact valid and infringed.

VIII. SPECIFIC PRACTICES IMPLICATING ANTITRUST AND PATENT LAW
This section examines specific post-issuance practices that have implicated
both antitrust and patent policy.
251 See, e.g., JON LEIBOWITZ, FED. TRADE COMM’N, “PAY-FOR-DELAY” SETTLEMENTS
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: HOW CONGRESS CAN STOP ANTICOMPETITIVE
CONDUCT, PROTECT CONSUMERS’ WALLETS, AND HELP PAY FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM

(2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements
/pay-delay-settlements-pharmaceutical-industry-how-congress-can-stop-anticompetitive-co
nduct-protect/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2SKP-G92U.
252 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
253 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
254 See, e.g., FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-2141, 2014 WL 3731753, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. July 29, 2014) (holding that because patent had already been declared invalid,
respondent could not rely on strength of the patent arguments to defend settlement that
provided for six year delay).
255 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 156, at 76.
256 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237–38 (2013).
257 See infra notes 267–75 and accompanying text.
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A. Product Price Fixing and Horizontal Market Division
Naked product price fixing is per se unlawful under the antitrust laws, is
condemned by competition authorities everywhere, and can be a criminal
offense under United States law.258 At the same time, a patent production or
use license is a buy–sell agreement that must set a price on the license itself.
As a result there is nothing wrong with a license agreement that sets a royalty
for the licensee’s use of a patent as a lump sum, a percentage of the sales price,
a per unit price, or by some other means. The Patent Act expressly authorizes
such licenses.259
In the Bement v. National Harrow Co. decision the parties went further,
however. They settled litigation over patents covering spring-tooth harrows by
a cross-license agreement that also stipulated the price at which the harrows
themselves must be sold.260 The Supreme Court upheld the agreement,
reasoning that one element in ownership of a patent is the right to set a product
price, which the patentee could retain.261 In 1926, the Supreme Court
acknowledged a similar exception for an agreement under which General
Electric licensed Westinghouse to make light bulbs under its patent and set the
price for the bulbs.262 Congress repeatedly considered overturning this rule,
but without success—a point that three dissenting Justices emphasized in the
1948 Line Materials case.263 The majority condemned a market wide price
fixing agreement contained in patent cross-licenses.264 The basic crosslicensing agreement covered two complementary patents owned by the two
principals, but they also agreed to license others to manufacture under the two
patents and jointly stipulated the price of the manufactured products.
While Bement and United States v. General Electric Co. (GE) have never
been explicitly overruled, today the antitrust enforcement agencies largely
ignore them.265 In a district court opinion, Judge Richard Posner, sitting by
designation, opined that a product price fixing agreement contained in a
license settling a patent dispute would be unlawful if the parties believed that
the patent was “almost certain” not to survive a validity challenge.266 He also
suggested that the “elderly and much-criticized” GE decision would not be
258 See 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, ¶ 303b.
259 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 271(d)(2) (2012).
260 See Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 72–75 (1902). On the technology,

see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 354–55.
261 See Bement, 186 U.S. at 93–95.
262 See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 493–94 (1926).
263 See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 362–63 (1948) (Burton, J.,
dissenting).
264 Id. at 362 n.30 (majority opinion).
265 See IP ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 5.2 & n.33 (mentioning GE case in
a footnote and emphasizing extent to which courts have narrowed it but not mentioning of
Bement).
266 Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(citing 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 31.1c.).
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upheld today, noting that the low royalty rate (2%) plus an output escalation
clause that served to limit production indicated that the parties were very
dubious about the patent and also wanted to fix prices.267 In addition, they
collectively held 93% of the light bulb market.268 In dicta in Actavis, the
Supreme Court restricted GE in a different way, limiting it to agreements
between a “single patentee” and a “single licensee.”269 Perhaps a patentee has
an interest in limiting price competition from its licensee.270 Chief Justice Taft
thought so in his GE opinion for the Court.271 The patentee could achieve the
same result, however, simply by raising the license price. That would permit
the patentee to keep the surplus to itself rather than sharing it with the licensee.
Of course, the licensee might be unwilling to pay more, but that would suggest
that the patent is worth less than the cartel markup in any event.
Neither Judge Posner’s restriction to patents of dubious validity nor
Actavis’s restriction to agreements between a single patentee and a single
licensee goes far enough. First, the Actavis limitation might be a useful way of
distinguishing GE as judicial precedent, but on the collusion question, the
smaller number of players increases rather than decreases the competitive
danger, provided the cartel has sufficient power to increase the price. Indeed, a
two-person cartel in a duopoly market is typically more stable and thus more
dangerous than a cartel composed of a larger number.
Judge Posner’s restriction to patents of dubious validity does not address
the full problem either. To be sure, including a license in a worthless patent
may be a cover for price fixing. But the problem goes far deeper: a product
price fix in a patent license agreement attributes the entire value of a
monopoly market position to the patents covered in the license agreement. To
illustrate, suppose that office staplers can be sold competitively at a price of
$5.00, but that a monopolist or well-functioning cartel would charge $7.00, or
40% higher.272 Suppose that the manufacturers of these staplers identify a
minor patent covering one manufacturer’s stapler. They form a cross-licensing
agreement for that patent, stipulating that each of them will charge $7 for
staplers. They have in fact merged the legal question about patent validity and
infringement and the economic question of patent value into the cartel
agreement. Even if the patent were completely valid it may have contributed
little value to the staplers in question and certainly not value sufficient to
enable the staplers to be sold at a 40% markup, the full product cartel price.
267 Id. at 992.
268 Id.
269 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013).
270 See BOWMAN, JR., supra note 24, at 126–27.
271 See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926) (“It would seem

entirely reasonable that he should say to the licensee, ‘Yes, you may make and sell articles
under my patent, but not so as to destroy the profit that I wish to obtain by making them
and selling them myself.’”).
272 A cartel and a purchasing functioning monopolist charge the same price. See
HOVENKAMP, supra note 121, § 4.1.
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The empirical literature on price fixing overcharges and patent licenses
bears this out. In successful cartels the average markup is on the order of 20%
to 50% over the pre-cartel price,273 while average per patent royalty rates on
licensed patents run in a range of 1–6% of the wholesale product price.274 One
study found the median rate to be about 3%.275 Further, only valuable patents
are licensed. Only about 1–2% of issued patents are ever litigated, and less
than 5% are licensed.276 A significant majority of patents are not even
maintained when renewal fees become due.277 But any patent, whether
valuable or not, could be used as an excuse for a product price fix if contained
in a cartel agreement that the courts permitted. Without regard to the patent’s
value this agreement would permit the parties to set the price to the full cartel
level. That situation resembles the one in Actavis, where the opportunity for
273 See Robert Clark & Jean-François Houde, The Effect of Explicit Communication on

Pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel, 62 J. INDUS. ECON. 191, 192
(2014); John M. Connor, Cartel Overcharges, in 26 THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS
ACTIONS 249, 316 (James Langenfeld ed., 2014); John M. Connor, Price-Fixing
Overcharges: Revised 3rd Edition 51, 53, 60 (Feb. 24, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2400780, archived at http://perma.cc/UQ3F-6G9J
(detailing statistical data that indicates, among other things, overall median overcharge is
23%; mean overcharge is 48.7%; and international cartel overcharges are higher than
domestic ones); John M. Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern Private
International Cartels, 1990–2005, at 21 (Purdue Univ. Dept. of Agricultural Econ.,
Working Paper No. 06-11, 2006), available at http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/working_
papers/workingpaper.connor.11.10.06.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T4RJ-AJSZ; Florian
Smuda, Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law 4 (Ctr. for
European Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 12-050, 2012), available at http://ftp.zew.de
/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp12050.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HTC3-VN2B (finding
somewhat lower overcharges than Connor).
274 See KPMG, PROFITABILITY AND ROYALTY RATES ACROSS INDUSTRIES: SOME
PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE 8 (2012), available at http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en
/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/gvi-profitability-v6.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/5Q7Y-EP89 (finding actual royalty rates in the range of 2.6% to 3.6%);
Roy J. Epstein & Paul Malherbe, Reasonable Royalty Patent Infringement Damages After
Uniloc, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 3, 4–19 (2011) (noting wide industry-specific variations and
indicating problem of distinguishing portfolio rates and single-patent rates; also discussing
the often criticized and now generally rejected litigation rule that royalties are
presumptively 25% of the infringer’s “profits”); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent
Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007) (breaking out single-patent and
overall royalty rates, mainly in information technologies); see Uniloc USA, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (excluding expert testimony
based on 25% rule: “[t]his court now holds as a matter of Federal Circuit law that the 25
percent rule of thumb is a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate
in a hypothetical negotiation,” in part because of the rule’s indifference to patent strength
or the number of patents in a portfolio).
275 Mariko Sakakibara, An Empirical Analysis of Pricing in Patent Licensing Contracts
12 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1515163, archived at http://perma.cc/58VN-CANE.
276 See Lemley, supra note 233, at 1507.
277 Id. at 1503–04.
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collusion eliminates most of the adversity between the parties, permitting them
to share the cartel profits. Patent strength could then be reflected in the size of
internal cross-licensing royalties. As Judge Posner noted in Asahi Glass, for
example, the fact that GE and Westinghouse set a very low royalty rate
suggests that the patent was not very strong.278
By contrast, suppose that one of the stapler manufacturers has a patent that
it believes really does make the staplers worth $7, or $2 more than the cost of
production. The manufacturer could then license the patents to its competitors
at a royalty rate of $2 per stapler. The output result in this case would be the
same, yielding final prices of $7, assuming that both manufacturers have costs
of $5. But this situation is far different because now we have preserved
adversity among the parties on the relevant patent questions of validity,
infringement, and value. If the rival stapler manufacturer does not believe that
the patent is valid, that it is not infringing, or that the patent does not add $2 in
value, it will not pay. It might try to invent around the patent rather than pay
the royalty, but the ability to join a cartel would undermine that incentive as
well. This makes this situation very different from Bement or GE.
No provision of the Patent Act authorizes product price fixing, and for
good reason. But should we apply the rule of reason rather than the per se rule
to a naked product price fix contained in a patent license? That might be a
compromise between the Bement and GE conclusions of legality and the
antitrust rule of per se illegality. It would condemn such price fixes only in
cases of significant power and where the price that is fixed is in some way
unreasonable.
The problem with a rule of reason in this setting is that it greatly
encumbers the analysis of a problem without giving anything in return. As
noted above, the harm from a product price fix can occur whether or not the
patents are valid or infringed. Quite aside from questions of validity or
infringement, they might simply not be worth much, or at least not worth
nearly as much as the markup that the fixers agree upon. As a result, asking
whether the price fix was no more than reasonably necessary to cover the
value of a patent that was valid and infringed would require a very costly and
uncertain inquiry into both patent validity and market value—precisely the
“sea of doubt” that Judge Taft worried about in his famous defense of the per
se price fixing rule, rejecting the defendants’ arguments for an inquiry into
reasonableness.279 Further, in this case the patentee has a perfectly reasonable
alternative, which is metering of the royalty rate rather than the product price.
The patentee will simply have to convince the prospective licensee that the
patent is worth that much.
One qualification to this rule is the Patent Act provision that authorizes
domestic horizontal territorial division.280 Section 261 authorizes a patentee to
278 See supra notes 265–66 and accompanying text.
279 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898).
280 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 24.3b.
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grant a production license to another firm that covers “the whole or any
specified part of the United States.”281 The provision is written in such a way
that it covers both horizontal agreements and purely vertical territorial
restraints, where the licensor and licensee are not product competitors.282
Thus, for example, if the owner of an upstream process patent licenses it to
numerous downstream dealers, neither patent policy nor antitrust policy has
much reason to attack the arrangement, provided that the licensees are not
agreeing with each other.283 As far as patent law is concerned, the practice is
statutorily authorized. As far as antitrust is concerned, purely vertical nonprice
restraints are governed by the rule of reason and few are condemned.284
Problematically, however, the provision also insulates purely horizontal
territorial restraints where the parties are competitors. These could be per se
unlawful under the antitrust laws. In United States v. National Lead Co., the
Supreme Court qualified § 261’s reach, holding that the Sherman Act applies
if competing firms disguise a naked horizontal territorial division agreement in
patent cross licenses.285 In this case the territorial restrictions were worldwide,
taking them out of the § 261 authorization, which extends only to domestic
territorial division agreements.286 In addition, the territorial provisions
included licensees’ agreements with one another, as well as with licensors.287
No provision of the Patent Act authorizes licensees to enter anticompetitive
agreements with one another.288
Unlike a pay-for-delay settlement, in which the generic does nothing but
stay out of the market, § 261 creates an express authorization only for
patentees or their assignees to grant a license.289 As a result, there will be a
level of integration between a competing patentee and licensee, because they
are using a common patent to produce something. An ancillary market division

281 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
282 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 24.3b.
283 See Sec. Materials Co. v. Mixermobile Co., 72 F. Supp. 450, 455–56 (S.D. Cal.

1947) (holding it is lawful for patentee to grant one licensee an exclusive right to sell in
Southern California and another licensee an exclusive right to sell in other parts of the
United States, excluding Southern California and the patentee’s own area); see also
Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisele & Co., 86 F.2d 267, 269 (6th Cir. 1936) (stating in dicta
that patentee could license multiple users and limit each to a specified part of the United
States).
284 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 37 (1977); see also 8 AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1643–1648.
285 See United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 341 (1947); see also United
States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118, 126–27 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (involving
government claim in allegation that patentee and rival used minor patent mechanism in
hand-towel dispensers to allocate distribution territories).
286 35 U.S.C. § 261.
287 Nat’l Lead, 332 U.S. at 341–43.
288 Id. at 341–42.
289 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 2044a.
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agreement—unlike the naked territory division in National Lead—would be
addressed under the rule of reason.290
Finally, § 261 authorizes licenses of the patent, not the entire product in
which the patent is embodied. To illustrate, suppose that firm A sells lawn
mowers east of the Mississippi River that include a patented handle that
purports to be easier to grip. A is free to license firm B, another lawn mower
seller, to use its patent and to limit use of the handle to mowers sold west of
the Mississippi. What A cannot do, however, is forbid B from selling any
mowers whatsoever east of the Mississippi. Firm B is free to sell mowers
anywhere it wishes provided that it does not incorporate A’s patented handle.
Territorial agreements that reach to the product itself are not protected by
§ 261. If horizontal and naked, they can be illegal per se.291
Product and customer market division agreements stand on a different
footing from territorial division because they are not authorized by the Patent
Act. Such agreements usually take the form of “field-of-use” restrictions,
under which a patent is licensed for a particular product or customer set.292
Field-of-use restrictions permit a producing patentee to license others for
markets that it does not wish to serve with its own production.293 Once again,
to the extent they involve licenses that are actually producing, they are
ancillary restraints with respect to that patent. If the restrictions are imposed
by one firm on others the courts generally uphold them under the rule of
reason.294 For example, in General Talking Pictures v. Western Electric Co.,
AT&T reserved the production of sound amplifiers incorporating its patents
for commercial use to its own subsidiaries, but it licensed others to produce
private versions.295 While agreements such as these are horizontal in form,
because the patentee competes with the licensees, they are vertical in
substance to the extent that the patentee behaves as the manager of the
arrangement and is simply licensing other firms to produce in other markets. A
close analogy in distribution restraints generally is “dual distribution,” in
which a producer such as General Motors might own some of its dealerships
290 Compare Nat’l Lead, 332 U.S. at 341–42, with Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1050 (9th Cir. 1983) (remanding to lower court to apply
rule of reason and approving product licensing agreement permitting one firm to make
land-based military aircraft and the other to make carrier-based aircraft).
291 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 24.1b.
292 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 2044.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), aff’d on
reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938). See generally B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d
1419, 1427 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (field-of-use restriction to be evaluated under rule of
reason); United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (similar); Benger Labs. Ltd. v. R.K. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639, 648–49 (E.D.
Pa. 1962) (approving arrangement in which one licensee could manufacture patented drug
for veterinary use and another for human use), aff’d per curiam, 317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963).
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while entering into franchise agreements with others. After a lengthy history of
debate,296 the courts today overwhelmingly regard them as essentially vertical
arrangements with significant potential to increase output.297
But some field-of-use arrangements cross the line when firms use the
restrictions to support collusion. These are closely analogous to other
restricted distribution systems in which the product division is instigated by a
cartel of dealers or by one powerful dealer.298 For example, the HartfordEmpire Co. v. United States decision involved an elaborate product market
division agreement among competing glassmakers. The agreement, which
settled patent infringement litigation, gave Corning an exclusive right to make
pressed and blown glassware, while Hartford received an exclusive right to
make other types of glass. Thatcher became the exclusive manufacturer of
glass milk bottles, and Ball the exclusive maker of canning jars.299 All of the
major participants owned patents that were contributed to the cross-licensing
agreement, but the agreements themselves applied to the products, not to the
patents as such.300
Dividing the territory between beneficial and harmful field-of-use
arrangements brings antitrust policy to one of its most conceptually frustrating
issues: how to distinguish vertical from horizontal agreements in the context of
restricted distribution. Because the Patent Act does not speak to the issue of
product-restricted licenses, antitrust law’s rule of reason applies and the issues
for patent licenses are not different in principle from the issues for organized
product distribution generally. The one important difference is that organized
distribution by means of patent licenses may involve technology sharing,
while individual product dealers tend to be silos with relatively little interdealer communication. But these are fact questions that antitrust law’s rule of
reason is designed to address.

B. Pooling, Cross-Licensing, and Standard Setting of Patented
Technologies
Pooling and cross-licensing simpliciter refer to situations in which
product-producing firms agree to share technologies for some part of their
296 See, e.g., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1975) (classifying

dual distribution arrangement as horizontal), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Hobart
Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894, 899 (5th Cir. 1973) (similar).
297 See Elecs. Commc’ns Corp. v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 129 F.3d 240,
243–44 (2d Cir. 1997); Mesirow v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 703 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir.
1983); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1576 (11th Cir. 1983);
Davis-Watkins v. Serv. Merch., 686 F.2d 1190, 1199 (6th Cir. 1982). The case law is
analyzed in 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1605.
298 See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1604.
299 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 392–400 (1945) (clarified by
324 U.S. 570 (1945)).
300 Hartford-Empire Co., 323 U.S. at 400.
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production without fixing product prices or dividing the product market.301
The agreements can range from specific licenses for specific patents, to
licenses for large numbers of patents, to standard setting agreements that
involve standards essential patents (SEPs), and up front commitments to
license the patents on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND)
terms. In some cases, firms will simply exchange royalty-free licenses to their
entire portfolios.302
Licensing exchanges that do not restrict products do not often violate the
antitrust laws. Such disputes mainly involve either patent law or contract law.
Antitrust becomes involved when the restrictions facilitate price fixing, market
division, or some other restraint in the product market. Pure patent exclusions
can be anticompetitive, however, when firms manipulate the standard setting
process to exclude particular technologies that compete with the technologies
of members.303 Antitrust also becomes relevant when firms combine their
patents and use exclusive cross-licenses as a device for excluding others.304 Of
course, if a standards essential patent is truly essential to network
functionality, then a pure patent restriction may also operate as an effective
product restriction as well.
A traditional view about antitrust in markets for pooling and cross
licensing was that pooling of complementary patents is efficient, while pooling
of substitutes is suspicious because it facilitates collusion.305 At a high level of
abstraction, that observation seems important. Complements are ordinarily
used together. Pooling of complements reduces the transaction costs of joint
licensing, and also eliminates double marginalization, or royalty “stacking.”306
By contrast, if two patents are substitutes they should be competing with one
another and the licensee needs one of them, but not both. In that case, pooling
is unnecessary to achieve economies and may facilitate collusion.
The substitutes/complements argument often falls apart in practice,
however, particularly in information technologies. First, when patents have
large numbers of claims, as many information technologies patents do, then
dividing them up into substitutes and complements is often impossible. Many
patents function as both simultaneously. For example, the Princo Corp. v.
301 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, §§ 34.2a–34.2b.
302 Id.
303 See infra notes 333–37 and accompanying text.
304 See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196–97 (1963)

(condemning cross-licensing to facilitate concerted refusal to exclude rival manufacturers).
305 See BOWMAN, JR., supra note 24, at 61–63; Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent
Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 89, available at
https://journals.law.stanford.edu/stanford-technology-law-review/online/antitrust-patentpools-century-policy-evolution, archived at http://perma.cc/AX82-Z7JT. The literature and
case law are exhaustively covered in 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 34.
306 See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 25, at 958–61. Double marginalization,
or royalty stacking, occurs when the producers of two complementary products with some
monopoly power are unable to coordinate their output. Id. at 958. The result will be that
price will be higher and output lower than under-coordinated pricing. Id.
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International Trade Commission decision involved alternative patents for
digital and analog technologies for a portion of a writable CD system that
located the stylus on the disc.307 A manufacturer would use one technology or
the other, but not both, making them function as substitutes.308 However,
practicing the analog patent required infringement of at least one claim in the
digital patent.309 This made the patents legal complements as well because
effectively they had to be licensed together.310
The products that contain pooled patents might be more easily classified as
substitutes or complements, but even that is not always clear. One problem
with large information technology pools such as MPEG LA, which pools
video patents for digital devices, is that the scope of many individual patents
has not been determined at the time of licensing.311 The members of MPEG
LA include manufacturers of personal computers, software, DVD discs and
players, memory cards, computer displays, digital televisions, mobile video
receivers, TV set-top boxes, Blu-Ray discs and players, digital still video
cameras, as well as pay-per-view television technology.312 For example, a
digital camera and a digital computer display are complements in the product
market. One makes photos and the other displays them, so each enhances the
value of the other. Nevertheless, these two devices very likely share numerous
patents that cover technologies of video digitization and compression. A
traditional DVD player and a Blu-Ray player are better classified as substitutes
rather than complements. Nevertheless, they undoubtedly share many patents
as well. In sum, the complements/substitutes distinction becomes useless in
markets with any significant degree of complexity.
In large information technology pools no one knows until after costly
claim construction whether or not specific patents write on someone’s
product.313 A paying licensee of the package has little economic incentive to
examine each patent in the package for validity or infringement. Even if a
patent in the package were declared invalid, there is no legal mechanism short
of price regulation that would require a rate reduction.
In such a setting the transaction cost savings from pooling make it far
more favorable to most firms than individual enforcement or licensing.314
307 See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc).
308 Id. at 1324.
309 Id. at 1324–25.
310 Id. at 1325; see also Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 475, 510–11 (2011).
311 Nero AG v. MPEG LA, L.L.C., No. 10-cv-3672-MRP-RZ, 2010 WL 4366448, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010).
312 See id. at *1. For further details on MPEG LA, see MPEG LA,
http://www.mpegla.com/man/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc
/AR3S-6DFP.
313 See 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 34.4a1.
314 See id. § 34.4c4.
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Indeed, in markets other than chemicals and pharmaceuticals the average value
of patents is often less than the cost of acquiring, interpreting, and litigating
them.315 In that case, widespread pooling becomes a way for firms to “back
out” of a patent system that is based on individual appropriation when sharing
is a superior alternative. By sharing all of the important technology, they can
bring themselves back into an equilibrium with far fewer patents to worry
about, except for those held by outsiders to the pool.
A more robust explanation for pooling in high tech markets is rooted in the
theory of commons development, in this case the “innovation commons.”316
The legally recognized boundaries of individual property rights are valuable to
the extent they reduce the costs of enforcement and in the process increase the
value of appropriation.317 The clearer boundaries are and the less costly it is to
defend them, the more valuable individual property rights will be.
In some cases, however, boundaries are so costly to define and defend that
sharing is preferable to individual appropriation. Consider the examples of
fisheries and grazing rights, which traditionally experienced a large number of
commons dating all the way back to the Middle Ages.318 A characteristic of
such “common pool resources” is that the cost of defining and defending
individual boundaries is very high in relation to production value.319 One
might imagine that the 100 fishermen owning a common pool could build
underwater fences dividing the pool into 100 parts. But doing so would be
tremendously expensive, might hamper the movement of the fish with
devastating results to the yield, and produce many disputes about the proper
location of boundary lines and assignment of parcels. Considering all these
impediments, the fishermen obtain a much greater payoff by turning the pool
into a commons, developing rules about how much each participant can take
out and how much each must contribute.
This phenomenon is simply a special case of Ronald Coase’s The Nature
of the Firm.320 Firms decide on an input-by-input basis how to organize their
production, choosing the most cost-effective/highest-payoff alternative.321 The
Coasean theory of the commons simply says that firms will choose a commons
when the payoff to doing so is greater than the payoff to individual boundary
setting.322
315 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 86, at 138–42.
316 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 325–64.
317 See id. at 347–49.
318 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 61–88 (1990).
319 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra

note 3, at 337.

320 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 386‒87 (1937).

See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutonalism, and the Origins of Law and
Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499 (2011) (discussing Coase’s contributions to the modern
discipline of law and economics).
321 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 331.
322 Id.
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Patent pools have some similarities to common pool resources, but they
are not identical. One critical difference is that the resources in a traditional
common pool are rivalrous, or “subtractive,” while output under a patent is
not.323 For example, fishermen on a common pool risk overfishing, which will
deplete the pool. Each has an incentive to take too many out, while
contributing too little to restocking and maintenance. As a result, the managers
must impose catch limitations on individual members. These quotas look
dangerously like cartels, however, and would be unlawful if enforced by a
fishing group that did not share a common pool. A patent, by contrast, can be
practiced an infinite number of times without depleting the amount that is left
over.324 As a result, output restrictions in patent pools are more suspicious
than they are in traditional common pool resources.325 That is a place where
antitrust can become relevant, although for the most part large pools for
standardized technologies do not impose product output limitations.
Another difference between patent pools and traditional common pool
resources has to do with the diversity of both the participants and the patents in
the pool. A commons for grazing, fishing, or irrigation rights typically
includes participants and rights that are fairly homogenous. Not so with many
large patent pools, as the discussion of the MPEG LA pool illustrates.326 This
can naturally lead to disputes about what should be included in the patent pool.
Some manufacturers might want a smaller set of patents, or a different set of
patents than other members want.
This phenomenon has led to challenges to a form of “tying,” or package
licensing, in which a licensee complains that in order to obtain a set of patents
that it wants (analogized to the tying product) it must also take a set of patents
that it does not want (i.e., the tied product).327 Historically the Supreme Court
has recognized such claims under the antitrust laws, but today they generally
fail for the reason that no injury to competition is present.328
Competitive harm from tying occurs when a buyer is forced to take a
dominant firm’s tied product and as a result cannot purchase that product from
a rival.329 The “unwanted tied product” claim, by contrast, is simply that the
buyer would prefer a smaller package than the one that is being sold.330 This
323 Id. at 328.
324 Id.
325 See id. at 328–30.
326 Nero AG v. MPEG LA, L.L.C., No. 10-cv-3672-MRP-RZ, 2010 WL 4366448, at

*1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010).
327 See id. at *2 (rejecting such a claim).
328 Id. at *4.
329 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16–18 (1984).
330 See, e.g., Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1200 (9th Cir. 2012)
(rejecting claims based on unwanted tied product under rule of reason); see also Herbert J.
Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Nonexcluding Ties 3–4 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research
Paper No. 12-36, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2143869, archived at http://perma.cc/5L7K-LSHP.
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claim may have made some sense in a world in which pools of complementary
patents were regarded as beneficial but pools of substitutes were not, and
where patents and the technologies incorporating them were easily interpreted.
By showing that a particular patent was “unwanted” the plaintiff was
establishing that at least for its own use that particular patent was not a
complement. By contrast, the theory makes no sense if the reason for pooling
is to reduce transaction costs and deal with boundary ambiguities. The plaintiff
is asking the court to do precisely the very expensive act that pooling seeks to
avoid—namely, establishing and costing out each licensee’s individual use.
In any event, it is not antitrust law’s purpose to force sellers to cut their
product offerings into smaller pieces for the benefit of a customer when no
harm to competition is present. Further, accepting the “unwanted tied product”
rationale for an antitrust claim turns the court into a micromanager of package
size and price.331 For example, if the licensee member of a 1000 patent pool
protests that its product actually uses only 150 of the patents, a court would
have to conduct a fiercely expensive claim construction in order to determine
how many patents the plaintiff’s product actually practices. Then it would
have to determine some pro rata formula for giving the plaintiff a price
reduction to account for the patents it does not use. Because all patents are
hardly created equal, such evaluations would be enormously costly if not
heroic.332
Patent pooling via standard setting can become anticompetitive for the
same reason that standard setting itself might—namely, when it is used to
exclude a superior standard for the benefit of incumbent firms who are
committed to an established standard. One good example outside of the patent
licensing context is the Allied Tube decision.333 The Supreme Court found a
likely antitrust violation when a group of firms producing traditional steel
electrical conduit manipulated a standard setting organization into
disapproving plastic conduit, a cheaper and superior product that captured
most of the market once the ruling was reversed.334 This story has some
analogues in patented high technology standard setting.335
331 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 772 (D. Del.

1981).

332 For a comparison to the copyright context, see id. at 764–65, 767 (rejecting tying

claim that country and western bar was forced to take full pool of copyrighted songs in
BMI database and holding that costs of cutting up the package and verifying actual use
outweighed any gains).
333 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509‒11 (1988).
334 Id. at 496–97.
335 See Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 270–71 (5th Cir.
2008) (rejecting such a claim); see also TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 114574, 2012 WL 3584626, at *25 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2012) (sustaining a complaint);
Cryptography Research Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, No. C 04-04143 JW, 2008 WL
5560873, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008) (similar). For further analysis, see
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 35.6; Hillary Greene, Non-Per Se Treatment of Buyer
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One important thing about technology standard setting is that antitrust
must resolve exclusion disputes without becoming unnecessarily involved in
the substantive standards themselves. In areas such as telecommunications,
electrical, and medical devices, juries are simply not equipped to make such
evaluations. But there are other things that a court can examine. For example,
competitive harm usually will not result if those setting the standard are not
competitors with the person being excluded. As the Seventh Circuit once
observed, a standard setting association of boat trailer manufacturers who
purchase rather than make their own trailer lights has no anticompetitive
incentive to exclude a particular light for failing to meets its standards.336 As
purchasers rather than competitors, they stand to benefit from safe, reliable
lights, just as consumers would. Second, if the standard setting organization
does have participants who compete with the excluded firm there needs to be
transparency and, if possible, firewalls that exclude direct competitors from
participating in the standard setting process for a competitor’s good.337

C. Grantbacks and Market Regimentation
A grantback clause in a patent license requires the licensee to “grant back”
any patented improvements it might make to the invention.338 Patentees might
regard such a clause as essential before they agree to a license.339 Otherwise
they might be threatened with obsolescence in the very markets that they have
developed.340 For example, if patent A were licensed and the licensee then
developed a complementary improvement, B, that made A work better, the
patentee would be stuck with the older version of A unless it were guaranteed
access to B as well.341 Grantback clauses can be either vertical or horizontal,
depending on whether the patentee and licensee are competing producers in
the product market.
The Patent Act does not mention grantbacks by name, but the Patent
Misuse Reform Act provision applied to tying arrangements includes them. It
speaks of a patentee who “condition[s] the license of any rights to the

Price-Fixing in Intellectual Property Settings, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶¶ 66‒67
(arguing against per se rule).
336 Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass’ns, 819 F.2d 693, 702–03 (7th Cir. 1987). See
generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 B.C. L.
REV. 87 (2007) (arguing that when government involvement in standard setting is
substantial, antitrust challenges generally should be rejected).
337 One situation where these were absent was Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 496–97. Allied
Tube was able to pack a voting meeting with its own employees, instructing them where to
sit and how to vote. Id. The administrators apparently paid no attention to who was voting
or to conflicts of interest.
338 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 25.1.
339 Id. § 25.2.
340 Id.
341 See id. § 25.
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patent . . . on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent . . . .”342
The statute then provides that this practice should be regarded as unlawful
only if “the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.”343 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this language as requiring proof of market
power for antitrust claims of unlawful tying just as much as for misuse
claims.344 Clearly the same limitation should be applied to grantbacks.
When assessed under the rule of reason, grantbacks are seldom found to be
anticompetitive, although harm is possible in a few situations.345
“Nonexclusive” grantbacks require that the improvement be licensed back to
the patentee but not that it be exclusive.346 The district court found competitive
harm in such a case when General Electric granted production licenses to a
large number of licensees for electric lamp production and made each promise
GE a nonexclusive license in all improvements that they made.347 The court
believed that this could create a patent aggregation monopoly by making GE
the only holder of all of the extant technology.348 In any event, this strategy
would require market dominance in the primary patent, so it should be
addressed under the rule of reason with a serious market power
requirement.349
An exclusive grantback requires the licensee to grant the improvement
back to the grantor exclusively.350 Such provisions typically permit the
innovating licensee to retain a royalty-free licensee to use the improvement
itself, but only the original patentee can license the improvement out to
others.351 One complaint about exclusive grantbacks is that they reduce the
licensee’s incentive to make and patent improvements, for all it receives is a
nonexclusive right to use, which could generate only the competitive return.352

342 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2012).
343 Id.
344 See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 38–39, 41–42 (2006).
345 The only Supreme Court decision on this issue is Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v.

Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
346 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 25.2.
347 United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 995, 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
348 Id. at 1016.
349 Santa Fe-Pomeroy, Inc. v. P & Z Co., 569 F.2d 1084, 1100–02 (9th Cir. 1978)
(upholding grantback provision giving licensee a royalty-free reserved right on any
patented improvements and citing lack of market power); see, e.g., Barr Rubber Prods. Co.
v. Sun Rubber Co., 277 F. Supp. 484, 487–95, 505–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff’d in relevant
part, 425 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1970); Old Dominion Box Co. v. Cont’l Can Co., 273 F.
Supp. 550, 572–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff’d, 393 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1968); see also IP
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 5.6.
350 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 25.3.
351 Id.
352 Id.
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The improvement is then more valuable to the original patentee than to the
improving licensee.353
Exclusive grantbacks can exacerbate the collective action problem present
in the 1948 General Electric case, discussed above, by making it impossible
for anyone other than the primary patentee to assemble the full technology
set.354 For example, if GE owned a pioneer lamp patent and placed exclusive
grantback clauses in the agreements of ten licensees, each might develop one
or more patented improvements. Under an exclusive grantback clause only GE
would be able to practice all of the improvements unless it licensed them to the
others. In an extreme case a patentee whose patent must be licensed to every
market participant would be in a position to acquire an exclusive right to every
patent developed for the industry by its existing participants. If the technology
is “rolling” with frequent ongoing patenting, such a restraint could perpetuate
the patentee’s dominant position indefinitely. This could enable the patentee to
restrict total market output to the monopoly level while imposing competitive
rates of return on its licensee rivals. Once again, this is a dominant firm
strategy that must be tested under antitrust law’s rule of reason.355

D. Purely Vertical Practices
A practice is purely vertical if none of the parties to any agreement are
competitors.356 Instead, they stand in a buyer–seller relationship. As noted
previously, most of the “nine no nos” from the 1970s era were vertical
practices, including such things as tying, exclusive dealing, and resale price
maintenance.357 The law in most of these areas has changed, although for
reasons that have little to do with patent policy. In most cases no harm to
competition can be shown. Prior to the 1990s much of the perceived conflict
between antitrust and patent law resulted from routine antitrust condemnation
of competitively harmless vertical practices. Today purely vertical agreements
are addressed under the rule of reason in virtually all contexts, including IP
licensing agreements and settlements.358 To the extent that a vertical
settlement involves a production license to the infringement defendant, it is
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 One possible situation occurred in Kobe Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416,

420, 423–25 (10th Cir. 1952) (finding an unlawful attempt to monopolize in the primary
patentee’s use of exclusive grantbacks to acquire all new patents in the industry).
356 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 20.1.
357 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
358 See generally NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (requiring rule of
reason treatment for purely vertical exclusion agreements); United States v.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (similar). The rule of
reason was applied to vertical nonprice restraints in 1977 and to resale price maintenance
in 2007. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (vertical
nonprice restraints); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
881–82 (2007) (resale price maintenance).

2015]

ANTITRUST AND THE PATENT SYSTEM

539

authorized by the Patent Act in any event, provided the agreement does not
explicitly restrain output in the product market.359
The major antitrust concern is vertical agreements that limit the sales of
rivals, principally tying, exclusive dealing, and similar practices.360 Tying
arrangements are competitively benign in most cases, even when one of the
products is patented and, significantly, even when the defendant has market
power in the tying product.361 Exclusive dealing raises competitive concerns
only when relatively strict structural requirements are met.362
The Supreme Court has not strictly overruled its numerous declarations
that tying is unlawful per se.363 In Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc.
the Court came close, but in fact struck down only a per se presumption that
tying of a patented product is per se unlawful without an independent showing
of power.364 The decision is perhaps a strong signal that the Supreme Court is
prepared to abandon the tying per se rule in an appropriate case.
The list of vertical practices still requiring antitrust examination also
includes a few package licenses and related practices, as well as some
grantbacks, but only when they facilitate anticompetitive exclusion or
collusion.365 Of particular concern are vertical restraints initiated by licensee
cartels or powerful individual licensees.366 What these practices have in
common is a firm that is dominant and a practice that in actual effect is
“horizontal” in that it either limits the opportunities of rivals or facilitates
collusion. Further, while a patentee typically has an incentive to maximize
output by its licensees, individual licensees or cartels of licensees may have an
incentive to reduce output to the monopoly level. Traditionally these practices
are assessed under both § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act as well as § 3 of the
Clayton Act if commodities are involved. Section 1 of the Sherman Act and

359 Vertical practices involving patent and other IP rights are discussed in 1

HOVENKAMP ET AL.,

supra note 43, §§ 20–25. On vertical practices generally, including
those that implicate patents, see 6–11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, §§ 14, 16–18
(addressing agreement, intrabrand restraints, tying, and exclusive dealing).
360 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 21.1.
361 Id.
362 See 11 HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1821.
363 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–12 (1984); N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 396 (1947), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc. 547 U.S. 28
(2006). See generally 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1620 (tracing origin and
rationale of per se tying rule).
364 Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 42.
365 See supra notes 15–28, 307–13 and accompanying text.
366 On the role of dealer cartels or powerful individual dealers, see 8 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1604.
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the corresponding Clayton Act provision both require an agreement,367 but § 2
of the Sherman Act does not.
One of the most important developments in the recent antitrust analysis of
vertical practices is the courts’ movement away from agreement-based models
of harm for supplier (licensor) imposed practices, and toward dominant firm
models.368 This movement reflects two important realities. First, conduct
involving exclusivity obligations imposed on downstream firms is in fact
unilaterally imposed, notwithstanding that most of the time it is contained in
an agreement, such as a franchise contract or an IP license. The “agreement”
requirement adds nothing other than an explanation for the dominant firm’s
leverage over downstream firms. In some interbrand restraint cases a relevant
agreement is impossible to prove, such as when the seller refuses to sell
separate components individually or refuses to sell to dealers who are already
selling the products of competitors, or when the two products are bound
together by technological design.369 The result is that legality too often
depends on the happenstance of an agreement only because of the statutory
structure. Second, vertical exclusion is a dominant firm practice, in which
market power is much more relevant to competitive harm than the existence
vel non of an agreement.
I have argued elsewhere that § 2 is actually a better fit for these practices
because they are best assessed as the unilateral actions of a dominant firm.370
In fact, failure to insist on a reasonable showing of anticompetitive exclusion
explains much of the antitrust overreaching that occurred in the 1980s and
before. Having found a qualifying “agreement,” the courts were content to
condemn the practice on a much lower market share than they would have
required for a § 2 dominant firm case.
Of course, exclusive patent licenses can be collusive—but this occurs
when the licensor or licensee are competitors, or would be competitors but for
the license. The other collusion danger is cartel agreements among licensees,
but these are not authorized by the Patent Act and can readily be addressed
under ordinary antitrust rules for horizontal restraints.371
While § 261 of the Patent Act authorizes exclusive licenses, it does not
explicitly authorize anticompetitive exclusive licenses. Does it do so
implicitly? In other contexts the general creation of granting or transacting
powers does not imply a right to violate the antitrust laws. For example, all
business corporations have a power to enter into contracts or acquire property,
but that does not imply a power to make anticompetitive contracts or
367 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (using the terms “contract,” “combination,” or
“conspiracy”); 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012) (using the phrase “condition, agreement, or
understanding”).
368 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 68–69 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2005).
369 See 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶¶ 1753–1757.
370 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 1800c5.
371 See supra notes 265–74 and accompanying text.
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acquisitions that violate the antitrust laws. Mere legality under corporate or
contract law does not imply antitrust legality.372
In any event, whether § 261 authorizes anticompetitive exclusive licenses
is partially settled by § 3 of the Clayton Act, which reaches exclusive dealing
and tying of goods “whether patented or unpatented,” provided that the
requisite harm to competition is proven.373 That does not fully address the
§ 261 issue, however, because the Clayton Act provision is limited to “goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities . . . .”374 A
patentee might still grant an exclusive license of a process patent, which would
not be covered by the Clayton Act provision. By negative implication the
Patent Act also permits antitrust challenges to anticompetitive ties, provided
that the tying patentee has market power in the tying patent.375 In sum, the
§ 261 authorization of exclusive licenses should be limited to exclusive
licenses that are not anticompetitive.376
When exclusive licensing does cause anticompetitive harm it is frequently
at the behest of the licensee, who is the beneficiary of the exclusivity
provision, rather than the licensor. For example, a dominant firm in a
technology heavy product market might acquire exclusive licenses in order to
keep rivals from having access.377 Section 261 of the Patent Act expressly
permits IP rights holders (both patentees and assignees) to “grant and convey
an exclusive right,” but says nothing about receiving such a right.378 Even if
this provision protected anticompetitive exclusive selling of IP licenses, it does
not necessarily protect anticompetitive buying. Once again, the statute should
be read to permit only those exclusive licenses that are not anticompetitive.
Limiting antitrust condemnation of vertical practices to those involving
exclusion or collusion throws out two important sets of tying and tying-like
372 The point was recently reiterated in FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133
S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (2013). However, it stretches back a century earlier. See United States v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 86 (1912) (finding that the fact that transaction was
lawful under corporate law did not immunize it from Sherman Act merger challenge). See
generally 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, ¶ 102b.
373 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012).
374 Id.
375 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2012).
376 See Cnty. Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 739 (7th Cir. 2007)
(stating that noncompete agreement is similar to exclusive dealing, not patent misuse and
there is no injury to competition); Columbus Auto. Corp. v. Oldberg Mfg. Co., 387 F.2d
643, 645 (10th Cir. 1968) (assuming that exclusive dealing requirement in patent license
constituted patent misuse); Nat’l Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255,
256 (3d Cir. 1943) (similar). But see Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 581–
82 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (assuming that exclusive agreement in patent license could be
challenged under antitrust laws but not finding illegality).
377 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 889–91 (D. Md. 1916)
(condemning defendant for a variety of practices, including acquisition of exclusive patent
rights).
378 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
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practices that the courts have historically recognized. The first is claims
involving leverage, while the second involves unwanted tied products.
The leveraging issue is often muddled by its confusion with foreclosure
and price discrimination. In its most basic form the claim is that a person with
a monopoly in one product can earn a second monopoly profit by tying a
complementary good.379 Stated in this way, the leveraging claim was
thoroughly exploded in the 1950s by Ward Bowman, who observed that
consumers of complementary goods place a value on the package rather than
its individual components.380 As a result, if a seller is already charging its
profit-maximizing price for a tying product it cannot earn more by tying a
complement and charging a second monopoly price.381 Consistent with profitmaximization, the seller can increase the price of the second product only by
reducing the price of the primary product.382 To be sure, tying can create
opportunities for price discrimination, which can resemble leverage, but the
great majority of price discrimination ties are efficient.383
Ties and package licensing, which is sometimes analogized to tying, can
be used for a number of purposes unrelated to exclusion or collusion. These
include quality control, maintenance of interoperability, elimination of double
marginalization, price discrimination, economies of joint production or
distribution, or transaction cost savings. Many of these effects are identical
with those of pooling. The main difference is that a pool is an agreement
among numerous patentees while a package license contains one patentee with
a portfolio of patents and numerous licensees.384 Most antitrust challenges to
package licensing do not involve exclusion but rather are complaints that the
patentee is required to take unwanted patents.385 As noted in the discussion of
pooling, however, after years of wrestling with the issue the courts are now
starting to see that forcing a buyer or licensee to take an unwanted product is
not an antitrust problem.386
In a few exceptional cases, the impact of package licensing is to exclude a
rival by forcing it to compete with a price of zero.387 For example, suppose
firm A licenses a package of several patents on an all-or-none basis. One of
those patents is X, and a rival holds patent X’, a substitute that may be superior
to X for some users. From the licensee’s perspective, however, X is already
379 See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31 (1931).
380 Bowman, Jr., supra note 23, at 20.
381 Id.
382 Id.
383 Compare Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 25, with Einer Elhauge, Tying,

Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 397 (2009).
384 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 22.1.
385 Id. § 22.7.
386 See, e.g., Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 2012); see
also supra notes 289–305 and accompanying text.
387 See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 22.8.
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included in the package and the licensee will not receive a royalty reduction if
it does not practice X but instead switches to X’.388 Even so, inclusion of X in
the package license is not necessarily illegal. First, there may still be costs
associated with verifying whether licensees are practicing X, or whether or not
they are also practicing X’. Second, inclusion of X’ in the licensee’s
technology may create conflicts with the other patents in the package. Third,
relief might require a court to compute the requisite downward adjustment in
the royalty rate for a package that does not include patent X.389
In some situations these problems can be addressed. One example,
although it did not involve package licensing as such, was Microsoft’s “per
processor” licensing contract with computer manufacturers.390 Microsoft’s
standard licensing agreement for Windows required computer manufacturers
to pay the Windows license fee on every computer it made, whether or not the
computer actually used Windows.391 The result was that if a computer
manufacturer wanted to install a rival’s operating system that computer would
be subject to two licensing fees. In this case Microsoft entered a consent
decree requiring it to abandon per-processer licensing and charge a fee only on
computers that actually installed the Windows Operating System.392
Would an injunction against a patent package that forbids inclusion of
patents with competitive alternatives be procompetitive? Suppose that a
licensor of a package of 100 patents includes one patent X. A rival patentee
holding a substitute patent X’ claims anticompetitive foreclosure. The court
responds with an injunction requiring the defendant to drop X from its
package. If the court simply removes patent X from the package without
ordering a price reduction, then whether the patentee cuts the price will depend
on competitive constraints. If it does not cut the price, however, then all
licensees will simply end up paying more. On the other hand, if the court must
determine and order a price reduction, it is placed in the unacceptable position
of price regulator of the value of that patent. Finally, the mere fact that a
licensee practices patent X’ does not entail that it is not also practicing patent
X—not in a world in which patents have numerous, often overlapping, claims.
This discussion suggests two warnings about the antitrust analysis of
vertical arrangements. The first is that courts and enforcers should be aware of
the ubiquitous possibilities that vertical practices create for achieving
operational and transactional efficiencies. This makes it imperative that market
power requirements be taken seriously and that courts understand the rationale
for a practice. A second warning is that it does no good to identify a practice
388 See Grid Sys. Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1033, 1039–41 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (alleging facts that stated a Sherman Act claim).
389 See 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1782a2.
390 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462‒63 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(per curiam).
391 Id. at 1451.
392 Id. at 1462.
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as an antitrust violation if the court is unable to devise an effective antitrust
remedy, and judicial setting of prices is rarely that.

E. Royalty “Extensions”
Royalty “extensions” refer to practices in which the basis for royalties is
something other than the typical percentage of cost or price, or a fixed dollar
amount of each unit sold or each time a device covered by a valid patent is
used. The most common and commonly litigated examples are: (1) provisions
that require the payment of a royalty beyond the expiration date of the
patent;393 (2) provisions that assess royalties on goods that are not covered by
the licensed patent but that are produced with a patented machine or process;
(3) “reach through” royalties that are attached to final products produced with
a patented research tool or process; or (4) royalties assessed on a producing
licensee’s entire output of some product, whether or not individual units of
that product actually practice that patent. The courts assessing these practices
have often relied on “scope of the patent” formulations.
Royalty extensions are not explicitly authorized by the Patent Act, so
antitrust analysis is appropriate. Nevertheless, the practices are almost always
purely vertical and are anticompetitive in only a few situations. Further, most
of them are not obviously offensive to patent policy’s concern with promoting
innovation either.
In Brulotte v. Thys Co., a divided Supreme Court refused to enforce a sales
contract for a hop-picking machine that called for the payment of royalties
beyond the date that the last patent on the machine expired.394 The patentee
was not the seller of the machine, but rather had licensed its patents to the
manufacturer who then used a reach-through provision to charge the license
fee to the purchaser.395 While Brulotte was clearly not an antitrust case, it was
not strictly speaking a misuse case either. Ordinarily misuse is asserted as a
defense to patent infringement. In this case, however, the royalty extension
was challenged in a state contract law action to enforce the royalty
provision.396 In any event, Justice Douglas’ opinion for the Court used
antitrust-like language to speak of the provision as leveraging the patent

393 See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30 (1964). For decisions applying

Brulotte, often while criticizing it, see Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 727 F.3d 856, 857
(9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 781 (2014); Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014,
1016 (9th Cir. 2007); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002);
Meehan v. PPG Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 881, 883–86 (7th Cir. 1986). See generally 1
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 23.2.
394 Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 30.
395 Id.
396 Id.
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“monopoly” beyond the scope of the patent.397 The dissent also spoke of the
issue as involving patent misuse.398
No monopoly was being extended, however. The challenger did not wish
to produce Thys’ machines, and once the patents expired anyone could have
done so.399 Indeed, to the extent that Brulotte, a farmer, was required to pay a
per use royalty400 on the Thys machine, he would have an increased incentive
to obtain a machine from a competitor. Just as was true of many patent misuse
cases, the underlying theory was based on a conception of harm that had little
to do with either competition or innovation.
The majority also ignored the extent to which nominal license payments
perform an amortization function when they are attached to patented goods. If
I buy an automobile and agree to pay for it over ten years, the price has been
set up front and the payments operate in satisfaction of a loan or lease.
Monthly payments will not decline as patents expire. This ultimately reduces
the Brulotte problem to one of contract drafting, and the relatively few
situations that have run afoul of it largely fall into that camp.401 Otherwise the
implications would be that if someone leased a car for, say $100 per month
plus five cents per mile, she would be entitled to a pro rata price reduction to
account for any patent that expired during the lease period. Justice Harlan’s
dissent made this point rather forcefully.402
Nevertheless, whether Brulotte should be overruled after a half century is
debatable. The argument for reversal rests on the logic that patent “misuse”
should be defined by antitrust principles. Brulotte’s rationale makes little sense
on antitrust grounds because in most cases involving post-expiration royalties
nothing is being monopolized.
Forceful counter-arguments exist, however, although they may apply in
only a few situations. For example, perhaps all of the sellers in a market have a
license from the patentee that requires post-expiration royalties, and new entry
into this market is unlikely. In that case the payment of post-expiration
royalties could serve to raise prices across the market, harming consumers
without serving patent policy. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kimble v.
Marvel Enterprises Inc. represents a related possibility. The patent in question
was on a toy “Spiderman” hand that enabled a child to pretend to throw a
sticky web as Spiderman did in Marvel comic books and movies.403 Once the
patent expired another firm could employ the invention, but that would not
397 Id. at 33.
398 See id. at 38 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
399 Id. at 32 (majority opinion).
400 The royalty stipulated in Brulotte’s contract was $3.33 per 200 pounds of dried

hops harvested, subject to a minimum of $500 annually over the life of the contract.
Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 29.
401 See, e.g., Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1016 (7th Cir. 2002).
402 Other decisions are discussed in 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 23.2.
403 Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 727 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
135 S. Ct. 781 (2014).
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give it access to Marvel’s trademarks, which last indefinitely, or other
intellectual property rights. As a result the patent might be worth very little to
anyone other than Marvel, and the impact of the license fee agreement could
be to force an overcharge on the toy indefinitely. Consumers could be harmed.
One problem with Brulotte, however, is that while post-expiration
royalties may be harmful in some cases, Brulotte does not require any kind of
evaluation of market structure or post-expiration market effect. The rule is per
se and applies in competitive and monopolized markets alike. As a result it
does not distinguish the occasional harmful use, such as Kimble, from the
much larger number of cases that are harmless.
Second, one can usually evade the Brulotte trap by careful license
agreement drafting that separates out the patent and nonpatent portions of an
arrangement.
Third, and more fundamentally, while Brulotte may not be justifiable on
antitrust grounds, it may nevertheless serve a useful purpose within patent law,
which is properly concerned about arrangements that tie up property rights
once patents have expired. Patent law’s “first sale” doctrine performs an
analogous function, by refusing to enforce licensing restrictions on a patented
article after that article has been sold.404 Clearly, the concern is not economic
monopoly, because the doctrine applies to sales of a single article. The first
expression of the first sale doctrine was in a decision that refused to apply a
congressionally enacted patent term extension to a machine that had already
been sold and for which the patentee sought to apply the extension
retroactively.405 Brulotte is really nothing more than a variant of the first sale
doctrine, applied to post-expiration royalties.
Finally, Congress has the power to overrule Supreme Court statutory
decisions that it disapproves. Most particularly, twenty-five years after
Brulotte it amended the Patent Act to make clear that refusals to license are not
patent misuse, and that tying arrangements are unlawful only in the presence
of tying product power.406 It said nothing about Brulotte, however. Even
though Brulotte’s per se rule may not be justified by either competition or
patent policy, its long duration and Congress’s failure to correct it cautions
against a change now.
Royalties on unpatented goods or attached to a licensee’s entire output,
whether or not every unit embodies the licensed patents, rarely offend either
antitrust or patent policy. Many situations operate as nothing more than per
404 See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc. 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008);

Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 49,
at 491.
405 See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 550–51 (1852); see also
Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 57.
406 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (2012). The Government’s amicus brief urging the Court
to adhere to the Brulotte rule made this point forcefully. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 135 S. Ct. 781 (2015)
(No. 13-720), 2015 WL 981525, at *19 n.3.
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use royalties calculated by an alternative method. Others involve transaction
cost savings in situations where it is difficult to identify which units of a
licensee’s output practice a particular patent.
For example, the owner of a large portfolio of patents covering radio
circuitry might license them to a radio manufacturer with the royalty
calculated as so much per radio produced, regardless of how many of the
patents are actually used in that particular radio. This agreement clears the
transaction at far lower cost than an alternative that would require inquiry and
perhaps litigation over the question of exactly how many patents are practiced
by any particular unit. Neither collusion nor exclusion is likely.407 Indeed,
even if we believed that patent law had a concern with “extraction” as such—
that is, with obtaining elevated royalties—it is hardly clear that these royalty
formulations extract. Most are a form of second-degree price discrimination
that tends to collect higher royalties from higher intensity users. Whether
licensees are harmed on balance would be extraordinarily difficult to
determine, but certainly cannot be inferred. Virtually all such schemes serve to
increase total output and, typically, the total number of licensees as well.408
Output increasing practices are not good candidates for antitrust violations.
“Reach through” royalties operate in much the same way, with the added
attribute that they can be an effective risk-sharing device. For example, the
seller of a research machine or tool for laboratory use might grant the right to
use the machine without charge but demand a percentage of the sales price of
any successful product that is developed with the machine. If the research
venture is unsuccessful, as is often the case, then no royalty is due. If it
succeeds, then the royalty could end up being quite high, particularly if
demand for the invention is strong. Such a contract permits the licensor of the
machine to participate in the risks and benefits of the research in question. As
a general proposition, the arrangement is no more anticompetitive than if the
research team agreed to hire a specialist or accept an investor whose
compensation was a percentage of the return on the final product. Although
the practice has generated some controversy in the law reviews, particularly

407 See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 832
(1950); see also Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 1125,
1133 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (upholding royalty based on final customer price, which covered a
combination of the patented good, labor, and other services), aff’d, 830 F.2d 606 (6th Cir.
1987).
408 On the economics, see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 25. For coverage of
the cases, see 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 21.
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because it may contribute to double marginalization or royalty “stacking,”409
the courts have generally treated it as benign.410

F. Antitrust and Patent Enforcement
Merely “obtaining” a patent improperly is pre-issuance conduct that is not
generally addressable through antitrust law.411 First, the patent system itself
provides for comprehensive regulatory oversight with virtually all issuance
decisions made by government officials and supervised on appeal by judges.
Second, the patent system includes its own remedial mechanisms for dealing
with improper conduct, mainly through declarations that a patent is invalid or
unenforceable. This system has been harshly criticized, in part because a mere
declaration of invalidity as punishment on a patent that was invalid to begin
with is not really a punishment at all.412 For example, if a patent would not be
issued if the true facts were known, then an applicant has every incentive to
hide an essential fact when the probability of detection is less than 100% and
the only penalty is that the patent is unenforceable. Indeed, in the case of a
licensed patent later invalidated for inequitable conduct, the Patent Act does
not even call for disgorgement of improperly obtained royalties.413 It is the
rough equivalent of a criminal rule for theft that required as its only penalty
that the thief return the stolen good.
While lax treatment of inequitable conduct is a significant problem for the
patent system, that does not make it an antitrust problem—unless the
inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is coupled
with some post-issuance conduct as well, such as an infringement action,
409 See, e.g., Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent

Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 440–41 (2003); Alfred C. Server et al., Reach-Through
Rights and the Patentability, Enforcement, and Licensing of Patents on Drug Discovery
Tools, 1 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 21, 28 (2009). But see Bohannan, supra note 310, at
520 n.170 (distinguishing royalty stacking from reach-through royalties).
410 See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467, 470 (D. Del.
2002) (holding that a reach-through royalty is not patent misuse).
411 See FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1418 n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(distinguishing “mere procurement” of a patent from subsequent enforcement and stating
that the former cannot be an antitrust violation); see also Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v.
ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that procurement of patent by
fraud cannot establish an antitrust violation absent evidence of any action toward
enforcement of a patent).
412 Compare Tun-Jen Chiang, The Upside-Down Inequitable Conduct Defense, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1252–53 (2013), with John F. Duffy, The Inequities of Inequitable
Conduct: A Case Study of Judicial Control of Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV.
417, 419–20 (2013) (acknowledging Chiang’s claim but showing that in other cases the
defense overreaches).
413 See Allison Pruitt, Note, Keeping Patent Applicants Honest: A Proposal to Apply
Disgorgement Remedies to Findings of Inequitable Conduct During Patent Prosecution, 13
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 465, 487–88 (2006) (arguing for the use of the disgorgement remedy
for acts of inequitable conduct during patent prosecution).
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threat of an infringement suit, or insistence on licensing. Housekeeping inside
the PTO and the patent system is a job for Congress and the oversight power
of the Secretary of Commerce or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Fixing deficiencies in the work of other government agencies is not an
antitrust function so long as the decision-making in those agencies is entirely
in public control.

G. Walker Process: Objectively Unreasonable Infringement Actions
Post-issuance enforcement conduct is another matter. The decision to
bring an infringement suit, to threaten a suit, or to insist on a license is
privately initiated. Here, antitrust can be brought to bear, but its limitations are
evident. In this area the conduct is typically unilateral. This means that it must
be addressed under § 2 of the Sherman Act, which reaches only monopoly or
attempts to monopolize. As a result, antitrust reaches only instances of
improper patent infringement where monopoly is threatened.
While the Patent Act explicitly authorizes enforcement by the filing of
infringement actions,414 it does not authorize improper, anticompetitive
actions. In addition, access to courts and other enforcement tribunals is
strongly protected under the United States Constitution, without regard to the
subjective intent of the plaintiff. Objectively baseless enforcement actions are
not protected.415
In Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., the
Supreme Court held that an infringement lawsuit based on a patent that had
been fraudulently procured could be the basis of an antitrust violation,
provided that the structural elements of an antitrust offense were present as
well.416 The lawsuit must be “baseless” under an objective test, considering
whether a reasonable patentee knowing the facts would have believed the suit
to be proper.417
If the conduct does not threaten monopoly, then the patent may be found
invalid, but any further discipline must come through the patent court. For
example, the exceptional case provision in the Patent Act, discussed below,
may shift some attorney’s fees for litigation misconduct, but the remedy will
not go beyond that. The inadequacy of these remedies leads one to expect that
the amount of deadweight loss caused by improper enforcement actions is
significant, particularly where the probability of detection is low. This is the

414 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (2012).
415 On the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and protection of access to the courts in antitrust

cases, see 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶ 201–203. On patent infringement
actions specifically, see 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 706.
416 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174–
80 (1965).
417 See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
60–61 (1993).
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reason that antitrust law has a damages multiplier—designed to offset the fact
that violations are difficult to detect and prove.
A good illustration of this problem is Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, in
which the patent on a popular ice cream concoction was invalid because the
patent applicant had lied about barring prior sales made a decade earlier at
small fairs.418 When the patentee later filed an infringement action, the sales
were discovered and the lower court found both patent invalidity and an
antitrust violation. The court awarded trebled attorney’s fees to the
infringement defendant under the antitrust attorney fee award provision.419
The Federal Circuit reversed the antitrust judgment, however, concluding that
the antitrust laws required something more than mere enforcement of an
improperly obtained patent.420 It also reversed the judgment granting
attorney’s fees as antitrust damages.421 The result is that the only penalty that
Dippin’ Dots suffered was invalidation of its patent. The patent was already
invalid, however. It never would have issued but for the false declaration that
there had not been any disqualifying prior sales. Further, the court seems to
have lost sight of the fact that clearly there was something more—the patentee
had not merely obtained the patent fraudulently, but it also filed an
infringement action several years later, knowing the patent to be invalid if the
true facts were known.
What makes the Dippin’ Dots rule particularly troublesome is that prior
sales that bar patentability are “off record,” known to the patent applicant but
typically not to others. The patent applicant provided a sworn statement that
there were no barring prior sales or uses.422 This makes the problem different
than for a patent subsequently declared invalid because the applicant failed to
mention known prior art423 or took inconsistent positions in front of different
enforcement tribunals.424 These failures are usually on the record and
discoverable later, given that many more resources are poured into patent
litigation than into initial patent procurement.
The Supreme Court has partially corrected this imbalance by strengthening
the Patent Act provision authorizing judges to award attorney’s fees to

418 Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
419 See id. at 1342, 1349 (citing Dippin’ Dots v. Mosey, No. 05-1330, slip op. at 3

(Fed. Cir. May 1, 2006)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (providing for treble damages and
attorney’s fees to a prevailing antitrust plaintiff).
420 Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1347–48.
421 Id. at 1349.
422 See id. at 1341; see also In re Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., LLC, Patent Litig., 536
F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (relying on applicant’s sworn declaration). See generally
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (detaling the novelty bar).
423 See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
424 See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1283–84
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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prevailing parties in “exceptional” cases.425 The Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s rule that confined the use of this provision to patent
infringement claims that were “frivolous” or “objectively baseless,” or brought
in subjective bad faith, and that required proof by “clear and convincing”
evidence.426 Placing these limitations on the provision largely rendered it
superfluous, the Court concluded, because the common law already permitted
judges to shift fees for bad faith lawsuits.427 Shifting of attorney’s fees is a
fairly toothless remedy for a patent that has been improperly obtained but has
been licensed out to third parties unaware of its deficiencies. Of course, all
patents are probabilistic and judgments must be made about validity and
scope, but they must be made with objectively measured good faith.
The time period and knowledge requirements for a Walker Process
violation are not the same as those for determining pre-issuance inequitable
conduct. The Walker Process doctrine considers what a reasonable patentee
actually knew or should have known at the time of an infringement suit, which
could be many years after patent prosecution activity. In some cases, a patent
may have been obtained improperly but was subsequently assigned to an
innocent purchaser with no knowledge of the improper conduct. In other cases,
invalidating facts may not have been known at the time a patent was obtained
but may have come to light later. Further, Walker Process is not limited to
questions of invalidity resulting from inequitable conduct. It can also apply to
cases that involve valid patents that are clearly not infringed or where the
patentee sued without inquiring about infringement.428 The courts have even
indicated that suit on an expired patent could be a Walker Process violation,
although it is difficult to see how a lawsuit so easily countered could ever

425 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable

attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).
426 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755, 1757–
58 (2014).
427 Id. at 1758.
428 See Synopsys, Inc. v. Magma Design Automation, 2006 WL 1452803, at *1–2 (D.
Del. May 25, 2006) (holding that plaintiff adequately pled that defendant used
fraudulently-obtained patents and public accusations of infringement and other
disparagement to drive plaintiff out of business); Ecrix Corp. v. Exabyte Corp., 95 F. Supp.
2d 1155, 1158 (D. Colo. 2000) (permitting antitrust discovery on patentee’s basis for
thinking that defendant’s device infringed the patent in question); United States v. Besser
Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 312 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (dealing with machine alleged to have
infringed but that patentee had never examined), aff’d, 343 U.S. 444 (1952); see also
Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Int’l Nutrition Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 296, 313–14 (D. Conn. 2001)
(rejecting motion to dismiss on antitrust claim alleging that defendant’s prior patent
infringement action was objectively baseless because it did not reasonably have ownership
of the patent in question).
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create durable monopoly power.429 Finally, unjustified threats to sue can also
create Walker Process violations even if no lawsuit actually ensues.430
The Dippin’ Dots holding is unlikely to be disciplined by circuit conflict,
even though it is an antitrust holding rather than a patent law holding and the
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction only over the latter. Walker Process
antitrust claims are virtually always presented as counterclaims on patent
infringement suits, and in most cases they are compulsory counterclaims,
which means that they cannot be separately brought.431 Prior to 2012,
counterclaims to patent infringement actions were appealed to the regional
circuits rather than the Federal Circuit.432 However, the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act brought counterclaims on patent infringement suits, including
antitrust counterclaims, into the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.433
Direct attack remains a possibility for third parties such as purchasers,
however. In In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., the Second
Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over a Walker Process style lawsuit
brought by purchasers who claimed that they paid more for a branded drug as
a result of an improper lawsuit intended to keep generics off the market.434
Significantly, such a lawsuit does not “arise under” the Patent Act, and thus is
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.

H. Refusal to License: Unilateral and Concerted
The Patent Act provides that “no patent owner . . . shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of
his having . . . refused to license or use any rights to the patent . . . .”435 By its
terms that provision applies to unilateral and unconditional refusals to license.
For example, price fixing is a refusal to license except at the cartel price, and
tying is a refusal to license unless the licensee also takes the tied product.
These are “conditional” refusals to license, and they are subject to the ordinary
429 See, e.g., Int’l Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Pilkington PLC, 137 F.3d 1382, 1393 (9th

Cir. 1998) (sustaining Walker Process claim involving lawsuit on expired patent).
430 Goss Int’l Ams., Inc. v. MAN Roland, Inc., No. 03-cv-513-SM, 2006 WL 1575287,
at *3 (D.N.H. June 2, 2006) (citing Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375
F.3d 1341, 1344–45, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (stating that warning letters or other threats
based on improperly obtained patents could satisfy Walker Process).
431 Critical-Vac Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Int’l, Inc., 233 F.3d 697, 700–01 (2d
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001); see also 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 9, ¶ 706e1 (noting division among the circuits on this issue).
432 See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831
(2002).
433 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C.).
434 See In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 682, 687 (2d Cir.
2009); see also Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
435 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2012).
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antitrust rules. Additionally, the provision does not apply to mandatory
licensing that is incorporated into a consent decree or judgment concerning
some other violation, such as an unlawful merger or act of monopolization.436
The statutory provision permitting refusals to license speaks in the
singular, authorizing a unilateral refusal to license. Extending it to concerted
refusals to license, as the dissent in the Federal Circuit’s Princo Corp. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n decision would have done, reads an unnecessarily broad
immunity into the provision, disregarding competition considerations.437 In
antitrust law, unilateral refusals to deal are ubiquitous and rarely unlawful.438
Reading § 271(e) of the Patent Act to apply to unilateral refusals simply states
a policy that is consistent with United States competition policy generally.
By contrast, concerted refusals to deal, or boycotts, are fully addressable
under the antitrust laws, and naked concerted refusal agreements among
competitors can be unlawful per se.439 There is no obvious reason why
antitrust should depart from these rules when patents are involved. Naked
restraints do not further innovation, and ancillary restraints come under the
rule of reason, where innovation effects can be considered if appropriate. Seen
thus, the Patent Act provision on unilateral refusals does no more than add a
small amount of additional limitation on an antitrust rule that is already
extremely tolerant of unilateral refusals. For example, under the Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. decision,440 which the Supreme Court
severely qualified in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis v.
Trinko,441 a firm acting unilaterally has no general duty to deal with a rival.442
Nevertheless, an unjustified or unexplained withdrawal from a previous
cooperative arrangement may have “evidentiary significance” entitling a jury
to condemn the withdrawal.443 The Patent Act provision does not contain this
limitation. Thus, for example, a dominant firm that licensed a patent to a rival
for a term of, say, five years, would have no obligation to renew the license
upon expiration.
Reading the Patent Act to exonerate concerted refusals from misuse or
antitrust claims condones practices that should not be immunized without
antitrust scrutiny. For example, a group of firms that cross-licenses a
436 See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, § 6.5. For a critique, see Richard A.

Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom
of Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71, 80–83 (2011).
437 See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc); see also Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 79, at 23.
438 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 409 (2004); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1080 (10th Cir.
2013).
439 Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 464 (3d Cir. 1998).
440 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600 (1985).
441 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
442 Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 600–01.
443 Id. at 601.
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networked technology but refuses to include a firm merely because it charges a
lower price or has a superior technology would be exonerated. Or two
automobile companies might agree to license their patents for some
technology to one another, but agree that they will not license them to a third,
more competitively aggressive rival. To that extent the Federal Circuit’s dicta
on concerted refusals seem ill-advised and was probably made without
considering the implications for competition policy.

I. Overly Broad Remedial Demands: FRAND-Encumbered Patents
Walker Process and lawsuits on invalid patents are not the only type of
litigation exclusion. Overly broad requests for an injunction, particularly on
FRAND-encumbered patents as well as lawsuits by non-practicing patent
aggregators have also exposed serious potentials for patent abuse. It is
unlikely, however, that these actions are antitrust violations under current law
unless they arise to the level of litigation misconduct that Walker Process
contemplates. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court held that
there is no automatic entitlement to an injunction for patent infringement.444
Since then, denials of an injunction to non-practicing entities have been
common, although there still are a few.445
A FRAND-encumbered patent is one which the owner has promised to
license on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” terms in exchange for its
designation as part of a technological standard.446 There is a growing
consensus that injunctive relief should not be given to the owner of a FRAND
encumbered patent, unless perhaps a firm simply continues to produce while
refusing to pay anything. A recent three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit
split three ways on this issue.447
Both First Amendment doctrine and our general rules about access to the
courts forbid applying the antitrust laws to litigation conduct unless it is
“baseless,” measured by an objective test.448 In the current state of the law, a
non-practicing entity that requests an injunction, or someone who asks for an
injunction on a FRAND-encumbered patent, might lose. But until the courts
speak more decisively these are not yet “baseless” claims, and antitrust
444 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 492–93 (2006).
445 See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L.

REV. 517, 540–41 (2014).
446 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition in Information Technologies: StandardsEssential Patents, Non-Practicing Entities, and FRAND Bidding, 2012 FORDHAM COMP. L.
INST. 439, 445 (2013).
447 See generally Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Judges
Reyna and Prost and Chief Judge Rader all disagreed on entitlement to injunction on
FRAND-encumbered patents. See id. at 1332; id. at 1333 (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part);
id. at 1342 (Prost, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
448 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60
(1993).
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liability should not attach to bringing them. In any event, these questions are
predominantly legal, and once an absolute rule has been adopted it is difficult
to believe that asserting a lawsuit in violation of it has any prospect of creating
durable monopoly power. Fundamentally, these are problems best addressed
through the patent system rather than by antitrust law.

J. Patent Acquisitions: Exclusive and Nonexclusive
The Patent Act treats patents as personal property, and they are freely
assignable.449 While the Patent Act expressly permits assignments, however, it
does not permit anticompetitive assignments. As a result, the courts have held
that patent transfers are reachable under the antitrust laws, although they have
rarely found that a patent acquisition as such is anticompetitive.450 For
example, one court concluded that patent acquisitions are fully reachable under
the merger provision, § 7 of the Clayton Act.451 It rejected an antitrust attack
on Xerox’s acquisition of photocopier patents that were not yet practiced at the
time of the acquisition, however, because there was as yet no market subject to
diminished competition.452
The antitrust treatment of patent rights is appropriately sensitive to the
type of right that is being transferred. In general, even a dominant firm can
obtain a nonexclusive license without excluding anyone else, provided that the
license is nonexclusive in fact as well as form. Acquisitions of nonexclusive
licenses to practice may be essential to enable a firm to stay abreast of
technology within its industry.
Exclusive rights are another matter. While a dominant firm needs access to
technology in order to remain competitive, it does not need exclusive access.
For that reason a monopolist should be limited to the acquisition of
nonexclusive licenses of patents for technology in any market in which it has
dominance and where market exclusion of rivals is a likely effect.
One offsetting consideration is the rights of the patentee. The value, and
thus the price, of a patent reflects added value to the buyer. A patent that will
create or preserve a product monopoly will claim a higher price than one that
is sold into a competitive market. As a result one can expect that a monopolist
intent on maintaining its market position will be willing to pay more for an
exclusive right than the aggregate of potential licensees will pay to produce in
a competitive market. This is borne out by the literature on pay-for-delay
pharmaceutical settlements, which indicates that the value of monopoly

449 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
450 See, e.g., In re Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 103 F.T.C. 467, 473 (1984) (involving a

consent order requiring nonexclusive license).
451 SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 1001 (D. Conn. 1978), aff’d, 645
F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
452 See id.; see also IP ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 5.7 (concluding that
patent acquisitions are reachable under § 7).
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preservation to the pioneer patentee is worth far more than is the right of
competitive entry by the generic.453
While the Patent Act gives the patentee the right to transfer, it does not
create a right to make anticompetitive transfers, any more than the power to
buy or sell a production plant gives the owner a right to enter into an
anticompetitive transaction. For example, a production plant might claim a
higher price from a monopolist purchaser than a competitor, but that does not
immunize the monopoly transaction from the antitrust laws. On this point, the
anti-monopolization policy of § 2 of the Sherman Act and the merger policy of
§ 7 of the Clayton Act are in accord. A patent acquisition by a monopolist or
its purchase of an exclusive license could be an unlawful exclusionary practice
if it denies market access to one or more rivals, even though the monopolist
would be willing to pay more than an alternative buyer.454 By the same token,
it can also be an unlawful merger.
Even more threatening to a competitive economy is the dominant firm’s
acquisition and non-use of a patent. In this case, the monopolist is seeking not
only to protect its own productive technology from competition, but to shut
down alternative technologies that might compete with it. In Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. East Paper Bag Co., which did not raise any antitrust issues,
the Supreme Court held that a dominant firm could acquire a patent in
alternative technology that it was not using, and in effect put the patent “to
sleep” except for the right to bring infringement lawsuits.455 Worse yet, the
lawsuit had been sustained on a particularly broad reading of the patent law’s
doctrine of equivalents, which permits infringement actions against
technologies that do not literally infringe any claim in the holder’s patent.456
As a matter of patent law, Paper Bag is difficult to justify, even more
today given that entitlements to an injunction are governed by ordinary equity
principles. Injunctions are typically denied on unpracticed patents, although in
Trebro vs. Firefly the Federal Circuit recognized an exception for a firm that
competed in the market at issue but used a different technology than the one
covered by the patent.457 Further, the firm had acquired the patent from
someone else.458 The court held that, even though the patent in question was
unpracticed, the infringement plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm, a

453 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
454 See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 707c.
455 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 427–30 (1908); see

also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 295–99. The putting patents “to sleep”
phrase came from CLARK, supra note 173, at 145.
456 See supra note 183 and accompanying text; see also Herbert A. Johnson, The
Wright Patent Wars and Early American Aviation, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 21, 39–40 (2004);
Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 392 (2012).
457 Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
458 See id. at 1171–72; see also Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F. Cotter, Anticompetitive
Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2–3).
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requirement for an injunction, because it and the infringement defendant were
direct competitors.459
The Trebro decision represents the worst of both worlds—doing nothing
to further patent policy by actually permitting a firm to remove technology
from the market altogether, while also protecting a firm from competition in
precisely the circumstances it should be encouraged.
For a century or more, antitrust courts have accommodated patent policy
in their decisions involving patent practices made the subject of antitrust
challenge. In sharp contrast, patent law cases virtually never confront the issue
except in the small subset of cases where antitrust counterclaims are raised.
Does balancing of the “equities” in a patent infringement case where an
injunction has been requested mean balancing a myopic set of factors having
to do with injury from patent infringement, or does it require examining a
broader set in which our preference for competitive markets is accorded
weight as well? In Trebro, the Federal Circuit found irreparable harm because
the market contained only three players and the infringement defendant
FireFly was a new entrant among the three.460 The court observed that the sale
of a Firefly harvester was likely to steal a sale from Trebro, and that at least
one customer had switched from Trebro to Firefly.461 This theft of sales
counted as “harm” to the Federal Circuit, even though Firefly’s technology did
not infringe the technology that Trebro was actually using in its own
machines.462
But what counts as harm for purposes of patent law in this case counts as a
social benefit for purposes of competition policy. The decision effectively
gives dominant firms a protected right to buy up patents to technologies that
they do not actually use, simply to keep them from being deployed in the
market by prospective competitors. That is a great deal of harm to competition
policy, for little to nothing in return from patent policy.
To be sure, the facts suggest a case for antitrust, perhaps by means of a
counterclaim. In order to do that, the infringement defendant would have to
show a relevant market for mechanical sod cutters, which contains only three
players, and the patentee’s market dominance. It would then have to show that
obtaining the injunction against the new entrant under these facts constituted
an exclusionary practice. That is where the rub comes in. A lawsuit on a valid
patent is expressly authorized by the Patent Act and not condemned under
antitrust law unless objectively unreasonable. Indeed, the Federal Circuit
approved an injunction in this case. Alternatively, the infringement defendant
could challenge the dominant firm’s purchase of the unpracticed patent as an
459 Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1171 (“[T]he fact that Trebro does not presently practice the
patent does not detract from its likely irreparable harm. To the contrary, Trebro and FireFly
are direct competitors selling competing products in this market. Thus, the record strongly
shows a probability for irreparable harm.”).
460 Id. (noting that until recently FireFly sold only parts).
461 Id. at 1170.
462 Id. at 1164.
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unlawful merger. If the merger were indeed unlawful, as appears likely in the
Trebro case, it would not matter whether the infringement suit was reasonably
brought.
A better alternative on the facts of this case is for a court of equity to
intervene with a patent law rule that weighs both competition and innovation
effects. Patent “misuse” doctrine once performed that function. It is not in
favor today, largely because it developed during a period of rather extreme
antitrust overreaching, identifying harmless patent practices as
anticompetitive.463 Nevertheless, just as the “antitrust injury” doctrine, which
is not articulated in any statute, forbids plaintiffs from using the antitrust laws
in anticompetitive ways,464 so too patent doctrine should serve to limit uses
that harm competition while doing nothing to further innovation. Before that
can happen, however, courts need to think of the Patent Act as a set of legal
rules that manage innovation and competition policy, not simply as a set of
property rules.

K. Non-Practicing Patent Aggregators Generally
A growing body of literature indicates that the enforcement activities of
patent aggregators are harming innovation.465 According to one recent report,
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) or “trolls” file more than 60% of
infringement suits.466 These are firms that acquire patents in order to monetize
them. Typically, the firms are neither producers who practice their patents nor
inventors who develop their patents internally.
The enforcement activities of PAEs are increasingly regarded as pure rent
seeking, pursuing innovators who are sued for their own internal research, not
because they have copied technology from others. For example, Mark Lemley
concludes that the “overwhelming majority” of PAE-initiated infringement
suits are being brought, not against copyists, but rather against those who
developed an invention independently.467 In too many cases the aggregator of
a large portfolio of patents brings an infringement suit against a technology
company’s own internally developed technology and is able to extract a
significant award. In addition, often the number of defendants is large,
strongly suggesting that the patent is obvious.468
This problem exists in significant part because patent infringement is a
strict liability offense, even when the patent being infringed is not being
463 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 258–89.
464 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
465 See supra note 88.
466 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 1

(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/CLJ2-JVCX.
467 Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 151, at 1462; Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent
Infringement Require Proof of Copying, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1526 (2007).
468 See supra notes 199–201.
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practiced. In this respect patent law differs from copyright and trade secret
law, which require actual copying as a precondition for infringement, although
copying can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. The strict liability
infringement rule is particularly onerous in markets for information
technologies where patents are easy to obtain, numerous, costly to interpret,
and difficult to search. Further, to the extent they are not explicitly practiced,
there are no devices that can be examined.
These facts raise two questions, and it is important to keep them distinct.
The first is whether we are issuing far too many obvious patents, with the
result that people in the ordinary course of developing new ideas become
unsuspecting infringers. The second has to do with the way information about
patents and existing technology is disseminated. Before an innovator can
proceed without concern about patent infringement the patents that already
exist need to be both discovered and interpreted. To the extent that either of
these activities is too costly we produce innocent infringers. As a general
matter, the cost of providing notice is lower than the cost of searching—a fact
that must be considered if we want to improve the system.469 Further, as long
as knowledge about a patent is not required for infringement, patentees have
no reason to supply any more notice than they can get away with.
The strict liability rule for patent infringement has been widely criticized,
all the more because of the recent sharp increase in PAE activity. The widely
used term patent “troll” suggests the catching of people who are unaware that
they have committed patent infringement until they are surprised.470 A few
voices defend the existing scheme, at least with qualifications, arguing that
requiring proof of copying could drastically change patent law’s incentive
structure.471 While that argument has some force when we are talking about
469 On this point, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Notice and Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 221, 225 (2011); see also Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 5–6 (2013); Amanda Frye, “Inextricably Commingled”: A Restitution Perspective
in Patent Remedies, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 669, 687 (2013); Mark P. Gergen et al., The
Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 203, 247 (2012); Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice
Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 20 (2013); Stewart E. Sterk, Strict Liability and
Negligence in Property Theory, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2129, 2153 (2012).
470 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 467, at 1525, 1526; Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the
Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643, 1653 (2010); Stephen M. Maurer
& Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defense in Intellectual Property, 69
ECONOMICA 535, 540 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 92, 92
(2006); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105
MICH. L. REV. 475, 479 (2006).
471 See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV.
465, 528 (2004) (arguing that “an independent creation privilege in patent law would too
drastically reduce incentives to create”); Merges, supra note 153, at 6. For the practitioner
viewpoint, see Roger Milgrim, An Independent Invention Defense to Patent Infringement:
The Academy Talking to Itself: Should Anyone Listen?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 295, 296 (2008).
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practiced patents that are embodied in products that are widely disseminated, it
seems much more strained when we are speaking of unpracticed patents that
are highly complex and difficult to assess. Some compromises may be
available. One would be to require proof of copying in cases where the
invention is not practiced by either the infringement plaintiff or explicit
licensees.
Given the high number of infringement actions filed by aggregators, this is
a ballooning crisis in the patent system, particularly when one considers that
such lawsuits are discouraging rather than encouraging innovative activity. To
acknowledge that is to recognize a serious disconnect between what the patent
system should be doing and what it is actually doing.
Using the antitrust laws in such situations presents significant difficulties,
although they are not always insurmountable. First, the patent aggregator is
typically not a product producer. Even if the infringement lawsuits are
objectively baseless, the plaintiff is not practicing and as a result is typically
not competing in the infringement defendant’s product market.472 This makes
the case distinguishable from Walker Process, where the improper
infringement lawsuit was being used to exclude a rival. Mounting an antitrust
challenge to the aggregation and enforcement of a large patent portfolio, even
if the patents are unused, would require identification of a relevant market in
which competition is lessened.
That is not the end of the query, however. The patent aggregator and the
infringement defendant are in fact in a potential seller–buyer (licensor–
licensee) relationship. Consumers as well as competitors have antitrust
standing to challenge improper infringement suits that threaten higher prices in
the markets in which they purchase.473
Perhaps some lawsuits by PAEs can be addressed under antitrust as well
as patent law. The domain of antitrust is restricted, however, requiring proof of
harm to competition as well as improper conduct. A threat of higher royalties
would be sufficient, provided that the injury affects the market and not simply
one firm. That is, it must at least partly be passed on to customers. To
illustrate, an improper patent infringement suit forcing a few firms in a highly
competitive market to pay royalties would not cause competitive harm. Such
firms would not be in a position to pass their injury on to customers, so the
harm would sound more in tort than antitrust. By contrast, if an improper
lawsuit is brought against a firm or group of firms with a sufficient market
position in their downstream product market, at least part of the royalty

472 See Erik Hovenkamp, Predatory Patent Litigation: How Patent Assertion Entities

Use Reputation to Monetize Bad Patents 2 (Aug. 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2308115, archived at http://perma.cc/AZ49-BXW3.
473 See, e.g., Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 505 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
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overcharge would pass into the market itself, causing the kind of competitive
injury that makes antitrust relevant.474
Even if the conduct fails to establish antitrust harm, the patent courts
certainly have the power to discipline improper litigation conduct under either
the exceptional case provision, which does not require competitive injury,475
or their own equitable powers.

IX. CONCLUSION: INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND THE EQUITABLE
POWERS OF COURTS
Antitrust and patent law are both incomplete and imperfect instruments for
dealing with complex problems of the innovation economy. The American
patent system is older than federal antitrust enforcement, but it has also been
dominated by a property law mentality that has paid inadequate attention to the
innovation and competition effects of patent law’s own processes. This is in
sharp contrast to antitrust law, which has been much more proactive in
assimilating economic knowledge into policy.
The rise, very considerable excesses, and subsequent decline of judgemade patent “misuse” doctrine was an opportunity lost. Patent misuse doctrine
promised patent law something that it needed a century ago and needs even
more today—namely, a body of rules derived from patent law itself and
designed to make the system more consistent with its underlying goals.
Misuse doctrine got off to a reasonably good start a century ago in the
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. case. The Supreme
Court relied on patent doctrine rather than antitrust law to refuse enforcement
of a clearly anticompetitive patent license restraint.476 Within a few years,
however, the doctrine had gone off the rails, reaching practices such as
variable proportion ties of unpatented commodities that were never shown to
be offensive to either competition policy or innovation policy.477
In an equity case, the historical remedy for a plaintiff’s inequitable
conduct—its “unclean hands”—is to deny relief in that case. Beginning in the
1940s, however, the Supreme Court developed a much more draconian remedy
for patent misuse, making the patent unenforceable against anyone until the

474 See Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No. 12-CV-1143 YGR,
2013 WL 6247594, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (refusing to dismiss antitrust
complaint).
475 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012); see also supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
476 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519 (1917).
477 See, e.g., Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 34 (1931);
see also Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684
(1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942). On patent misuse,
see generally BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 258–89; Bohannan, supra note
310, at 497; DARYL LIM, PATENT MISUSE AND ANTITRUST LAW: EMPIRICAL, DOCTRINAL
AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES (2013).
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misuse was “purged.”478 Of course, that may be the effect if the inequitable
conduct serves to make the patent unenforceable as a general matter, but that is
hardly always the case.
Interestingly, the courts did not really need misuse to pursue what they
believed to be antitrust violations such as tying. Already in 1909 the Supreme
Court had recognized antitrust illegality as a defense to a breach of contract
action.479 The Court held that a contract that was part of a price fixing
conspiracy could not be enforced.480 There was no obvious reason that an
antitrust violation could not be asserted as a defense to a patent infringement
claim. Had the Supreme Court pursued that route, the law of misuse might
have taken a different course.
By mid-century, Congress was rightfully unhappy with the patent misuse
doctrine, and the 1952 Patent Act limited its reach.481 The limitations were
expanded in 1988 to preclude tying claims unless market power in the tying
product was shown, and to clarify that a unilateral refusal to license could not
be misuse.482 More recently the courts have construed the doctrine so narrowly
that it barely exists,483 although somewhat more room remains for a doctrine
of copyright misuse.484 In general, the courts have moved from a framework
that evaluates misuse claims by considering whether the conduct extends the
patentee’s power “beyond the scope” of the patent, to a framework that limits
misuse to conduct that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws.485 The
limitation makes misuse almost irrelevant. Further, it serves to take misuse out
of patent policy where it belongs and place it within antitrust policy. The result
has been largely to remove the federal judge’s equitable powers to limit a
patent remedy unless the patentee is violating the antitrust laws, breaking an
explicit provision of the Patent Act, or making clear misrepresentations during
patent prosecution or litigation.
478 See U.S. Gypsum v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957) (holding that
plaintiff could not recover until original misuse was purged); B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314
U.S. 495, 498 (1942) (holding patent unenforceable until misuse purged).
479 Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 261–62 (1909).
480 Id. at 262 (“The plaintiff comes into court admitting that it is an illegal combination
whose operations restrain and monopolize commerce and trade among the States . . . [but]
a court will not lend its aid, in anyway [sic], to a party seeking to realize the fruits of an
agreement that appears to be tainted with illegality . . . .”).
481 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)–(3) (2012).
482 Id. § 271(d)(4)–(5).
483 See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc) (refusing to extend the patent misuse doctrine to concerted refusals to
license).
484 See, e.g., Assessment Techs., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 645, 647 (7th
Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (using copyrighted software to “sequester” uncopyrighted data was
a practice akin to misuse).
485 See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Posner, J.) (stating that antitrust exhausts the full range of anticompetitive conduct,
leaving no residual for misuse claims).
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This story is unfortunate because room remains for more patent law equity
doctrine regarding conduct that falls short of an antitrust violation but is
nevertheless inconsistent with patent law’s purpose to facilitate innovation.486
Attempts to restrict the public domain via patent practices, to restrain
innovation by others, to engage in tortious but nonmonopolistic conduct such
as misrepresentation,487 or to enforce patents under circumstances that harm
competition while doing nothing for innovation still need to be countered. For
example, a clause in a license agreement forbidding a licensee from
developing any technology in competition with the plaintiff’s technology
might not be a sufficient exercise of power to violate the antitrust laws, but
patent law itself is concerned about practices that restrain innovation even if
they are not antitrust violations.488 The same thing can be true of patent license
agreements that forbid reverse engineering or that foreclose competing
technologies.489 As the Supreme Court has noted, reverse engineering is an
“essential part of innovation.”490
One value of misuse doctrine in such settings is that the remedy can be
limited. Rather than assessing treble damages, as antitrust does, or making a
patent completely unenforceable, a court could simply enjoin an abusive
practice or deny relief to the plaintiff in a particular case.
“Misuse” is a doctrine of equity,491 nearly always raised as a defense to a
patent infringement action. Seen in this light, the Supreme Court’s eBay
decision provides an important rationale for rethinking misuse.492 eBay
rejected a line of Federal Circuit decisions making an injunction more-or-less
automatic in patent infringement actions, largely in disregard of the Patent Act
provision.493 Rather, entitlement to an injunction against patent infringement
should track ordinary principles of equity, including a query whether an
486 For a fuller catalog, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 258–89.
487 See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 300, 324 (D. Del.

2013) (holding that the destruction of documents pertaining to alleged inequitable conduct
in contemplation of patent litigation unlawful).
488 Cf. Lasercomb Am. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding
copyright infringement in licensor’s clause that “[l]icensee agrees during the term of this
Agreement and for one (1) year after the termination of this Agreement, that it will not
write, develop, produce or sell or assist others in the writing, developing, producing or
selling computer assisted die making software, directly or indirectly without Lasercomb’s
prior written consent.”).
489 On the latter, see U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1189–
90, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
490 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989); see also
Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
restriction on reverse engineering constituted copyright misuse).
491 See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
492 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
493 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012) (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under
this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the
violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).
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injunction under the circumstances is in the public interest.494 The courts have
a legitimate role in policing conduct that is not expressly authorized by the
Patent Act and that serves to restrain innovation, sequesters the public domain,
imposes competitive harm disproportionate to innovation effects, or that
involves improprieties in the patent procurement process. The Trebro decision
discussed above is a good example.495 Any examination sensitive to both
innovation and competition concerns should have convinced a court in equity
that the public interest demanded denial of an injunction.
Calling the patentee’s conduct in such cases “misuse” is probably ill
advised, given the history of that term and the criticism that has properly been
heaped upon its use. But eBay’s equitable principles stretch far beyond
“misuse”—a term that eBay’s majority and two concurring opinions never
used, even as every Justice agreed that the judge in a patent infringement case
clearly had the power to withhold an injunction.496
Antitrust policy responded to a half century of overreaching by developing
extremely strict rules for establishing competitive harm. Beginning in the
1970s and continuing to this day, antitrust has undergone a revolution in
thinking that has disciplined and narrowed its focus and made its rules more
consistent with its underlying goals. Patent law would benefit significantly
from such a process—one that reflects consumer interests more strongly and
that takes our economic knowledge of innovation and its relationship to
competition and economic growth more fully into account. Today, the one
enormous advantage that antitrust law has over patent law is that it confronts
the economic question of impact on competition directly and explicitly, often
dismissing complaints when harm to competition cannot be shown. Patent law
needs to take a page from this playbook.

494 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. In order to be entitled to an injunction the plaintiff must

show:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.

Id.

495 Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see

also supra notes 457–58.
496 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 (Thomas, J., majority opinion); id. at 394–95 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring); id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

